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**THE TRUTH ABOUT
MESOPOTAMIA
PALESTINE & SYRIA**

THE TRUTH ABOUT MESOPOTAMIA PALESTINE & SYRIA

BY

J. DE V. LODER

WITH A FOREWORD

BY

LORD ROBERT CECIL



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PREFACE

THE writing of this little book was suggested to me while working for the League of Nations Union. It is an attempt to supply a background for the discussion of the application of the ideas of which the League of Nations is the expression to former territories of the Ottoman Empire. This seems to me to be the crux of what may be called the Arab or Middle Eastern problem. The question is of special interest to the British public in view of British responsibilities in Palestine and Mesopotamia. British policy in this part of the world is continually the subject of minute scrutiny in the Press, and, to judge from my personal experience, the matter is one about which information is desired by all those who take any interest in foreign affairs. Nothing has so far been published giving an account of recent events and looking at the problem of the Arab countries as a whole. My object has been, as far as possible, to establish a body of facts which even the ardent supporter of particular causes will at least accept as the result of a dispassionate attempt to reach the truth.

I can make no claim to have achieved an exhaustive survey of the subject. Sources of information are limited, and I have had to make the best of what has been made available in official publications, in the

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Press and periodicals, and in books dealing with various restricted aspects. I have, however, been able to rely to some extent on my own first-hand knowledge in the selection and compilation of my facts. Since early in the war I have been in close touch with affairs in the Near and Middle East. After a period of regimental service at the Dardanelles and in Egypt, I was for the two years up to the Armistice in the Political Intelligence Department of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, and subsequently worked for two years in the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office. Since the end of 1920 my connection with the League of Nations Union has caused me to concern myself with Eastern problems from the League point of view.

I am very grateful to Lord Robert Cecil for having contributed a foreword, especially as he undertook to do so on the eve of his departure for America, and to Mr. Leonard Stein for contributing an Appendix on the history and aims of Zionism from the Zionist point of view. I have also to thank Dr. D. G. Hogarth, Mrs. Edgar Dugdale, Mr. Oliver Brett and others, who for various reasons have preferred to remain anonymous, for their kindness in reading the manuscript and assisting me with their expert advice.

Where alternative spellings of place-names exist I have generally adopted the form recommended by the Royal Geographical Society's Permanent Committee on Geographical Names.

J. DE V. LODER.

May 1923.

FOREWORD

By LORD ROBERT CECIL

I COMMEND this little book to all those who wish to know the facts that have led up to the present position in the Middle East. The author does not seek to draw conclusions, nor does he take sides, except with great moderation on one or two points. But he gives his readers the salient material to form a sane judgment. Only on one matter would I make some reserve—I am not sure that on the Palestine question I quite take his view. The Zionist policy seems to me of vital importance to the world. A nation without a country of its own is an anomaly, and anomalies bring trouble. Nor has the Arab State any ground of complaint. The recognition of a Jewish national home was part of the terms on which the Arab State was brought into existence, subject, of course, to the rights of individual Arabs being fully protected.

I am therefore a convinced Zionist. But that is a matter of opinion. The purpose of this book—and a very valuable purpose—is to state the facts, and that purpose is admirably accomplished.

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THE TRUTH ABOUT MESOPOTAMIA PALESTINE AND SYRIA

CHAPTER I

THE ARABS AND THE WAR

Origins of the Arab Movement—Growth of the movement before the war—Situation in Arabia—Early circumstances of the war—Negotiations with the Sherif of Mecca—Negotiations between the Allies—The Arab part in the war—The Balfour Declaration—The Anglo-French Declaration.

THE Arabs have only come into prominence as an entity in the modern world in consequence of the war, but what is known as the Arab Movement had been in existence for many years before 1914. Anti-Turk in its origin, but developing national tendencies largely owing to the stimulus of Western ideas, this movement has come to be regarded as being in the nature of an Arab renaissance. This is only partially true. The Moslem majority, indeed, look back to the conditions inaugurated by the first great sweep of Islamic conquest and developed in the heyday of the Ommayyide and Abbaside Empires in order to find an inspiration in the past for the

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construction of a brilliant future. This also applies, but to a less extent, to members of unorthodox Moslem communities such as the Shiah, and to the members of such derivative religions as the Druse. Even Christians of various denominations have come to acquire a share of pride in the glories of this bygone epoch. But community of language and community of feeling against the Turks outweigh whatever sense there may be of community of race and tradition. A widespread, though by no means universal, feeling of solidarity undoubtedly exists, however, in what are known as the Arab countries, and it is the expression of this feeling which we call the Arab Movement.

When we speak of the Arab countries we mean the area within which the Arab Movement, as defined above, has a general permeating influence. It includes all those territories of the former Ottoman Empire lying to the south of the Taurus range and the mountains of Kurdistan, together with the Arabian peninsula. Egypt must be excluded, for, although there are theoretically as good grounds for including it as exist elsewhere, the Arab Movement has not in fact been a force there. This is because circumstances have separated the Egyptian tradition from that which binds together the eastern neighbours of Egypt. The success of Mehemet Ali during the second quarter of the nineteenth century in securing virtual independence for Egypt, and the subsequent British occupation, removed the country from the sphere of direct Turkish action just at the time when the Arab Movement was beginning its modern career because

of that action. But although for present purposes it is therefore best to omit Egypt from the category of Arab countries, it is not impossible that the affinity may become an active factor at some future period.

From the time when Kurd and Seljuk interlopers achieved the gradual downfall of the Arab Caliphate in the ninth century any corporate sense which may have existed among Arabs declined, until it practically died out after the Ottoman conquests of the fifteenth century. It was not until four hundred years later that this sense began to revive, largely in response to the stimulus of Western ideas on the subject of nationality. For some time the ideal of Islamic solidarity encouraged by Sultan Abdul Hamid's Pan-Islamic policy counteracted any separatist tendency in the Arab Movement. But when the Young Turk revolution of 1908 brought "Ottomanization" into the forefront of the Constantinople Government's schemes, the relations between Arabs and Turks, which in many places, such as in Arabia and in the Syrian desert, had never been very close, developed a strong antagonism on national lines, which had, indeed, been growing up for more than a generation.

The measures adopted by the Young Turks soon convinced the Arabs that a deliberate attempt was being made to suppress their culture and tradition and to substitute that which was purely Turkish. Arabs who were not able or prepared to be thus assimilated found it impossible to obtain preferment in civil or military appointments. The use of Arabic was excluded from official use and dis-

Growth of the
Arab Move-
ment prior to
the war.

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couraged in the schools. In consequence, Arab National Committees began to be formed in opposition to the Committee of Union and Progress.

While the Turks were in a position to suppress to a great extent the manifestations of Arab self-consciousness in the Syrian and Mesopotamian provinces, they were unable to do so equally effectively in Arabia proper.

Situation of
Arabia.

Except in certain western districts, notably Hejaz and Yemen, where Turkish domination was to a certain extent secured by military occupation and by the Hejaz railway, their authority in the Arabian peninsula was little more than nominal, and was, moreover, in some parts counterbalanced by British influence. Apart from the general effects of British predominance in the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, the occupation of Aden and the treaty relations existing with such rulers as the Sheikh of Koweit and the Sultan of Oman gave Great Britain a position of special importance on the southern and eastern littorals.

Arabia is a geographical expression and corresponds to no political entity. The social and political organization of the Arabian peoples is still in the patriarchal and tribal stage. The Emirs of Mecca, Nejd and Hail, the Idrisi of 'Asir, the Imam of Yemen, the Sultans of Oman and Koweit, were, with other lesser chieftains, virtually independent rulers whose sovereignty was only partially limited by the enforcement of Turkish claims to supremacy or by British intervention. Thus while the lower level of civilization entailed the

absence of those intellectual motives which animated the Arab Movement in the more advanced Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire, the primitive spirit of independence subsisted in Arabia in a more definite form.

It was natural that when Turkey entered the war the Allies should see in the Arab Movement an instrument wherewith to counteract
Early circumstances of the war. Turco-German attempts to incite the Moslem world to "Jihad," or Holy

War, and Great Britain was the Power to whom it obviously fell to find a means of using this instrument. The choice of an agent fell on Hussein, the Sherif of Mecca, who for various reasons appeared most suitable for the purpose. For some years Hussein had been strengthening his position in the hope of being able some day to throw off the Turkish yoke and advance to the fulfilment of a policy of aggrandizement inspired by dreams of the restoration of an Arab Empire. He was thus likely to embrace this favourable opportunity with avidity. Any rivals he may have had for the position of leader of an Arab revolt suffered under serious disqualifications. Turkish policy had effectively reduced the influence of the leading families in Syria and Mesopotamia; Ibn Saud of Nejd and the Imam Yehia of Yemen were heretics; none of the other Arabian princes represented any particular factor of importance in the Moslem world, while Hussein had the advantage of holding the most sacred places of Islam within his dominions. At the same time it must not be supposed that the support

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of the Sherif of Mecca was in any way calculated to have the results which the adhesion of a recognized leader might have promised. He had no particular religious authority, the prestige accruing from his territorial position being almost entirely temporal, nor could he really speak for anyone but himself. But as an ambitious man with certain claims to special regard by the Arabs and by the Moslem world in general, he appeared the most suitable agent the Allies could lay their hands on.

Nevertheless, the tentative negotiations carried on during the earlier months of the war proved inconclusive. Hussein was doubtless minded to make sure he was "backing the right horse." While endeavouring to counter any move by the Turks which might impede his freedom of action, he was careful at this stage to keep up an appearance of friendliness with them. In order to avoid the application of conscription in his territories, he allowed a contingent of volunteers to be recruited for the abortive Turkish expedition to the Suez Canal in February 1915, and he used his influence on behalf of some of the crew of the *Emden* who got into difficulties on the Red Sea coast. The military situation was indeed not such as to inspire any certainty in the victory of the Allies. So far as the Eastern theatres were concerned, the British occupation of lower Mesopotamia and the repulse of the Turks in Sinai was set off by the doubtful issue of the Dardanelles operations and by some Turkish successes against the garrison of Aden, which had

Negotiations
with the Sherif
of Mecca,
1915-1916.

local repercussions out of proportion to their true significance.

This indecisive attitude was changed by the action of the Turks themselves. They had been suspicious of the Arabs from the beginning, and these suspicions had been confirmed by the discovery of documents in the closed Allied consulates in Syria incriminating a number of local Arabs of relations with the Allies. The drastic measures instituted by Jemal Pasha to check disaffection were the result. They had the effect of frightening Hussein lest a similar reign of terror should be introduced in Hejaz, and he was further being urged by Syrians who had fled from the Turkish wrath to draw the sword on behalf of Arab freedom.

In July 1915 a correspondence began, and continued until the beginning of the following year, between Hussein and the British High Commissioner in Egypt, representing His Majesty's Government, in the course of which the conditions of Arab intervention on behalf of the Allies were discussed. Great importance is to be attached to these documents, since they contain those engagements binding the British and Arab Governments which were to prove such a fertile source of trouble in the sequel.¹

Hussein started by asking Great Britain to acknowledge the future independence of the regions bounded on the north by a line starting from Mersina and passing through Adana to the 37th parallel of latitude, which it was to follow through Birijik, Urfa

¹ The full text of this correspondence has never been published, but fairly complete summaries and substantial extracts have seen the light in the Press from time to time.

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and Mardin to the Persian frontier ; on the east by the Persian frontier to the Gulf of Basra ; on the south by the Indian Ocean, with the exception of Aden, which was to remain British ; on the west by the Red Sea and the Mediterranean. Great Britain was further asked to recognize the establishment of an Arab Caliphate and to agree to the abolition of foreign privileges (i.e. capitulations) in the Arab countries. In return, the Sherifian Government offered Great Britain preference in all economic enterprises in the Arab countries whenever conditions of enterprise are otherwise equal. A mutual defensive military alliance was proposed, together with an agreement to preserve neutrality in the event of an offensive war being waged by the other party.

The British Government, foreseeing difficulties in the acceptance of such definite commitments, returned a somewhat vague answer to these advances, confirming its desire for the independence of *Arabia* and its approval of an Arab Caliphate, both of which had been affirmed by Lord Kitchener some months before, but attempting to shelve the discussion of Arab frontiers on the grounds that it was advisable to wait and see what the situation would be at the close of hostilities.

Hussein was not to be thus put off. Asserting that the territorial claims were not put forward as personal demands, but on behalf of the Arab race as a whole, he insisted on their integral recognition ; whereupon the British representative, in consideration of this insistence, was empowered to convey the views of the British Government on the subject in the following terms :—

The districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and the portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Hama, Homs and Aleppo cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded from the proposed limits and boundaries. With the above modification, and without prejudice to our existing treaties with Arab chiefs, we accept these limits and boundaries, and in regard to those portions of the territories therein in which Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interest of her ally, France, I am empowered in the name of the Government of Great Britain to give the following assurance and make the following reply to your letter :—

Subject to the above modifications, Great Britain is prepared to recognize and support the independence of the Arabs within the territories included in the limits and boundaries proposed by the Sherif of Mecca.

Great Britain will guarantee the Holy Places against all external aggression and will recognize their individuality.

When the situation admits, Great Britain will give to the Arabs her advice, and will assist them to establish what may appear to be the most suitable forms of government in these various territories.

On the other hand, it is understood that the Arabs have decided to seek the advice and guidance of Great Britain only, and that such European advisers and officials as may be required for the formation of a sound form of administration will be British.

With regard to the vilayets of Baghdad and Basra, the Arabs will recognize that the established position and interests of Great Britain necessitate special measures of administrative control, in order to secure these territories from foreign aggression, to promote the welfare of the local populations, and to safeguard our mutual economic interests.

In his reply Hussein agreed to abandon claims to any territory in the districts of Mersina and Adana, but maintained those to the whole vilayets of Aleppo and Beirout, disputing the contention in the British Note that "portions of Syria lying west of the districts of Damascus, Hama, Homs and Aleppo" were also not entirely Arab. Fearing, no doubt, that the

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stipulation about the vilayets of Baghdad and Basra might open the way to a greater degree of British control than he was prepared to admit, he further affirmed the Arab right to these provinces, offering only to leave the districts at that moment occupied by British troops under British administration "for a short time," in return for suitable pecuniary compensation, and agreeing to recognize special agreements with local sheikhs.

It was explained to Hussein in a subsequent letter that the interests of France being involved in the disposal of the vilayets of Aleppo and Beirout, this question would have to be left open, but the Sherif made it clear that he was not prepared to make any concessions. While abandoning the discussion for the moment in the interest of Allied unity, he announced that "at the first opportunity after this war is finished we shall ask you (what we avert our eyes from to-day) for that which we now leave to France in Beirout and the coasts." Pointing out the disadvantage, not only to the Arabs but to British interests, of establishing the right of another Power to interfere in these parts, he continued: "In addition to which the people of Beirout will decidedly never accept such isolation, and may oblige us to undertake new measures which may exercise Great Britain certainly not less than her present troubles, because of our belief and certainty in the reciprocity of our interests, which is the only cause that caused us never to care to negotiate with any other Power than you. Consequently, it is impossible to allow any derogation that gives France, or any other Power, a span of land in these regions." Further dis-

cussion of the British position in Mesopotamia was also suspended. The British Government gave a general assurance that "Great Britain has no intention of concluding any peace on terms of which the freedom of the Arab peoples from German and Turkish domination does not form an essential condition."

It will be seen that the measure of agreement reached in these negotiations did not include a settlement of the future relations between the Arabs and the Great Allied Powers; in fact, the correspondence stressed certain points that were sure to cause dissensions later. The immediate object of securing co-operation between the Arabs and the Allies, with a view to the eventual separation from the Ottoman Empire of territories inhabited in majority by Arabs, was, it is true, advanced. The Arabs, however, regarded this co-operation and separation as a means of attaining an independence limited (if at all) only by their own requests for assistance, while the Allies sought the co-operation primarily as a means of winning the war, and were further concerned about the changes in their mutual political relations which the separation of Arab territories from Turkey involved. Negotiations were, indeed, proceeding at this very time between the Allies for the division of the spoils accruing from the anticipated disintegration of the whole Ottoman Empire.

The agreement concluded in the spring of 1915 between Great Britain, France and Russia, by which the Russian claim to Constantinople was recognized, stipulated further negotiations between the three Powers for the determination of their prospective

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acquisitions in Asiatic Turkey. These negotiations resulted in the agreement of February 1916 defining the extent of Russian acquisitions in Armenia and Kurdistan, of French acquisitions in central Anatolia, Cilicia and the coastal regions of Syria, and of British acquisitions in southern Mesopotamia and in respect of the ports of Haifa and Acre. Finally, a supplementary agreement between Great Britain and France, generally known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement, was signed in March and confirmed by an explanatory exchange of Notes between the two Governments in May 1916¹ regulating Franco-British relations with special regard to Arab aspirations.

Negotiations
between the
Allies.

It is with this last set of documents that we are here concerned. Their provisions were secret and remained unknown to the Sherif until they were divulged by the Bolsheviks at the end of 1917. It is for this reason, and because the negotiations between the Allies and those between Great Britain and the Sherif were proceeding simultaneously, that the British communications to Hussein were for the most part couched in such vague and guarded terms. It is not clear how far the French Government were kept informed of these Sherifian discussions. They were, of course, aware of their immediate purpose and general tenor, but it would seem that their knowledge was too incomplete for a full realization of the latitude of interpretation permitted by the inconclusive state in which matters were left, having regard on the one hand to the definition of Arab pretensions, of

¹ For text see Appendix I., p. 161.

which the French were only partially cognizant, and on the other hand to the Sherif's ignorance of the parallel negotiations. How it came about that the British Government, which alone held complete data, should thus have left such obvious openings for confusion and conflict it is difficult to say. It may, however, be surmised that the difficulty of reconciling the ambitions of France and the Sherif induced the British not to attempt to bring about a comprehensive and conclusive settlement for fear of introducing fatal complications at a critical stage of the war. The British Government, while apparently quite sincere in its belief that the two sets of engagements were not contradictory, foresaw that neither the French nor the Arabs were likely to accept this point of view.

The arrangements embraced by the so-called Sykes-Picot Agreement involved the division of the area concerned into five zones, as follows:—

The Sykes-Picot Agreement.

1. A zone of British administration, commonly referred to as the "red" zone, embracing Mesopotamia from Basra to a line north of Baghdad, together with a small "enclave" on the Syrian coast, including the ports of Haifa and Acre.

2. A zone of French administration (blue), embracing, in addition to Cilicia and a large part of central Anatolia, the Lebanon and a broad strip extending along the Syrian coast, carved out of the vilayets of Aleppo, Beirout and Damascus.

3. A zone of British influence (B) embracing

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all the intermediate country between Palestine and Mesopotamia and prolonging the Mesopotamia red zone to beyond Tekrit.

4. A zone of French influence (A) embracing all the country east and south of the blue zone and north of the B zone, including the cities of Damascus Aleppo and Mosul.

5. An international (brown) zone intended to correspond with Palestine.

Within zones (A) and (B) Great Britain and France expressed themselves "disposed to recognize and protect an independent Arab State or a Confederation of Arab States under the suzerainty of an Arab head." They reserved for themselves within their respective spheres a priority right on local enterprise and loans, and the right "alone to supply advisers and foreign officials at the request of the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States."

Within the "blue" and "red" zones Great Britain and France were to be respectively authorized "to establish such direct or indirect administrations or such control as they desire and may deem it expedient to establish in agreement with the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States."

In the "brown" zone was to be established "an international administration whose form shall be decided after consultation with Russia, and subsequently in agreement with the other Allies and the representatives of the Sherif of Mecca."

Further provisions dealt with the Baghdad Railway, the establishment of Alexandretta and Haifa as free

ports, Cyprus, Arabia, and other matters concerning the commercial and political relations of the contracting parties.

Meanwhile, circumstances had arisen in Arabia which decided the Sherif to raise the standard of revolt immediately, in spite of the ambiguities of the political situation even so far as it was known to him, and although the military preparations were still incomplete. During May 1916 the Turks considerably reinforced the garrisons of Medina and by other measures made it clear that western Arabia was going to be made a strong base of operations for the Red Sea and the African coast. Hussein at once foresaw that this meant the introduction of direct Turkish control and the destruction of his liberty of action. On June 5th he at last threw off the mask and commenced hostilities with such Bedouin levies as he could induce to take the field.

It would be useless to the purpose of these pages to detail the military history of the Arab revolt, but some account must be given of its general progress in order to understand the relation to the main Allied plan of campaign and the position held by the Arabs after the conclusion of hostilities.

The weak, isolated Turkish ports and garrisons in South Hejaz were unable to offer any serious resistance to the attacks of the Sherif's tribesmen. By the end of 1916 they had all been swept away. At the same time the Idrisi of 'Asir and the Imam of Yemen were being encouraged to declare openly against the

The Arab part
in the war,
1916-1918.

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Turks. The former did so and co-operated with the British at Aden to immobilize the Turkish forces in the south-west corner of the peninsula. In central Arabia, Ibn Saud of Nejd, who had also been persuaded to embrace the Allied cause, maintained a conflict with the Emir of Hail, who was supported by the Turks, choice of side in these cases being dictated by an old-established rivalry between the two chieftains. The Turks, however, still maintained a contact with northern Arabia, through the Hejaz railway, which extends along 800 miles of single track across mostly desert country from Damascus to Medina. The latter city had repulsed the first Arab attacks owing to the relative strength of its garrison, and was able to hold out owing to its position at the head of the railway and owing to the resources of the oasis in which it is situated. A close investment was established, which prevented any offensive action by the Turks from this quarter, but the Arab forces were never able to effect its reduction, partly owing to their lack of training and partly owing to their unwillingness to bombard the Holy City. The Arabs did not enter Medina until its surrender after the Armistice.

The long and vulnerable line of railway which supplied Turkish communications with Arabia was the natural point on which the Arab efforts were concentrated. During 1917 the Turkish posts along the line were subjected to continuous raids, and sections of the track were repeatedly demolished. But the natural indiscipline of the Arabs and their inexperience in scientific warfare prevented them from inflicting irreparable damage. The Arab efforts were neverthe-

less a continual source of annoyance to the Turks and created a useful diversion on their flank.

Meanwhile a regular Arab force of a few thousand men was being trained under British auspices. Arab propaganda was at the same time securing the defection from the Turks of tribes farther north on the eastern frontiers of Palestine and Syria. After the British advance in the autumn of 1917 and the capture of Jerusalem, the existence of an Arab political and military organization, however loose it may have been, became of increasing value. It afforded a rallying-point for the Arab populations of the regions now being invaded, and as the advance progressed Arab action could be brought to bear nearer and nearer the Turks' vital centres. During 1918 most of the tribes east of the Jordan were won over, and even in the settled districts of the west, which were in effective Turkish occupation, disaffection, seething beneath the surface, added greatly to the discomfort of the situation for the Turks.

During the final offensive of the autumn of 1918, which destroyed the Turkish armies and concluded only with the Armistice, the Arab forces for the first time played a distinct part in major operations. Under the guidance of Allied officers and with the help of Allied technical detachments, they were responsible for the attack on the eastern flank, which severed the Turkish railway communications in their rear at the junction of Deraa.

It will have been realized that the military part played by the Arabs in the Allied victory over the Turks was subordinate to the political. As has been

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already indicated, the secession of the Sherif of Mecca from his Turkish allegiance was an encouragement to other chieftains of Arabia to follow his example and provided a centre round which the disaffected elements in the Arab Ottoman provinces could rally. This was the principal service of the Hejaz revolt to the Allies, though the removal of a long stretch of Red Sea coast from Turco-German control was also a very important result. In return for the initiative he had assumed, the Sherif aimed at securing the recognition of his personal authority over all the territories which the Allies had promised to detach from the Ottoman Empire. The Allies had never pledged themselves to give such recognition, but if there had been convincing signs that the population as a whole were favourable to such a course, the idea might have compelled Allied support. There was, however, no formed body of opinion among the Arabs such as to leave the Allies no option but to accept it for the fulfilment of their avowed intentions, while French ambitions were a serious obstacle to treating the Arab countries as a unity. The Arabs desired independence, but had little idea of the forms it might take. In the circumstances, and given their lack of solidarity and political experience, this could hardly be otherwise. The Sherifian scheme held the field alone. It was the only *point d'appui* for those who wanted to get rid of the Turks, but there is no certainty that it would have been able to impose itself against the deadweight of negative resistance which undoubtedly existed.

There were, therefore, good reasons for the Allies not

to commit themselves hastily to the support of the Sherifian proposals. Whether this support, if wholeheartedly given, would have ensured their successful working in practice is doubtful. The rivalry between Great Britain and France effectively prevented the attempt being made, and divergences of views among the Arabs were thereby increased. In Arabia the effect of the war was merely to increase British at the expense of Turkish influence, which was completely eliminated. In Mesopotamia religious considerations, among others, mitigated against the acceptance of Sherifian authority. Even in Syria, where the influence of Mecca was able to make itself most felt, no unanimous verdict could have been confidently predicted. In Palestine a complication had been introduced through the recognition in November 1917 of Zionist aspirations in the terms of what is known as the Balfour Declaration.¹ This declaration, though issued in the name of the British Government, was approved, after some hesitation, by the French and Italian Governments, and ran as follows:—

His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish People, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

**The Balfour
Declaration,
November
1917.**

It was in these circumstances, and in the light of

¹ For the history and aims of Zionism and the opinion of non-Zionist Jews on the movement, see Appendix II., p. 165.

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the commitments expressed and implied in the negotiations and documents treated of in the preceding pages, that the following declaration of policy was issued jointly by the British and French Governments on November 7, 1918 :—

The Anglo-French Declaration, November 1918.

The end aimed at by France and Great Britain, in their carrying out of the war in the East unloosed by German ambition, is the complete and final enfranchisement of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks, and the establishment of national governments and administrations, drawing their authority from the initiative and free choice of the native populations.

To fulfil these purposes, France and Great Britain have agreed to encourage and help the establishment of native governments and administrations in Syria and Mesopotamia, which have been freed by the Allies, and in the territories whose liberation they are now pursuing, and to recognize these as soon as they are effectively established. Far from wishing to impose upon the populations of these regions any particular institutions, the Allies have no other desire than to assure, by their support and by an effective assistance, the normal functioning of the governments and administrations which the populations have freely given themselves. To assure an impartial and equal justice for all, to facilitate the economic development of the country by helping and encouraging local initiative, to favour the spread of education, to bring to an end Turkish political divisions, too long exploited, such is the rôle which the two Allied Governments assume in the liberated territories.

It would seem a natural consequence of this declaration that the secret Agreements revealed by the Bolsheviks should be revised. The establishment of the League of Nations and the invention of the Mandate system appeared to afford a suitable opportunity and method of doing so. But whereas

a change of form seems all that the Powers concerned intended, while a change of spirit in accordance with sentiments publicly declared was what the Arabs expected, misunderstandings, dissensions and conflicts forthwith arose.

CHAPTER II

CONDITIONS IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES UNDER ALLIED OCCUPATION UNTIL THE END OF 1918.

Stages of the occupation—Administration of the occupied territories: (1) in Mesopotamia, (2) in Palestine and Syria—General political situation after the Armistice.

THE occupation of the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire was achieved by two British armies, the Egyptian Expeditionary Force and the Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force, operating respectively across Sinai from Egypt and up the Tigris and Euphrates from the Persian Gulf. To the Egyptian Expeditionary Force was attached during the last two years of the war, for political reasons, a French detachment of all arms, amounting towards the end of the period to something like a mixed brigade, to which must be added the Armenian and Syrian volunteer corps of the Légion d'Orient.¹ There was

¹ At the opening of General Allenby's final offensive on September 19, 1918, the French Palestine detachment had a total fighting strength of about 7,000 men, composed as follows: one battalion of French territorial infantry, two battalions of Algerian infantry, one composite regiment of Algerian cavalry, two 75-mm. field batteries, two 65-mm. mountain batteries, an aeroplane squadron, and transport and technical troops in proportion. The Légion d'Orient was principally composed of Armenian refugees. It was formed at the end of 1916 and trained in Cyprus. It supplied

also an Italian detachment of a few hundred infantry.

The progress of the occupation may conveniently be divided into five main stages :—

1. Basra having fallen on November 22, 1914, the Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force had occupied almost the whole of the vilayet by July 1915, after the capture of 'Amara and Nasiriya.

2. As a result of the operations begun at the end of 1916, and resulting in the recovery of Kut and the fall of Baghdad (March 11, 1917), a large part of the vilayet of Baghdad, including the Shiah holy cities of Najaf, Karbala, Kadhimain and Samarra, came into British hands. Supplementary operations in the winter and spring of 1917-18 extended this area to Khanikin and Kifri, thus establishing contact with the Kurds and opening the way into north-western Persia.

3. Between the end of October 1917 and the beginning of the new year, the Egyptian Expeditionary Force advanced from its positions in front of Gaza, capturing Beersheba on October 31st, Jaffa on November 16th, Jerusalem on December 9th, and Jericho on February 31st, 1918, thus bringing southern Palestine west of the Dead Sea under British occupation.

4. During the offensive immediately preceding the Armistice the rest of Palestine and the whole of Syria were occupied. Haifa fell on September 23, 1918,

three infantry battalions in the offensive of September 1918, and thus increased the numbers of the French detachment to the figure given above. It included a number of Syrian recruits who were later formed into separate units.

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Damascus on October 1st, Beirout on October 7th, Aleppo on October 26th.

5. The Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force occupied the vilayet of Mosul as a result of operations preceding the Armistice and in consequence of the terms of the Armistice. Kirkuk was captured on October 25, 1918, and Mosul surrendered on November 8th.

In all these areas military administrations were set up, based as far as was practicable, and in accordance with international usage, on the previously existing system. **Administration of the Occupied Territories.** Executive authority was placed in the hands of military governors and political officers under a supreme administrative officer responsible to the Commanders-in-Chief.

In Mesopotamia civil matters were under the direction of the Government of India and the India Office. Indian currency was introduced, primarily **(1) In Mesopotamia.** to meet military requirements on account of the deficiency of local currency, and as a result of this influx no less than of the depreciation of the Turkish exchange, Turkish currency, except gold, which always commanded a premium, almost disappeared from circulation. Numerous officials were also provided from the Indian services.

For over three years the important commercial city of Basra and its neighbourhood, and for nearly two years the still more important city and province of Baghdad, were in British occupation before the

conclusion of hostilities made it possible to count on their ultimate detachment from the Ottoman Empire. Further, although the occupation of Mosul occurred when the defeat of the enemy was an accomplished fact, the rights of France under the Sykes-Picot Agreement made it appear that the British system of administration would only be temporary in this area.

But provisional though the administration must necessarily be throughout the country, the protracted occupation of a large proportion of it demanded the establishment of more systematic Government than strictly military considerations might have required elsewhere, since the inefficiency of Turkish methods made a partial reconstruction of the administrative machinery inevitable. Moreover, while it was incumbent on the British, having regard to the promises of the Allies to the Arabs, to encourage local talent and institutions, the privileged position which Great Britain anticipated acquiring in the final peace settlement predisposed her forthwith to the laying of permanent foundations. Considerable criticism of British procedure has been voiced both in England and among Arab nationalists, but it is well to discriminate between measures which were certainly intended to be the best for the country in the immediate circumstances and the prejudiced vision of the future with which the minds of officials steeped in Indian traditions may have been tinged.

The initial difficulties attendant on the taking over of a tract of Turkish territory are a measure of the task of an heir to Ottoman sovereignty. Officials of

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Turkish race withdrew with the retreating army and usually removed all the more important administrative records. But in addition to this, and to the inevitable confusion arising out of the nature of a state of war, the system of Government itself was so unsatisfactory or so distorted by misuse and abuse that the handling of it presented the greatest difficulties. Thus, in the vilayet of Basra at the time of the occupation

five departments of Government, apart from the general revenue, were independently collecting moneys and remitting them to Constantinople. . . . The net result of these five excrescences was that the normal life of the people was interfered with at almost every step and that no unification of system or taxation was possible.

There was a complete cleavage between the executive and revenue sides of the administration. The executive officers provided force for the collection of taxes, but they had no other concern with the revenue system. Taxes were collected usually by farming or by subordinate officials appointed annually to collect a specific tax. With few exceptions all demands were fluctuating. They were fixed each year by assessments, or by counts of the objects subject to taxation, such as sheep, buffaloes and camels, or date and fruit trees, or, in the case of crops, by estimation of the yield. The greater part of this work was done by a temporary official who had no interest in his particular employment beyond making the most of its short duration. There was no one permanently responsible for the probity of the collector in any area, and the system invited peculation and corruption. The invitation was seldom refused. . . .

It was necessary to set up temporarily some sort of revenue and fiscal administration. To this end it was decided to keep intact the Turkish system, to which people were accustomed, but to free it from corruption and abuses and increase its efficiency. The number of alien officials introduced was deliberately kept low. All other appointments were filled by the more honest of the ex-official people of the country,

the large majority being Moslems. This would have been in any case inevitable, as the records of the departments were all in Turkish; the language of vernacular records and receipts, together with all other business, was, however, changed to Arabic, a measure which satisfied local sentiment. One of the curses of the Turkish régime was the number of its officials; checks, counter-checks and delays being multiplied in order to provide occupation for fresh appointments. In consequence, no one did even half an honest day's work, and idleness pervaded every office. Under the British organization only the minimum number of officials were re-employed.¹

The new machinery of government developed out of the Revenue Department, which, for the reasons above stated, was the first to be established as the most pressing necessity and under which the principal spending departments could conveniently be grouped in the early stages. A general impression of the function of the Revenue Department would be conveyed by describing it as

the land agent of an estate, represented by 'Iraq, the proprietor being the Government. This was, in fact, the Ottoman concept, and it underlay the Agrarian system of the Turks. Mesopotamia was regarded by them as a conquered country, and all such lands as had not been allocated by the Government to provide individuals belonged in theory to the State.²

As time went on, Customs, Education and Aukaf (i.e. Pious Bequests) became separate departments. Agriculture and Irrigation were, during the war, regarded as primarily of military concern, the expense of instituting measures to encourage production being

¹ *Review of the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia*, Report by Miss Gertrude Bell. Cmd. 1061, 1920, p. 6.

² Miss Bell, op. cit., p. 7.

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considered justifiable only in so far as it was necessary for military supplies. It was this necessity which decided the occupation of the Euphrates Valley above Naziriya. The shortage of shipping made it difficult to supply the army from overseas, so that the promotion of cultivation in these fertile districts was of great importance. An Agricultural Development Scheme was produced early in 1918, and Departments of Agriculture and Irrigation of a quasi-civil character were formed.

The land, as in all non-industrialized countries, was the factor upon which Turkish administration was based, so that in Mesopotamia the relation of the population to the land pervades the history of the British occupation from an administrative point of view. From the urban population and the settled agriculturists in the neighbourhood of the towns to the nomadic tribes of the desert every gradation of mode of life exists. Under the Turkish régime it may be said that Turkish authority varied inversely as the degree of tribal organization. Thus in many parts of the country the local sheikhs had been practically independent. They seldom paid taxes and were only nominally within the field of action of the Turkish officials. Not only was this the case in more or less desert regions, but even in the valleys of the great rivers, especially in that of the Euphrates, and in the marshy lands of the Muntafiq. The magnitude of the task of reducing these elements to some sort of order and of inducing them to pay contributions to the exchequer may be imagined, and the degree of success achieved, though it may only have been the minimum

adequate for the moment, is a tribute to British methods, for it was certainly greater in a few months than that of which the Turks had been capable over a long series of years.

The complication and variation of systems of land tenure under these circumstances was a formidable embarrassment to the administration. The difficulties were enormously increased by the incredible inefficiency with which the method of land registration was carried out. It will be sufficient to mention the case of a document in which a garden in the neighbourhood of Basra was described as being bounded towards the south-west by the Red Sea to illustrate the amazing vagueness of the official descriptions of landed property.

It is not surprising that litigation about land should have been frequent and cases difficult of satisfactory adjustment. In other respects the administration of justice offered scarcely less desperate problems. It was found necessary to promulgate a special code, known as the 'Iraq Occupied Territories Code, based on Indian Law, since, with the flight of Turkish officials, no sufficient body of persons having experience of Ottoman Law could be collected. The objections to which this course was obviously open were fortunately counterbalanced by the simplicity and expeditiousness of the new system. The mass of the population soon reconciled themselves to the alteration of the rules to which they were accustomed and were appreciative of the honesty of practice which was even more strange to them. The confidence inspired is reflected by the degree to which arbitration by the local Political Officer was resorted to.

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Amongst the tribes the customary working of tribal justice was recognized, subject to the ratification of judgments by the local Political Officer. After the occupation of Baghdad the judicial system of the country was subjected to comprehensive examination, and a new system evolved based mainly on Ottoman Law, overhauled and brought up to date. This system was extended soon after the Armistice to the Basra vilayet, where it superseded the 'Iraq Occupied Territories Code, and to the Mosul vilayet, thus unifying the judicial administration throughout the country. Moslem or Sharah Law continued to be applied as heretofore, deficiencies in composition of regularly constituted courts being temporarily met by enabling the parties to choose a competent jurist before whom to submit their case.

By this last provision a very serious inequality between Sunni and Shiah Moslems was removed. Although the great majority of the population of Mesopotamia are Shiah, the Sunni law, to which the Ottoman Empire officially adheres, was alone officially recognized. The teachers in Government schools had all been Sunni. Hitherto the Qadis, or judges of the Sharah, had necessarily all been Sunni, and the judgments of Shiah jurists, to whom the holders of unorthodox tenents resorted, had had no official weight. Now equal legal authority was given to the decisions of the representatives of either doctrine.

The disregard of the Ottoman State for the upholders of a dissentient branch of the Moslem faith is comparable to the attitude of established Christian

Churches to their dissenting co-religionists in the more advanced Christian countries until quite recently and in others even until to-day. Where the majority of the population were officially dissenters, as in 'Iraq, this religious discrimination was an especially grievous burden, and the religious question was further accentuated because 'Iraq contained the Shiah holy cities.¹

Something must be said about the peculiar position held and influence exerted by these places, since the part they have played and will continue to play in Mesopotamian affairs is very considerable. Apart from their importance as sites of pilgrimages, they are the homes of the mujtahids or principal Shiah divines, persons who have achieved pre-eminence by the sole force with which their reputed piety and learning has impressed itself on the Shiah world. Persian influence is naturally deep, because Persia is the only Moslem State which officially adheres to Shiah tenets, and many of the inhabitants are Persians or of Persian origin. Kadhimain and Samarra only require passing mention, since the influence of the capital is directly felt there and the Sunni communities are considerable. Karbala and Najaf, however, are situated beyond the Euphrates in a region where Turkish authority has always been precarious, and have consequently been the obvious centres of political and

¹ Najaf contains the shrine of Ali, Mohammed's son-in-law; Karbala that of Hussein, the son of Ali; Kadhimain that of the ninth Imam; Samarra those of the tenth and eleventh Imams and the place where the twelfth Imam disappeared. All these Imams were direct descendants of Ali. The differentiation of Sunni and Shiah began in the seventh century A.D. between the supporters of an elective as opposed to a hereditary Caliphate.

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religious disaffection in this part of the Empire. The animosity between the tenants of these Shiah strongholds and the Turks was a considerable embarrassment to the latter during the war until this region passed out of their hands some time before the fall of Baghdad, and their disrespectful treatment of the holy places did much to negative the effect of their religious propaganda. On one occasion in the summer of 1915 Turkish guns actually opened fire on Karbala and damaged the shrine, while a threat to confiscate the treasures of Najaf for the service of the "Jihad" further outraged the pious. Friendly relations were established with the British even before the departure of the Turks, and, for some months after, the cities were left to manage their own affairs with no more than distant and very general supervision from British headquarters. The dissensions of local factions, however, contributed to the maintenance of disturbed conditions. It was discovered that some of the leading men were carrying on a trade in foodstuffs with the enemy, to their own great pecuniary advantage but contrary to vital British military interests. No check was given to the activities of enemy agents, and a widespread plot against the British authorities was hatched with impunity at Najaf. The climax came with the murder of a British Political Officer in March 1918, and punitive measures had to be taken. Their effectiveness and the skill with which a very delicate situation was handled finally restored tranquillity. A cordon of troops closed round the town, cutting off the purer water supply, and ultimately

occupied the walls without firing a shot into the holy precincts. The surrender, trial and execution of the principal insurgents followed. British prestige gained considerably in these events by contrast with the Turkish procedure three years before, and although the general effervescence which is endemic in these places persists, no troublesome outbreak recurred until the insurrection of 1920.

It has only been possible to mention very briefly the kind of obstacles with which the occupying Power was confronted and some of the measures taken to overcome them. Those who care to pursue the matter further will find all the information they require in Miss Gertrude Bell's comprehensive and very readable report, extracts from which have already been quoted, and upon which the account here given of administration in Mesopotamia is based. The result was to sweep away much that was bad in the former régime without subjecting the general system to more than partial and experimental reconstruction. This was an advantage, having regard to the uncertainty as to the country's future state, in that it did not commit the country to any particular new forms of administrative institutions. It was a disadvantage in that it emphasized the uncertainties of the political situation, prevented administrative stability, and laid the British open to the charge of doing too much or too little according to the opposite points of view. It is impossible to administer a country as occupied enemy territory by the right of force of arms without resorting to a certain amount of arbitrary power. Military considerations have to take precedence, and the conse-

quence is that the military conception of the process of government is inevitably exaggerated. Advantage might have been taken of military domination to reorganize the civil administration on a permanent basis, but this would have implied a degree of permanent British control incompatible with Allied declarations and intentions. On the other hand, deliberately to leave the wreckage of a broken-down machine standing with only such repairs as to ensure its working momentarily with a certain minimum of efficiency was to invite trouble as soon as the exigencies of war ceased to demand the presence of large numbers of troops. The middle course, which was in fact followed in Mesopotamia, neither succeeded in preventing trouble nor in avoiding commitments which Great Britain was ill-disposed to bear. The degree of direct administration introduced on the Anglo-Indian model was sufficient to make Arab nationalists believe that the promises of the war were to be disregarded, while at the same time the administration was not strong enough to crush the dissatisfaction of which it was in a measure the cause.

The only part of the Turkish territory within the field of operations of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force to be in Allied occupation for any considerable period before the Armistice was southern Palestine, comprising a small settled agricultural area including the towns of Jaffa, Jerusalem, Gaza and Hebron, and a larger area of desert, sparsely inhabited by Bedouin tribes, stretching to the Gulf of Aqaba in the extreme south. This region was occupied at the

(2) In Palestine
and Syria.

end of 1917. The difficulties which beset the military administration in Mesopotamia were also present here, but on a very much smaller scale. It was to the British element in the Egyptian Civil Service that the military authorities turned in this case for assistance. Their task was very substantially facilitated by the free use which the Egyptian Government permitted to be made of its British officials and of its general organization.

Whereas in Mesopotamia political problems were for the most part natural consequences of the war, and until some time after the close of hostilities were of local rather than of international importance, the situation in Palestine and Syria was complicated from the outset by rivalry between the Allies, by the equivocal nature of relations with the Arabs arising out of the incompleteness of the settlements negotiated in 1915 and 1916, and by the claims of Zionism.

Discord, arising out of enmities centuries old, prevailed in all matters concerned with the Holy Places of Palestine, some of which are of exclusive Christian, Moslem or Jewish sanctity, though a greater number are objects of veneration to all three religions. More especially did the eviction of the Turks rouse the traditional animosities of the Christian Churches, whose unedifying bickerings had been in some sort restrained by Turkish intervention, and these religious dissensions were further complicated by political considerations. Russia had, perhaps fortunately, disappeared from the scenes, but France was doubly anxious to assert her traditional claims to the protectorate over Christian interests because of the

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insignificant part her arms had perforce played in the war in the East, and Italy together with the Vatican also took care to make the most of local privileges and associations.

At the same time mutual suspicion divided the French from all those who pinned their faith to the fortunes of the Sherifian family.

Finally, the Zionist Commission, which as an earnest of the fulfilment of the Balfour Declaration had been allowed to proceed to Palestine early in 1918, was arousing the anger and fear of the local population, Christian and Moslem alike, by its vigorous propaganda. The Commission had received special recognition from the British Government. It acted as the adviser of the Occupied Enemy Territory Administration in all matters affecting Jewish interests and claimed to be regarded as the official representative of the Jewish Community.

When the Turks had been driven out of Syria and the rest of Palestine, the political pretensions of interested parties were recognized by an allocation of administrative authority to the French and Arab elements of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force on the basis of the lines of demarcation in the Sykes-Picot Agreement. It was now agreed that this area, within which the Sykes-Picot Agreement definitely recorded an intention to set up an Arab State, should at once be entrusted to Arab administration, the French assuming responsibility for the coastal area and the British extending their control to the whole of Palestine. Three zones were accordingly delimited, known as Occupied Enemy Territory (O.E.T.) North, South

and East, in which the direction of the administration was to be undertaken by French, British and Arab officials respectively. The whole remained, however, under the supreme control of the British Commander-in-Chief owing to the continued existence of a state of war, which it was, of course, then anticipated would only last a comparatively short while longer. It was specifically laid down that the Turkish system of government was to be followed as far as possible for the time being, subject to a general subordination to British martial law, while it was further made clear that the arrangement was provisional, and in no way prejudiced the decisions of the Peace Conference.

The establishment of this species of condominium was not achieved without incidents indicative of future trouble. An Arab administration, hostile to Sherifian pretensions, had been formed in Damascus under the Emir, Abd el Kader el Jazirli. It lasted less than a day, but is worth mentioning as an indication of the existence of competitors to the Emir Feisal for power. At the same time a Sherifian general, Shukri Pasha el Ayoubi, made a dash for Beirout with a small troop of horsemen and took possession of the town in the Sherif's name, hoping thus to obstruct the French occupation. He was only persuaded to withdraw by a threat of force. A month later the French, on arriving at Alexandretta, found Sherifian officials exercising jurisdiction in the interior. The cazas of Harim and Antioch had been included in the French zone, but the Sherifian authorities persisted in maintaining and recruiting levies there until the end

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of the year, when they at last yielded to the peremptory orders of the Commander-in-Chief.

On the Syrian side the situation at the end of the year and at the moment the Peace Conference was

General political situation at the end of 1918. about to meet in Paris was decidedly inflammable. The French Government were slow to realize the necessity of

supplying its representatives with adequate resources for the control of the large area for which the desire to achieve an immediate realization of their political aspirations had induced them to claim administrative responsibility. There was a deficiency of administrative staff and material of every kind. The garrisons had to be drawn to a large extent from the Armenian battalions of the Légion d'Orient, one of which had been hastily recruited in Damascus after the Armistice. These troops were only partially trained, ill-disciplined, and unable to resist the temptation to pay off scores against the Moslem population. Their behaviour did much to make the French unpopular amongst the Moslems, and public security, even in the big towns, was continually disturbed by broils in which religious partisanship was aggravated by the action of those who were supposed to be responsible for order. The intervention of Armenian Legionaries on behalf of one party often provoked that of the Arab gendarmerie on the other; even the Moslem Algerian units were affected. The Armenian Legion was finally drafted away to Cilicia, but not before a battalion had mutinied at Alexandretta in February of the new year (1919).

On the borders of the French and Arab zones dis-

order reigned. Neither the French nor the Arabs were strong enough to control their partisans, even if it be assumed that they desired to do so. The Arab administration at Damascus, though it benefited by assistance from the British military authorities, was scarcely up to the task of reconstructing the machinery of government, of which the dilapidated framework alone remained, in a country thoroughly disorganized by war. It lacked almost entirely officials of the necessary capacity and experience. It was, moreover, subject to pressure from within from nationalist cliques, the leaders of which held high positions. The Emir Feisal was officially only Commander-in-Chief of the Arab forces. The Chief Administrator, Ali Riza Pasha er Rikabi, was also president of an active society, the "Nadi el Arab," having for its object Arab independence and proclaiming frankly anti-French views. In spite of orders prohibiting political activities, Arab propaganda was not checked. Inflammatory pamphlets circulated freely. Arms from depots surrendered by the Turks were openly sold to the civil population. Brigandage, in which irregular Arab levies participated, assumed large proportions. Raids, directed particularly against Christian villages on the Lebanon border, were frequent.

Knowing the influence exerted by the British in Arab councils and acutely conscious of their own impotence in this direction, the French hastily assumed British connivance in all Arab activities directed against them. They conceived the suspicion that Great Britain was hostile to French pretensions in

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Syria and was prepared perfidiously to wreck the 1915-16 agreements to be confirmed. Having been brought up to believe that the predominance of French culture connoted a desire of the Syrians unanimously to welcome French administration, they were unable to attribute the difference between anticipation and reality to any other than British influence. The "Comité Central Syrien," located in Paris and purporting to voice all Syrian opinion, though in fact it represented little more than the Lebanon and certain of the Christian populations outside it, fostered and provided the evidence for these beliefs. Its cry was for an integral Syria, including Palestine, under French protection. It repudiated the claim of the Sherifian family to represent the Arab-speaking peoples of the Ottoman Empire. It represented the Syrians as an ethnological unit owning community of language and descent with the Arabs, but differing from them in character and capacity no less than in cultural development. It asserted that Syrians would never consent to be ruled by Bedouins.

Unfortunately the relations between British and French were nothing better than officially cordial in a political sense. There was undoubtedly a feeling amongst the British that the French were not wanted by the Moslems of Syria at any rate, and this, combined with the characteristically British contempt for the capacity of all foreigners to deal with non-Western civilizations, produced an attitude of mind in individuals easily capable of misinterpretation. The Arabs got the impression of a sympathy, and the French of a hostility, neither of which

were justified. The British Government, rightly or wrongly, believed that its commitments to the Sherif were reconcilable with the 1915-16 agreements, and it laboured to bring French and Arabs together in the interests of peace. Nothing could have been more contrary to the policy intended to be followed at the Peace Conference in Paris than to provoke dissensions in the Levant.

A great impetus was given to Arab nationalism by the Anglo-French Declaration of November 1918. The promise of self-determination played into the hands of all those who thought to strengthen their position by agitation against foreign control. In countries with as little sense of political and social unity as the Arab provinces of Turkey, and in which religious divisions cut across every other classification, self-determination carried to its logical conclusion is little more than a synonym for lawlessness. Some idea has been given of the disturbing factors in Syria. They were present in a certain degree in Palestine, but were held in check by the relative strength of the British military administration, and were deflected, though complicated, by the Zionist controversy, which had peculiarities of its own. The contagion spread more easily to Mesopotamia, where a general effervescence persisted for reasons already explained.

No better description of the disturbing effect of the Anglo-French declaration in Mesopotamia can be given than in the words of Miss Gertrude Bell¹ :—

Before the Armistice the people of Mesopotamia had

¹ *Review of the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia*, Cmd. 1061, 1920, pp. 126-7.

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accepted the fact of British occupation and were resigned to the prospect of British Administration. Sections of the inhabitants were more than resigned; they looked forward with satisfaction to a future in which they would be able to pursue commerce and agriculture in profitable security with a strong central authority preserving peace and order, and this frame of mind was probably most prevalent where British rule had been longest established. As early as 1917 the inhabitants of Basra made public declaration of their contentment with a condition of affairs which allowed them to engage in business with the certainty of advantage. They observed with truth that their town had made almost incredible progress, and they recognized gratefully that the comfort of their lives had been increased beyond all anticipation. They added, however, that the demands of the Government on labour were too heavy for the district to bear without injury to agricultural interests, and they begged that the supply might be sought in India. There can be little question that they had in their mind some system of indentured labour, and that they did not contemplate the settlement of colonies of the natives of India in the 'Iraq.

Grievances such as the labour and housing questions no doubt there were, and the longer they endured the harder they pressed, but on the whole it was recognized that they were due to a state of war, and that the British civil officials were as anxious to see their disappearance as were the people themselves. Throughout the country there was a conviction, which frequently found open expression, that the British meant well by the Arabs, and coupled with this an appreciation of the material prosperity which had followed in the track of our armies—notwithstanding the food shortage and high prices of war—together with a hope that the advent of peace would bring about instant improvements.

Roughly outlined, such was the temper of Basra, 'Amara, Hillah and the country districts generally. Baghdad, which is a far more active centre of political thought than any other part of the 'Iraq, had not spoken. As for the holy cities, Kadhimain, like Baghdad, had been voiceless; in Karbala any difficulties which had arisen had been purely local, while in Najaf the troubles of 1917 and 1918 had been fostered by Turco-German intrigue and allayed by the defeat and with-

drawal of the enemy and the removal of turbulent local elements.

A new turn was given to the native mind, firstly by the publication in the official Mesopotamian newspapers on October 11, 1918, of President Wilson's Fourteen Points, which, though declared to the Senate on January 8th, were unknown in the 'Iraq till they appeared in Reuter's telegrams; and secondly, on November 8th, of the Anglo-French declaration¹ which stated that it was the intention of the two Governments to establish among those peoples who had long been oppressed by the Turks "national governments and administrations drawing their authority from the free choice of indigenous populations. . . ."

This announcement of a policy in accordance with the principles on which the war had been waged did little but reiterate the intentions which had already been announced on the occupation of Baghdad, but it differed from the former pronouncement in one important particular, namely, that whereas the Baghdad proclamation had been issued while the upshot of the war was still extremely doubtful, and for that reason had been regarded as mainly a war expedient, the Anglo-French declaration was published after the victory of the Allies had been achieved, and commanded belief. If, previous to its appearance, the people of Mesopotamia had been as a whole content to accept the decision of arms, the declaration opened out other possibilities, the nature of which was not clearly understood, nor indeed was it likely to be understood, by the people to whom the declaration was addressed. Some regarded it merely as an indication of the uncertainty of its authors as to the future, and proceeded to canvass any insignificant incident or act on the part of the authorities with a view to discovering whether it might not imply a hidden intention of handing the country back to the Turks, a prospect which was regarded with mixed feelings, but suggested at least the instant need of hedging; others went to the opposite end of the scale and interpreted the expressed wish of the Allies to set up an indigenous government in Mesopotamia as a recognition of the capacity of Arabs to embark on native administration without assistance or control. In Baghdad, where political ambitions are more

¹ See text on p. 32.

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highly developed than elsewhere in Mesopotamia, within a week of the publication of the Anglo-French declaration the idea of an Arab Emir of the 'Iraq was everywhere being discussed, and in Mohammedan circles it met with universal approval. But there was no consensus of opinion as to the person who should be selected to fill the post. At first the choice wavered between a son of the King of the Hejaz, a member of the family of the Sultan of Egypt, and a magnate of Mosul; the Naqib of Baghdad was mentioned, and once a preference for a republic was expressed. But the idea of a republic was not agreeable to most Moslems, and the Naqib showed some reluctance to accept high office of State.

Debate in the town took almost at once a sharply controversial colour, and this was due partly to the fact that a new element had been imported into Baghdad after the Armistice. According to the terms arranged with the Turkish Commander, all men of Arab birth who had been in Ottoman employ, whether civil or military, were permitted to return to their homes. A proportion of these were men who of free choice had accompanied the Turks when they retreated before General Maude's victorious army, and were *ex hypothesi* unlikely to entertain kindly feelings towards the continuance of British control, however liberally it might be exercised. Moreover, the Turkish system of administration was based on the multiplication of small posts which gave employment to a horde of petty officials, more or less, more rather than less, unworthy of office. A number of these had fled with the Turkish army after the occupation of Baghdad and had been given sinecures in the Mosul vilayet pending the recapture of the capital. We found the public offices choked with salaried persons having no visible duties; unemployed, and to a great extent unemployable, they returned to Baghdad and formed a nucleus of discontent and hostility.

The Jewish community, which is most wealthy in Baghdad, and comprises considerably more than a third of the population of the town, took alarm at the windy and violent oratory in the coffee-shops, and sent in a unanimous petition asking to be allowed to become British subjects if an Arab Government were set up in Mesopotamia; the Christians, a small body, about one-twenty-fifth of the whole population, were equally perturbed and declared that the attitude of the Moslems towards themselves was becoming truculent.

At the same time, and in pursuance of the policy expressed in the Anglo-French declaration, the British Government ordered an inquiry to be set on foot to ascertain the views of the population on the following points :

1. Whether they were in favour of a single Arab State under British tutelage extending from the northern boundary of the Mosul vilayet to the Persian Gulf ?
2. If so, whether they considered that the new State should be placed under an Arab Emir ?
3. And in that case whom would they suggest ?

For the nature and result of this inquiry, which took place during the winter of 1918-19, it is again impossible to improve on Miss Bell's account :—

In the light of experience it may be doubted whether any such inquiry carried out under official or other auspices would have been likely to elicit answers which might serve to guide the questioner. The bulk of the people to whom the questions were addressed had no definite opinion and were not in a position to form one. It was clearly impracticable to pursue the inquiry among the rank and file of the tribesmen, the shepherds, marsh dwellers, rice, barley and date cultivators of the Euphrates and Tigris, whose experience of statecraft was confined to speculations as to the performances of their next-door neighbours. They would in any case have done no more than re-echo by command the formula prescribed by their immediate chiefs, and it was just as profitable, besides being more expeditious, to refer the questions to the chiefs only. Accordingly, in the country districts and provincial towns it was the sheikhs and men of a certain importance who were asked for their views.

On one point there was unanimity ; all considered that the Mosul vilayet should be united to the vilayets of Baghdad

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and Basra. In other respects, in the seventeen distinct inquiries which were set on foot the most definite reply was received from the Hilla Division, where the population, guided largely by the advice of the leading Saiyid, Muhammad 'Ali Qazwini (who, it will be remembered, had narrowly escaped execution by the Turks in November 1916) declared whole-heartedly for the continuance of British administration, and refused to yield to nationalist or other propaganda. In six more divisions British government without an Emir was requested, and in four cases it was desired that Sir Percy Cox should be nominated as High Commissioner. A similar reply was received from yet another five divisions, with the difference that an Emir was regarded as the ideal if any person could be fixed upon, and as a possibility in the near future; twice a protest against an Emir chosen from the Sherifian house was raised. In the Ba'qubah Division there was a sharp difference of opinion; the inhabitants of Ba'qubah town, influenced by Baghdad, wished for an Emir of the Sherif's family, probably with the implication that no foreign control was needed, while the tribesmen asked for British administration. In Najaf and the Shamiya Division, in which Najaf lies, public opinion made more than one *volte-face*, but on the whole it could be gathered that a Mohammedan Emir under British protection was generally favoured, and the family of the Sherif was mentioned in this connection. In Karbala and Kadhmain the mujtahids forbade believers to pronounce in favour of anything but an Islamic government, and controversy ran so high that inquiries were broken off, after which several petitions in favour of British administration were received, bearing the signature of sheikhs and townsmen of standing. Last of all, the decision was taken in Baghdad. The Qadhis of the Sunni and Shiah sects were asked to select twenty-five notables of their respective creeds, the Grand Rabbi twenty leading Jews, and the heads of the Christian communities ten Christians. The Qadhis, either by intent or under religious and political pressure, did not execute their task loyally. With considerable difficulty they produced a packed assembly, in which the heads of the leading Moslem families declined to take part on account of its advanced tendencies; the Jewish and Christian elements withdrew from it for the same reason, while the assembled Moslems

signed a petition in which they expressed their preference for an Arab State headed by a Mohammedan King who should be one of the sons of the Sherif. Nothing was said about foreign protection, but it was known that the extremists desired to exclude it. The Jews and Christians presented separate petitions in which they plumped for British administration, and in the following days a number of similar petitions were received, signed by the heads of leading Moslem families and merchants, all of whom had refused to take part in the assembly. It is worthy of note that the Naqib had forbidden any of his family to attend it.

The extremists had, in fact, overshot the mark. Men who had at first welcomed the idea of an Arab Emir were alarmed by the wild talk and the excitement which had been aroused, and rejected an alternative the mere discussion of which had given rein to passions dangerous to the political stability of the country. At the request of some of the principal citizens, seven of the agitators, all of them ex-Turkish officials, who had taken a leading part in anti-British propaganda, were sent to Constantinople via India and Egypt; the rest relapsed into quiescence.

Meanwhile the repercussion of events in Syria was not slow in making itself felt in Mesopotamia.

An influential body of the officers in the Emir Feisal's army were natives of Mesopotamia. They had formed a society called the "Ahd el 'Iraqi," whose object was to secure the independence of Mesopotamia from all foreign control, and its close union with an independent Syria under a member of the Sherifian family. It was, in fact, the Mesopotamian complement of the "Nadi el Arab," and its influence in the Arab administration of O.E.T. West enabled its activities to be pushed forward towards its eastern objective.

An opportunity soon presented itself on the Euphrates. The river, running diagonally through the Syrian desert from the neighbourhood of Aleppo,

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strings together a chain of permanent habitations across the sandy waste, linking up Cilicia with the Persian Gulf. The most important fertile stretch upon its course is at Deir-ez-Zor, the headquarters of a Turkish sanjak lying between the vilayets of Aleppo and Baghdad, and formerly administered directly from Constantinople. Shortly after the Armistice the inhabitants of Deir-ez-Zor had asked the Mesopotamian administration who controlled the Euphrates as far as 'Ana for a British Political Officer to be sent to preserve order. On his arrival the officer found Arab officials and gendarmerie sent by the Arab governor of Aleppo to take over the place. An amicable arrangement was come to, but it was clear that the Mesopotamian authorities were in the presence of an attempt of the nationalists acting from the immunity of the Arab zone in Syria to create difficulties for the British. The development of the situation in this area, though incidental in itself, was not without importance in connection with the upheaval in Mesopotamia in 1920, as the sequel will show.

The events we have described illustrate the great change which took place within a few weeks as a result of the conclusion of hostilities. For four years attention had been concentrated on the result of the war. Everything had been subordinated to this end. All the manifestoes, promises and agreements of those days had been qualified by the uncertainty of the issue. As soon as that uncertainty was removed, then realization entered the realm of practical politics. Ideals freely enunciated were to be put to the test,

and the minds of people long constricted by the concentration on an immediate objective, leapt the intervening gulf of the peace negotiations to the contemplation of their fulfilment as by enchantment. But while the reaction from war conjured up visions of a perfect peace, the achievement of victory also let loose a long-contained flood of selfish interests. Everyone thought the time had come when they would get what they wanted—the French their cultural and economic heritage in Syria, the British their dream of a Pax Britannica carried forward on a surging wave of Manchester goods, the Moslem Arabs their independence according as they conceived it in their different stages of mental development, the Jews their resurrection as a nation, the Oriental Christians the right to get their own back on the Moslems. Thus, crudely put, did each interested party interpret its own share in the millennium, and in something like this state of mind they turned to the deliberations in Paris.

CHAPTER III

THE ACTIVITIES OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE AND THEIR REPERCUSSION IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES DURING 1919

Paris discussions—The American Commission in Syria—Readjustment of responsibilities—The Anglo-French Convention—Agreement between Feisal and the French Government—Events and the Peace Conference—Situation in Mesopotamia :
(1) Deir-ez-Zor ; (2) Internal administration.

THE Emir Feisal left Syria for Paris on November 17, 1918, as the official representative of his father, the King of the Hejaz, at the Peace Conference, but it was not till February, 1919, that the Supreme Council got seriously to work on Arab affairs.

Paris discussions in the Spring of 1919.

Preliminary discussions had, however, by then led to agreement on important modifications of the 1915-16 arrangements. The mandatory system had been evolved, and its application to the Arab countries had been adopted as a means of reconciling Arab independence with the claims of Great Britain and France. The substitution of British for international control in Palestine had been agreed to as a consequence of this, and M. Clemenceau had further consented to the abrogation of French rights over the vilayet of Mosul in consideration of a promise

from Mr. Lloyd George of a 25 per cent. share in the oil of Mesopotamia as a whole.

Feisal appears to have presented a case for an Arab Confederation among the component States of which the Hejaz was to have some kind of pre-eminence. He contemplated a specially close connection between Syria and Hejaz, providing, however, for the autonomy of the Lebanon under French auspices, and for some kind of special régime in Palestine. A special position was to be conceded to the British in Mesopotamia. The relations between the chief Arabian potentates was to be settled by mutual agreement. Any help which the Arabs might require outside the areas in which foreign control was specifically provided for, Feisal maintained, should only be such as the Arab administration should ask and pay for.

Considerable French opposition was aroused by these proposals. They were not considered an adequate satisfaction of French claims, and the "Comité Central Syrien" asserted them to be contrary to the general wish of the inhabitants so far as Syria was concerned. The Sherifian point of view seems to have been that, as the only negotiations in which they had participated had been with Great Britain, it was for this Power to secure the fulfilment of the pledges given in 1915, and that these pledges implied a general recognition of Sherifian authority in the Arab countries. Feisal and his father did not consider themselves bound to participate in the Conference except for the purpose of approving and supporting British action on their behalf.

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While expressing their willingness to accept a compromise, they repudiated any obligations towards France,

It was ultimately decided, on the suggestion of President Wilson, that an attempt should be made to ascertain the wishes of the Syrian population by an inquiry on the spot. An international commission was proposed, but, owing to the failure of the French and British Governments to agree as to the terms of their respective representation, it resolved itself into a purely American body. A temporary arrangement to refrain from mutually injurious action and propaganda was at the same time come to between Clemenceau and Feisal. The Emir returned to Syria in May 1919, pledged to exercise a moderating influence on his extreme partisans, and the American Commission proceeded to Syria at about the same time.

Meanwhile the unsatisfactory conditions described in the last chapter persisted in Syria. The instability of the French position had been accentuated by the mutiny of the Armenian Legionaries on February 16th, to which allusion has already been made. A fortnight later serious anti-French disturbances had broken out at Aleppo. A meeting had been held to protest against a speech delivered on New Year's Eve by M. Pichon, the French Foreign Minister, and had resulted in hostile demonstrations before the French consulate and riots causing some two hundred casualties.

The arrival of the American Commission did nothing to improve matters. Attention was diverted for the moment from incitation to acts of mutual

hostility to efforts to create a good impression, and the various sections of the community devoted themselves during the four months of the Commission's visit to a course of unlimited intrigue.

It would have been difficult enough for the Commission to have achieved its object even had all concerned co-operated towards the discovery of a satisfactory solution. Under the conditions which existed it is not surprising that the Commission was somewhat baffled. The general conclusion of its report was that local opinion favoured independence without foreign control, but was prepared to accept a minimum of foreign assistance. Broadly speaking, the Christian communities in the Lebanon expressed themselves in favour of a French Mandate and the rest of the population in favour of an American or British Mandate, but it is not improbable that considerations other than such as would have guided frank and free declarations influenced some of these decisions. The French and the Sherifians openly accused each other of putting unfair pressure on those who did not agree with their respective contentions. The Damascus administration was alleged to have used the censorship to suppress friendly references to France and to have picketed the offices of the Commission for the purpose of intimidating the delegations of the Christian communities. On the other hand, the French were supposed to be using equally unjustifiable if less crude means of obtaining the same end in Beirout and the neighbourhood. On one point only does there appear to have been anything like unanimity, and that was in the demand for an integral Syria

including Palestine, but not necessarily excluding special local administrations for certain areas.

Thus by the autumn of 1919 a reconciliation of conflicting aspirations was no nearer realization, and in fact relations between the contending parties had been embittered. The attention of the public in Great Britain and France had, moreover, been drawn to Syrian affairs by the Press, and divergent points of view ventilated with some acrimony. French opinion demanded the cessation of the arrangement whereby the supreme responsibility for military affairs and for the administration of the three zones of Occupied Enemy Territory continued to be vested in the British Commander-in-Chief. The arrest in August of a prominent Arab notable, the Emir Said el Jazirli, by British troops in the French zone brought this matter to a head. The French authorities had disapproved of this action, seeing that the Emir was considered one of their staunch supporters, but Lord Allenby, judging his activities to be subversive to British military regulations, had insisted upon effecting his removal. The incident was closed by the release of the Emir on condition that the French expelled him from Syria, but it was clear that in the interests of Anglo-French relations some new division of authority was necessary. It was, indeed, no more desirable from the British than from the French point of view that the existing state of affairs should continue. Lord Allenby had recently been appointed High Commissioner in Egypt, where the crisis occasioned by

Readjustment
of military and
administrative
responsibility,
September
1919.

nationalist agitation against the British Protectorate was at its height. There was advantage in the concentration of his attention on regions directly vital to British interests and in the abandonment of responsibilities extending to Cilicia and the Taurus, which were expensive, embarrassing, and could not be justified by the part assigned to Great Britain for the future.

An Anglo-French military convention was accordingly signed on September 15th, providing for the handing over to exclusive French control of Cilicia and O.E.T. West¹ (i.e. coastal Syria) after November 1st. A line was drawn approximating to that in the Sykes-Picot Agreement, to the south of which all British troops were to withdraw. In O.E.T. East (i.e. the Arab zone) the Damascus Government continued to function, but France was to give it the necessary help in the part comprised within the "A" zone of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, and Great Britain in the part comprised within the "B" zone.

The French Government appointed General Gouraud to be their High Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief. He arrived at Beirout on November 18th.

The Emir Feisal had returned to Europe in September in order that his position under this agree-

¹ The French zone of administration in Syria—originally O.E.T. (North)—had been renamed O.E.T. (West) after the occupation of Cilicia—which became O.E.T. (North)—in January 1919, in accordance with the Armistice. The fact that, owing to the insufficiency of the French forces, Cilicia, though within the French political sphere of influence, had been placed under British control was made something of a grievance by the French.

ment should be made clear. Mr. Lloyd George and Lord Curzon pointed out to him that they considered the main point of the British pledges to the Arabs to be the inclusion of the four towns of Aleppo, Hama, Homs and Damascus in an Arab State, and that the French had consequently undertaken not to occupy them, but that the British Government considered itself equally bound to uphold the special rights of France on the coast.

In his conversations with Feisal, M. Clemenceau is said to have explained that the French undertaking must necessarily be conditional on the Damascus Government being able to keep order and repress anti-French propaganda. It was arranged that a neutral zone should be established along the common frontier of the two administrations. Feisal agreed to accept French help at Damascus.

Throughout 1919 Paris was the political centre of the world, and it was on the activities of the Peace Conference that events in the Arab countries turned during this period. The predominating factor was the situation in Syria, where international interests were most prominently involved. In the first place, the general discussion of Sherffian claims in the spring concentrated attention on Syria, to which Palestine may momentarily be considered as appended, where those claims were most hotly contested and where a settlement was most essential. The activities of the American Commission and the

Arrangements between Feisal and the French in the autumn of 1919.

Events during 1919 determined by the Peace Conference.

agreements arrived at in the autumn consequently fill the greater part of the picture.

Developments in Mesopotamia waited very largely on events in Syria. The activities of the Damascus

Situation in Mesopotamia during 1919 : nationalists continued to make themselves felt on the upper Euphrates.

(i) **Deir-ez-Zor.** Arab agents carried on an incessant propaganda at Deir-ez-Zor and among the neighbouring tribes. Pending the decisions of the Peace Conference no permanent frontier could be traced between Mesopotamia and Syria. The southern part of the sanjak of Deir-ez-Zor was therefore debatable territory where it was difficult to maintain stable conditions. The River Khabur was provisionally fixed as the frontier in September, but, by reason of its cutting across tribal divisions, this line was quite unsatisfactory. The withdrawal of the British from Cilicia and Syria complicated matters by the false impression which it gave of British weakness. It was resented by Arabs of the Sherifian party, who counted on British support for the fulfilment of Arab aspirations, and was regarded by them as little short of a betrayal.

The Turks were, indeed, emboldened to attempt the re-establishment of their authority in the desert south of the Armistice line. Their emissaries withdrew upon protests being made, but some idea will be gained from this incident of the uncertainty which prevailed locally. At the same time an opening was given to hostile Arab elements. Deir-ez-Zor was attacked by tribesmen in December and the life of the British Political Officer threatened. An Arab agent arrived

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from Aleppo at this juncture and claimed that the local population now desired the withdrawal of all British influence. Although this action was disavowed by the Damascus Government, the British made no attempt to assert themselves in view of the decision to regard the Khabur as the provisional frontier. Inaction under provocation was inevitable, and when the local population of Deir appealed against the disorders and extortions occasioned by the methods of the adventurers who claimed to act in Feisal's name, help had to be refused. British prestige suffered by these events and the spread of disaffection to the Jezireh was facilitated, both of which factors contributed to produce the upheaval all over the country in the following year.

Meanwhile efforts were being made to broaden the basis of the Mesopotamian administration in the light of the probabilities of its future status. As many natives as possible, having regard to the limited supply of qualified persons, were associated with the work of government. Local institutions were established on a more permanent basis. Informal advisory councils already existed in the towns and in many districts. It was now proposed to give them a definite organization.

In Turkish times the Administrative and General Councils of the vilayets were in theory elective. In the case of the former, however, no rules have ever been promulgated, and in the case of the latter the apparently wide franchise was deceptive. In practice the nominees of the Committee of Union and

Progress were accepted wherever it was possible to get round the local notables. Municipalities were now to be established in the big towns, and in the provinces Divisional Councils, whose members were to be nominated by the central government, were to sit under the presidency of the local Political Officer.

CHAPTER IV

ARAB NATIONALISM AND THE FRENCH IN SYRIA

Feisal's position—The French position—Franco-Arab disputes—
Feisal King of Syria—Syrian Mandate allocated to France
—Gouraud's ultimatum—The overthrow of Feisal—Admin-
istrative reorganization—Syrian opinion and the French
Mandate.

WHEN Feisal returned to Syria in the middle of January 1920, after his second visit to Paris, he was faced with a difficult situation. The influence of the extremists among his partisans was paramount. They were dissatisfied with the concessions he had made to the French. His personal authority had been weakened by absence. He was not completely in touch with local feeling. He himself sympathized to a large extent with nationalist aspirations and particularly with those which involved Sherifian leadership for their fulfilment. Yet, knowing that he could not count on British support for any policy likely to embarrass Anglo-French relations, he saw the necessity for compromise and had engaged himself to accept French co-operation. In the attempt to keep the confidence of his followers and at the same time loyally to fulfil his engagements, he gave offence

to both parties. Each accused him of treachery. There does not seem in fact to be any reason for suspecting his sincerity, but he lacked the strength of character necessary to deal with a situation which would have taxed highly the resources of a statesman of the first rank. Moreover, his personal prejudices, which were certainly anti-French, made him susceptible to his environment after his return to Syria and predisposed him to go with the tide which his judgment impelled him to stem.

On the other hand, the French were also in an embarrassing position. At the beginning of 1920, they were still very weak militarily. A formidable insurrection of the Turkish population in Cilicia resulted in serious reverses and the annihilation of some of their weak garrisons. Behind the insurgents the Turkish nationalist movement in Anatolia, led by Mustafa Kemal, and now beginning to assume an aggressive attitude, presented an imminent danger which had to be faced with inadequate resources. Arab hostility was a menace to communications, it introduced distracting complications and uncertainties and aroused not unnatural irritation.

Disorder continued to prevail on the borders of the French and Arab zones. French posts were attacked by bands led, it was alleged, by regular Sherifian officers. The collapse of public security was attributed by the French to Sherifian propaganda, and by Feisal to the unsympathetic attitude of French officials. Whatever the cause, the result was the same.

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The French were very much disturbed by the application of conscription in the Arab zone, which had been authorized by Feisal in December 1919. They could not help thinking that an increase of the Sherifian forces and the warlike preparations they observed were directed against themselves, though Feisal maintained that all this activity was only to enable order to be imposed on the unruly elements of the population.

The substitution for the moderate Jaafar Pasha as Governor of Aleppo of a violent nationalist, Rushdi Bey, and the appointment of Sheikh Saleh, noted for anti-French views, as Governor of the Ansarieh, seemed further to justify French suspicions.

At the same time the Sherifian Government refused to allow the French the use of the railway between Damascus and Aleppo for the transport of troops to Cilicia. Feisal later argued that the attitude of the population made it necessary to exact certain conditions, which had been complied with by the British before their withdrawal, but to which the French would not agree. He affirmed that the transport of stores was never interfered with. The French regarded this attitude as evidence of a desire to hinder their operations against Mustafa Kemal, complicity with whom they ascribed to the Sherifian Government on the grounds of a suspicious passing to and fro of Turkish emissaries. Feisal repudiated the charge and affirmed that he had used all his influence to prevent the tribes being affected by Turkish propaganda.

A further subject of dissension was the boycott in

the Arab zone of the new currency system¹ established by the French in their zone. Feisal asserted that he was powerless to alter the attitude of the Damascus and Aleppo merchants.

Finally, the presence of French troops in parts of the Bekaa, the fertile plain lying between the Lebanon and anti-Lebanon Mountains, which formed part of the neutral area agreed upon when Feisal was in Paris in the autumn of 1919, led to more mutual recrimination. Feisal demanded their withdrawal in accordance with the agreement, the French alleged the disordered state of the country as necessitating the maintenance of forces for self-protection.

By March, Feisal had been so far won over to the side of those who thought it hopeless to attempt to co-operate with the French, and who were convinced that French policy consisted in a deliberate attempt to provoke an outburst, that he acquiesced in the suggested proclamation of an independent Syria, with himself at its head. An assembly of 135 notables, partly elected by the secondary electors on the former Turkish parliamentary register, and partly co-opted from the tribal chieftains and leaders of religious communities, was brought together at Damascus. On March 11th, this "Syrian Congress," claiming to represent all Syria including Palestine and the Lebanon, proclaimed Feisal as King, a dignity which he decided to accept as the expression of the popular

Feisal, King of Syria, March 1920.

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¹ The Turkish pound of 100 piastres had been replaced by a Syrian pound, also of 100 piastres, whose value had been stabilized in relation to the French franc and accordingly varied, in relation to other foreign currencies, as the French exchange.

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will. A Ministry was formed, and the discussion of the Organic Laws of the new State begun. Recognition was asked for from the Allied Governments, and the question was discussed at the meeting of the Supreme Council held at San Remo in April. Great Britain is said to have been in favour of granting recognition, but it was opposed by France.

Meanwhile the situation of the French in Cilicia had become easier as a result of a partial reimposition of their authority and the conclusion of an armistice with Mustafa Kemal. Reinforcements had arrived, and General Gouraud was free to concentrate attention on the Arab zone. At the San Remo Conference the Mandate for Syria had been definitely allocated to France, and those for Palestine and Mesopotamia to Great Britain. Although the separation of the Arab provinces from the Ottoman Empire still remained legally to be affirmed in the Turkish Peace Treaty, as yet unratified, and though the terms of the Mandates had still to be drawn up and accepted by the League of Nations, these decisions were interpreted as giving the prospective Mandatory Powers anticipatory rights. In any case France regarded herself as justified in exercising supreme control within the areas allotted to her in the Sykes-Picot Agreement (as modified by subsequent arrangements), whatever form this control might ultimately be given. On the other hand the Arab Nationalists took their stand on the Anglo-French Declaration of November 1918, and on that paragraph of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which

Syrian Mandate allocated to France, April 1920.

states that in these territories "the wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of a Mandatory." In May the Damascus Government definitely rejected the French Mandate on the grounds of its being unacceptable to the mass of the population.

Determined to bring matters to a head, the French Government authorized General Gouraud to present an ultimatum to Feisal. This document, dispatched on July 14th, after a recapitulation of French grievances, demanded the acceptance *in toto* of the following terms within four days :

1. *Absolute disposal of the railway from Rayak to Aleppo* for all transportations ordered by the French authorities.

This disposition will be guaranteed by entire control of traffic in the stations of Rayak, Baalbek, Homs, Hama and Aleppo, by French military commissioners, supported by an armed detachment destined to assure the policing of the station, and by the occupation of the town of Aleppo, an important centre of communications which we cannot allow to fall into Turkish hands.

2. *The abolition of conscription.* Recruiting to cease completely and troops to be disbanded so as to reduce the Sherifian army to the formations and effectives which it possessed on December 1st last.

3. *Acceptance of the French Mandate.* The Mandate will respect the Syrian populations, it will remain entirely compatible with the principle of Government by the Syrian authorities regularly invested with power and by the popular will. It will only involve on the part of the Mandatory Power assistance rendered in the form of help and collaboration, but will in no case take the colonial form of annexation or direct administration.

4. *Acceptance of the Syrian currency.* This currency to become the national currency in the Eastern Zone, all restraints

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hitherto affecting the Bank of Syria in this zone being lifted.

5. *Punishment of offenders*, such as are most compromised by their acts of hostility against France.

Feisal, realizing that resistance must be useless and counting on being able by a personal visit to Europe to secure some mitigation of what he considered harsh conditions, accepted the ultimatum, but asked for an extension of twenty-four hours, and then again for a further twenty-four hours, in order to give him adequate time for the promulgation of orders for the execution of the terms. Both these extensions were granted, thus carrying the final moment for compliance to midnight on July 20th.

In Damascus great excitement prevailed. The Syrian Congress was for opposing the French by force, and was prorogued by Feisal during the day of the 20th. The disbandment of troops in the capital had meanwhile begun, and was accompanied by disorders involving over four hundred casualties. The population was being stirred to rebellion by the Arab "die-hards."

Feisal handed his detailed acceptance of and reply to the ultimatum to the French representative at Damascus at 5.50 p.m. on the 20th, five hours before the expiration of the time-limit. For some reason which does not seem ever to have been ascertained, the telegram conveying this answer to General Gouraud did not reach him in time. The French forces had already been ordered to advance.

On the 22nd, General Gouraud informed Feisal

that he was prepared to stop the advance in consideration of the measures already taken to execute the provisions of the ultimatum on condition of compliance with certain further stipulations, namely :

The overthrow
of Feisal,
July 1920.

1. The publication by the Damascus Government of an account drafted by the French authorities of how the march on Damascus came to be undertaken and stopped.

2. The maintenance of the French forces on the line now reached until the complete execution of the terms of the ultimatum.

3. The complete disposal of the railway from Rayak to el Tekik during this period.

4. The withdrawal of all Sherifian detachments to the east of this line, and French control of the gendarmerie in the occupied area.

5. The cessation of the support given by the Damascus Government to irregular bands operating in the French zone.

6. Disarmament of the population of Damascus and withdrawal of arms from disbanded soldiers.

7. Acceptance of a French mission at Damascus to supervise the execution of the terms of the ultimatum and to work out a scheme for the application of the French Mandate in the Arab zone.

Feisal protested that these conditions were far in excess of those set forth in the original ultimatum, that he could not be sure yet more might not be

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asked, and that compliance would mean the final collapse of his authority.

Indeed, a heterogeneous force of a few hundred regular troops and a few thousand armed townsmen had sallied forth from Damascus to meet the oncoming French forces. Negotiations were no longer possible. On July 23rd Aleppo was occupied after skirmishing; on the 24th the resistance of the Arab volunteers was broken at Meisalun. On the 25th the French entered Damascus.

Thus was accomplished the vindication of French claims in Syria. No apportionment of responsibility for the solution by force of a situation which for over eighteen months had been continually strained can or should be at present attempted. A new chapter of Syrian history was opening and it will now be necessary to give some account of the use which the French have made of the position they had conquered.

Feisal was naturally constrained to leave the country. He proceeded to Europe, where he entered into negotiations with the British Government which eventually led to his restoration to power in another sphere.

With the overthrow of the Emir Feisal, the Arab State, which had been established some four months earlier with the intention of giving the **Administrative reorganization.** hitherto purely administrative Arab régime a definite and sovereign status, ceased to exist. The southern portion of the former Arab zone, which came within the limits of the "B" zone of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, automatically became dependent on the British administration in Palestine, and henceforward constituted

the territory known as Transjordania ; the northern portion was taken over by the French as an extension of the coastal area already occupied by them.

In the area over which the French now exercised exclusive control, corresponding to that for which a Mandate had been allocated to France by the Supreme Council at San Remo in April 1920, a complete administrative reorganization was forthwith effected. Under the general supervision and control of the French High Commissioner at Beirut four autonomous states, to which a fifth was added in the spring of 1921, were set up. These were the Great Lebanon, the State of Damascus, the State of Aleppo, the Territory of the Alaouites and the Emirate of the Hauran.¹ It was intended in this way to give satisfaction to local particularities while holding out the prospect of union or federation when the time should seem ripe. At the same time the arrangement offered advantages to the French by consolidating regions where they were generally popular and splitting up those where opinion might be expected to be hostile to them. The Lebanon, for example, has a tradition of autonomy and of friendship for France. The preservation of the former would therefore carry with it the strengthening of the latter. The Druses of the Hauran, living very much

¹ The areas covered by these divisions can best be seen on the map. The estimated population of Damascus is 605,000, of Aleppo 718,000, of Hauran 10,000, and of the Alaouites 40,000. The population of the Lebanon has been definitely ascertained by the census of 1921 as 710,562, composed as follows :

<i>Christians</i>			<i>Moslems</i>		
Maronites	..	199,000	Sunni	..	125,000
Greek Orthodox	..	81,000	Shiah	..	105,000
Greek Catholics	..	42,000	Druses	..	44,000

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apart in a system of rugged volcanic mountains, have a similar tradition of independence. The recognition of their particularity was the best means of securing their allegiance to France, when dependence on an Arab Government at Damascus was the alternative.

On the other hand tribal and family rivalries earned some support for the separation of Damascus and Aleppo which together would have constituted a territory formidable both by its extent and population, and in which the maintenance of a division made it easier to cope with the remains of Sherifian nationalism. The Territory of the Alaouites is mountainous and inhabited by wild tribes belonging to various religious denominations peculiar to themselves. Their isolation would facilitate the pacification of a region where military operations were likely to be necessary.

In each of the new territorial divisions of Syria local governmental institutions were established, staffed and headed by natives, but closely supervised by French advisors. The extent to which this system of control was developed soon found weighty critics in France. It was argued that the population was being alienated by the establishment of something very like direct French administration. Both the number and activity of the French officials tended, it was said, unduly to reduce the scope and authority of native officials. And not only the quantity, but the quality of the French officials was attacked. Protests were made against this state of affairs in the Chamber of Deputies, and in the Senate, both on the grounds of incompatibility with the spirit of the Mandate system and on the grounds

of expense. In 1920 the cost to France of civil administration in Syria was 185 million francs, comprising subventions of 83 million francs to the budgets of the several Syrian States, and 102 million francs for expenses common to the whole country, including the High Commissioner's department. In 1921 the subventions to local budgets remained the same, while general expenses were reduced to 37 million francs, making a total of 120 million francs. In 1922 further reductions were made, the subventions to local budgets ceasing on the grounds that the several States could now meet essential expenses from their own resources, and the amount placed at the High Commissioner's disposal for general expenses being fixed for the year at 50 million francs.

These figures, however, gave less cause for alarm to the French taxpayer than those of military expenditure in Syria. From 118 million francs in 1919, during most of which year the army of occupation had been almost entirely British, the cost of the French forces jumped to 686 million francs in 1920 and 785 million francs in 1921. These figures include expenditure in Cilicia and explain the anxiety of the French to come to terms with Mustafa Kemal and their readiness to evacuate this region. The conclusion of the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement with Angora in October 1921 made reductions possible. The budget for 1922 provided for an expenditure of 332 million francs for the maintenance of a force of 35,000 men in Syria, instead of the 70,000 previously considered necessary. The French Government has been

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urged to make still greater decreases in the garrison in 1923.

The administrative arrangements made in the various Syrian States in the autumn of 1920 were admittedly provisional. During the spring and summer of 1921 General Gouraud, the High Commissioner, indicated the general lines which it was contemplated permanent institutions should follow. Each State was to have a Council of Government elected on a wide suffrage, as a preliminary for the working out of which the taking of a census was ordered. A beginning of the execution of the federal idea was foreshadowed by the proposed establishment of a Joint Council for the States of Damascus and Aleppo to deal with questions of common interest, such as Finance, Public Works, and Religious Endowments (Auqaf). The Councils of Government of the two States were each to elect five of their number to sit on the Joint Council, which was to meet alternatively at Damascus and Aleppo.¹

The carrying out of the census in the Lebanon enabled the new elective body in this State to be inaugurated in May 1922. Its powers are, at least on paper, reasonably wide. It may discuss and initiate any legislative proposal and no taxation may be imposed without its consent. But the High Commissioner, besides retaining control of foreign affairs

¹ A Syrian Federation was brought into being by a decree of June 28, 1922, establishing a Federal Council to deal with matters of common interest as indicated above. There is an executive President of the Federation who is assisted by Directors of Federal Services. The Lebanon is not a member of the Federation, but is in close relation to it.

for Syria as a whole, apparently has a power of veto and certification over internal legislation. The satisfactory working of such a system depends upon its being understood that the representative of the Mandatory Power will only prohibit or impose legislation as a last resort. It is open to the criticism that local institutions can be deprived of any real freedom. On the other hand if a Mandate implies ultimate responsibility for good government, the Mandatory Power has some justification for demanding an ultimate means of control. Such difficulties can only be got over in present circumstances by mutual confidence and co-operation.

No very certain information is obtainable as to how far the French have been able to make their Mandate acceptable to the population of Syria. They seem to have been able to introduce conditions generally favourable to material prosperity by maintaining a reasonable standard of public security and by the improvement of communications by road and rail, but it is questionable whether they have made any progress towards the conciliation of such opinion as has persistently opposed French or any other foreign interference in the task of government. During the summer of 1922 there were signs of a recrudescence of political unrest. To account for this it has been stated that the cessation of subventions from the French budget towards the local expenses of the several States has necessitated the imposition of new and unpopular taxation, while the reduction of the French forces of occupation is said to have encouraged

Syrian opinion
on the French
Mandate.

elements interested in creating disorder. Many allusions have also been made to alleged intrigues carried on by the Emir Feisal from Mesopotamia and by the Emir Abdulla from Transjordan with the object of helping the party favourable to a Sherifian Government in Syria and of hindering French activities. An indication of the belief that Great Britain is at the back of any such intrigues is seldom omitted. On the other hand there are those who find the source of the trouble in the lack of recognition accorded by the French to national aspirations, in the tendency of French methods towards direct administration, and in the conflict which arises out of the question as to how far a Mandatory is entitled to repay itself for its trouble by taking advantage of opportunities of economic exploitation running contrary to the spirit rather than the letter of the Mandate.

It is difficult in the absence of first-hand information or of official reports to answer the questions to which these considerations give rise, nor is it easy to present a coherent picture of present conditions in Syria. Superficially, the organization introduced by the French appears to be running fairly smoothly, but occasionally incidents come to light which show that beneath the surface things are perhaps not so satisfactory as those in authority would have us believe.

CHAPTER V

ARAB NATIONALISM AND THE BRITISH IN MESOPOTAMIA

Situation at the beginning of 1920—The Mesopotamian Congress at Damascus—Nationalist agitation in Baghdad ; declarations of British policy and signs of the oncoming storm—The insurrection of 1920—The High Commissioner and the Provisional Council of State—The choice of a ruler and Feisal's election—Situation after Feisal's accession—The Treaty between Great Britain and 'Iraq.

WHILE the events narrated in the earlier part of the last chapter were in progress in Syria, the state of affairs in Mesopotamia was also rapidly approaching a crisis. Sufficient has already been said about conditions in this region to indicate the various sources of general unrest to which the uncertainty consequent on the protracted delay in concluding peace with Turkey gave ample scope for development. Allusion has been made to the activities of the Mesopotamian element in Syria, working through its political society, the " Ahd el 'Iraqi " ; to the unsettled conditions at Deir-ez-Zor and throughout the Upper Euphrates area, for which this society was largely responsible ; to the turbulence of tribes unaccustomed to strong government ; to the disturbing influence of the Shiah Holy Cities of Najaf and Karbala ;

to the militant nationalism of a section of the Baghdad *intelligenza* ; and to certain special circumstances arising out of the war. All these factors contributed to undermine the stability of the British administration, itself deficient in many respects and suffering from the handicap of its provisional character. The British position, which it should not be forgotten was derived from an occupation achieved by conquest, had moreover been weakened by the withdrawal for demobilization of a large proportion of the military forces. The situation at the beginning of 1920 was thus far less favourable to peaceful reconstruction than it had been a year earlier. Throughout this period the elements of unrest had been gathering in volume and momentum, and the oncoming wave was preparing to break at a moment when the power to resist the effects had been seriously weakened.

Prominent Arabs have consistently maintained that unrest was finally traceable to dislike of the form taken by the British Administration, interpreting it as the negation of the pledges given during the war. We must be careful to distinguish in this connection between the more abstract political grievances of the *intelligenza* and the more concrete administrative grievances of the masses. The latter arose partly out of the unavoidable consequences of the war and partly out of resentment at the determined methods adopted to collect revenue. The former were based on psychological rather than material factors. In a country like Mesopotamia it requires a combination of the two to provoke anything approaching a general popular

rising—witness the rising in Egypt during the spring of 1919. It is when the economic life of the masses is affected that there is most response to the appeals of religious fanaticism and xenophobe propaganda which are the chief weapons of the politically minded class.

In March, 1920, at the same time as the Syrian Congress proclaimed the establishment of an independent Arab State in Syria, another body purporting to represent Mesopotamian opinion also met at Damascus, pronounced itself in favour of a similar régime in Mesopotamia, and offered the crown to Feisal's brother, the Emir Abdullah. No practical effect could, of course, be given in this case to the decisions taken, and the claim of an Assembly, gathered together in what was in effect a foreign country, to set itself up against an already constituted, even though provisional, authority, and to speak in the name of a population which had no idea of what was going on, was clearly preposterous; but a rallying point was provided for malcontents and an impulse given to the forces of unrest by the concrete expression thus given to nationalist sentiment.

The initial success of the Syrian *coup d'état* and the impression of military weakness given by British inaction in the face of continued provocation at Deir-ez-Zor and by the difficulties experienced by the British authorities in coping with tribal unrest, contributed to encourage the firebrands of Baghdad in the belief that foreign control could be ended by revolutionary methods. The mass of the sedentary popula-

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tion being less susceptible than the nomad tribes to the attractions of lawlessness and being comparatively indifferent to the political arguments which moved the so-called *intelligenza*, were appealed to through religious fanaticism. Sunni and Shiah united in carefully staged demonstrations known as "Mauluds," for the assertion of Moslem solidarity.

Nationalist
agitation in
Baghdad ; de-
clarations of
British policy
and signs of
the oncoming
storm.

The announcement on May 3rd of the acceptance by Great Britain of the Mandate allocated by the Supreme Council at San Remo in April intensified nationalist activity. A committee of British Political Officers was at that very moment sitting in order to draw up a scheme for setting up permanent Arab institutions. Its proposals, though not published, were generally known, and a committee of fifteen Baghdadis was formed to protest against them and the whole Mandatory idea. On June 2nd, this committee met Colonel Wilson, the Acting Civil Commissioner, together with twenty-five other local notables, including Jews and Christians, invited by him to attend. A demand was presented for the immediate summoning of a Mesopotamian Convention, to be chosen by the old Turkish electorate, for the purpose of establishing an Arab National Government, in accordance with the proviso of the Anglo-French Declaration of November 1918.

Colonel Wilson agreed to submit the question to the British Government and to ask for an expeditious settlement.

On June 20th, the following official announcement was made :—

His Majesty's Government having been entrusted with the Mandate for Mesopotamia, anticipate that the Mandate will constitute Mesopotamia an independent State under the guarantee of the League of Nations and subject to the Mandate to Great Britain ; that it will lay on them the responsibility for the maintenance of internal peace and external security, and will require them to formulate an Organic Law to be framed in consultation with the people of Mesopotamia, and with due regard to the rights, wishes and interests of all the communities of the country. The Mandate will contain provisions to facilitate the development of Mesopotamia as a self-governing State until such time as it can stand by itself, when the Mandate will come to an end.

The inception of this task His Majesty's Government has decided to entrust to Sir Percy Cox, who will accordingly return to Baghdad in the autumn, and will resume his position on the termination of the existing military administration as Chief British Representative in Mesopotamia.

Sir Percy Cox will be authorized to call into being, as provisional bodies, a Council of State under an Arab President, and a General Elective Assembly representative of and freely elected by the population of Mesopotamia, and it will be his duty to prepare, in consultation with the General Elective Assembly, the permanent Organic Law.

Meanwhile events had occurred in the north-western portion of the Mosul vilayet, for which the disturbed state of affairs on the Upper Euphrates was largely responsible, and which were in the nature of a prelude to the more serious insurrectionary movements then brewing in other parts of the country.

During the spring of 1920 the tribes of the northern Jezireh had been in a continual state of ferment. Nationalist propaganda, encouraged and abetted by the Turks, had been continually active. The walls of Mosul had been placarded with notices inciting the inhabitants to rebel. At last, on June 2nd, a rising broke out at Tel Afar, a small town some miles

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west of Mosul. Two British officers and their Staff were killed. Reports came to hand of a hostile concentration of tribal forces for an attack on Mosul itself. Not only the nomad but the more or less sedentary tribes were affected. The rapid and firm action of the British troops in the neighbourhood fortunately sufficed to restore a measure of local tranquillity, but the light had been put to the train which was within a few weeks to set the whole country ablaze.

Disquieting reports were already pouring in to Headquarters from other districts, especially from the Middle Euphrates where the malcontents of Najaf and Karbala were doing their best to stir up trouble.

On July 12th, another official announcement conceived in the following terms, was made by the Acting Civil Commissioner, in the hope of conciliating the nationalists of Baghdad, who had reiterated their demands for the immediate establishment of a national Government.

His Majesty's Government has authorized the Acting Civil Commissioner to invite the leading representatives of various localities to co-operate with the Civil Administration in framing proposals under which election to the General Assembly will, in due course, be held, and in making the necessary arrangements for electoral areas, the preparation of the registers of electors, and other matters preliminary to the election of the General Assembly. And inasmuch as there are at present in the 'Iraq individuals who were the representatives of the 'Iraq in the Turkish Chamber of Deputies, and who therefore have experience in matters relating to elections and in the discussion of public affairs, all these ex-Senators and ex-Deputies have been invited by the Civil Commissioner for the above-mentioned purpose. . . . This Committee will be invited to elect a President from

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among their number, and to co-opt additional members from areas which, owing to the absence or death of the former Deputies, or from some other cause, are not already represented.

No difficulty was experienced in getting the proposed committee together. It should be borne in mind that the protesting nationalist committee was drawn exclusively from Baghdad and was representative only of a section of opinion even in the capital. Nationalist leaders were invited to serve on the new committee. They refused and proceeded to reorganize a monster religious demonstration in order to rouse the Baghdad mob. The holding of the demonstration was prohibited and the arrest of the leaders ordered. Most of them effected their escape, but their flight destroyed the prestige which their "martyrdom" might otherwise have gained them.

Meanwhile, open insurrection had broken out on the middle Euphrates. Several garrisons were cut off and besieged. The situation was critical, for, although the British Army of Occupation numbered at that time some 60,000 effectives, nearly half were engaged on non-combatant duties.¹ Moreover, the extent of the country, approximating to that of the British Isles, necessitated, for political reasons and for police work, the maintenance of so many scattered

The Insurrection, July-December 1920.

¹ The following figures of the British forces in Mesopotamia on July 1, 1920, are given by the Commander-in-Chief, General Sir Aylmer Haldane, in his book, *The Insurrection in Mesopotamia* :—

	British Troops.	Indian Troops.	Total.
Engaged on non-combatant duties	3,000	23,000	26,000
Leaving for operations	4,200	30,000	34,200
Total	7,200	53,000	60,200

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detachments that no adequate central reserve could be retained. The withdrawal of substantial forces from any one area was impossible for fear of provoking an extension of the rising, and the length and difficulty of communications further prevented concentration, so that the task of conducting repressive operations was of a slow and arduous nature.

During July the situation on the Euphrates got worse rather than better. Towards the end of the month Rumaita was successfully relieved, but a premature attempt to succour the garrison of Kufa brought disaster to the troops composing the column, involving serious losses and an inconvenient setback to British prestige. A considerable body of troops at Diwaniya was able with difficulty to withdraw along the railway which had been cut in many places. By the second week in August a concentration had been effected at Hilla, between which town and Baghdad it had been possible to assure communication, but outbreaks elsewhere necessitated a diversion of forces and the postponement of offensive action.

While the middle Euphrates had thus virtually slipped from British control and, with the isolation of the garrison of Samawa towards the end of August, was in the hands of the insurgents from the neighbourhood of Hilla to that of Nasiriya, it had been possible to guard more effectively the country above, and below these points. In the north, the loyalty of certain sheikhs, notably the chief of the Dulaim and Fahad Bey of the Anezeh, enabled Ramadi and Falluja to be secured and their communications with Baghdad to be maintained in comparative safety. In

the south something little short of a miracle seems to have prevented the rising from becoming general among the Muntafik confederation of tribes, who inhabit the enclosed and marshy region where the Tigris and Euphrates draw nearer together before actually effecting their junction. Had the Muntafik risen, the trouble would certainly have spread to the Tigris tribes, who actually remained fairly well disposed towards the British throughout the insurrection, and communications along the river by which alone contact could be maintained between Baghdad and Basra would have been severed. It was not until the end of September that the arrival of reinforcements¹ enabled the line of the Tigris to be effectively secured. For three months there was imminent danger of an interruption of supplies which might have had incalculable consequences.

The outbreaks alluded to, which prevented for a time the restoration of the situation on the Euphrates, occurred among the tribes bordering the River Diyala, running north-east of Baghdad. During August, hostile raids had imperilled the safety of the railway between Baghdad and the Persian frontier. As this was the sole line of communication for the supply of the small British force which for various reasons

¹ The following figures of reinforcements sent to Mesopotamia during the insurrection are given by Sir Aylmer Haldane in the book already quoted:—

		Combatant.	Non-combatant.
British	3,416	153
Indian	13,502	4,134

16,918 4,287 Total, 21,205

In addition to these, 1,310 British and 6,872 Indian, a total of 8,182 troops, arrived as drafts to units previously in the country.

had been retained in northern Perisa ever since the war, and as its severance also meant the isolation of the summer camp at Karind where a number of women and children were stationed, the restoration of security in this region was considered of primary importance. Fortunately, the tribes were neither so well armed nor so well organized as those on the Euphrates, so that operations conducted in September achieved their object without serious difficulty. By the end of the month the tribes on the Diyala were beginning to send in their submission, although trouble continued for a considerable time longer farther to the north in the difficult mountainous country of southern Kurdistan around Kirkuk, Sulamaniya and Arbil.

It is remarkable that throughout the difficult period from the beginning of July to the end of September, no serious disturbance occurred in Baghdad itself in spite of the smallness of the garrison. That Basra should have remained quiet is more comprehensible since its commercial character makes its inhabitants less susceptible to political propaganda. At the other extremity of the country, Mosul also was never seriously threatened. After the repression of the outbreak at Tel Afar in June, no great extension of the rising took place in the vilayet, though the maintenance of communications with Baghdad was always a source of anxiety, that part which is covered by railway being subject to many raids and short interruptions.

The arrival of reinforcements, as has been already mentioned, enabled communications along the Tigris

to be secured by the end of September. It was now possible to take offensive measures. Operations conducted during October effected the restoration of British authority on the Euphrates. Hit was re-occupied on October 4th. Karbala, which had suffered from the cutting off of its most important water supply, surrendered on the 13th. Samawa was reached from Nasiriya on the 14th, after sustaining a six weeks' siege. The garrison of Kufa was relieved on the 19th, having been beleaguered nearly three months, and the submission of Najaf followed shortly. While minor disturbances continued for some time north of the Diyala and in parts of the Mosul vilayet, the main resistance had been broken. Punitive expeditions were carried out during the next few months, and large quantities of arms withdrawn from the hostile tribes.¹ The opportunity was taken for columns to show themselves in as many parts of the country as possible. From a military point of view order may be said to have been restored by the end of the year.² The effect of the insurrection had, however, been most unsettling to the country as a

¹ Sir Aylmer Haldane (op. cit. p. 298) gives the number of serviceable rifles collected as 63,435, of which 21,154 were of a modern small-bore type.

² The following figures of casualties sustained by the British forces between July 2nd and October 17th are compiled from those given by Sir Aylmer Haldane (op. cit. p. 331):—

			Killed, Missing and died of Wounds.	Wounded.
British	195	100
Indian	636	1,079
Followers	45	49
Total	876	1,228

The Arab casualties during the same period were estimated as 8,450 killed and wounded.

whole and political conditions were a long way from stable. It was to the work of reconstruction thus rudely interrupted, and to the restoration of the confidence lost as a result of the movement which had led to the disturbances, that British efforts were now urgently required to be directed.

Sir Percy Cox had arrived on October 1st to take up the post of High Commissioner in accordance with

The High
Commissioner
and the Pro-
visional Coun-
cil of State.

the announcement made in the declaration of June 20th. He had to pick up lost threads and proceed as quickly as possible to the establishment of permanent governmental institutions at once consonant with the decisions of the Peace Conference, with the declarations of British policy arising therefrom, and with national aspirations in so far as they were internationally recognized. After a rapid tour of the country he began his difficult task by calling into being a Provisional Council of State under the presidency of the Naqib of Baghdad. The Naqib succeeded in securing the support of most of the influential notables, and was able to fill the nineteen seats on the Council by the beginning of November. Eight ministers were appointed, among whom should be mentioned Saiyid Talib Pasha, Minister of the Interior; Sassoon Effendi (a Jew), Minister of Finance and Jaafar Pasha el Askari (formerly Governor of Aleppo under Feisal), Minister of War.

It was intended that this Provisional Council of State should carry out the work of government, until such time as a National Assembly could meet to discuss the establishment of a permanent Constitution. It

will be remembered that as a result of the British Declaration of July 12th a committee of former Ottoman deputies had been appointed to elaborate an electoral law. This committee duly made its report towards the end of the year, but the disturbed state of the country consequent on the insurrection necessitated a postponement of further arrangements for the election of a popular assembly.

The powers of the Provisional Council of State were considerably circumscribed by those of the High Commissioner. Foreign and military affairs were exclusively reserved for the High Commissioner to deal with, and he was further enabled to veto or modify any decisions the Council might take. A British advisor was appointed to assist each Minister, and it was specifically laid down that no Minister was to take any action except in collaboration with his advisor. In case of a difference of opinion the question under dispute was to be brought before the Council at its next sitting, and presumably the High Commissioner would ultimately have a deciding voice. It will be seen that such arrangements provided strong grounds for criticism on the part of those who considered that such close control was incompatible with national aspirations.

Some months were spent in the reorganization of the Administration, while the country was slowly settling down. Arab officials were appointed at the head of administrative divisions assisted by British advisory officials.

Meanwhile it was becoming clear that there was a general feeling in favour of the organization of the new State under a native ruler, though there was

The choice of
a ruler and
Feisal's elec-
tion, 1921.

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difference of opinion as to who this should be. The principal persons mentioned in this connection were the Emir Feisal, the Naqib of Baghdad, Sayid Talib Pasha, The Sheikh of Mohammerah, Ibn Saud Emir of Nejd, the Agha Khan and the Turkish Prince Burhan-ed-Din. Of these the first three were in greatest favour, but by reason of age and infirmity no less than personal disinclination the Naqib was not likely to allow his own candidature. Feisal and Sayid Talib thus stood out as virtually the sole competitors. The latter, sheltering himself behind the Naqib, and ostensibly working for a Republic, conducted an intense and extensive propaganda on his own account, but prejudiced himself by a hostility to Great Britain apparently based on the evident British partiality to Feisal, whose success, besides ruining his personal ambitions, would be distasteful to those who objected to any form of foreign control. His unguarded utterances ultimately gave the British authorities occasion for considering him a danger to public security, and he was consequently deported in April 1921. The field was thus left open for Feisal, who had in the meantime come to an arrangement with the British Government whereby he was to be allowed to forward his candidature by proceeding to Mesopotamia in person, while giving assurances in return that if he were successful he would accept British assistance. The Sheikh of Mohammerah and Ibn Saud had at the same time been induced publicly to disclaim any pretensions to the throne.

Feisal arrived in Mesopotamia towards the end of June 1921. On July 11th the Provisional Council

of State, on the motion of the Naqib, unanimously resolved to offer him the crown, which he duly accepted. The choice was confirmed by the British High Commissioner, subject to a referendum being taken. The result showed 96 per cent. of the votes cast to be in favour of Feisal. He was accordingly officially proclaimed King of 'Iraq on August 23, 1921.

The question of the part played by Great Britain in the events which brought about Feisal's accession has been much discussed. It would be difficult to ascertain whether the result of the referendum was in any way due to British pressure. It may, however, safely be said that such pressure, if any, was not direct and could not be interpreted to amount to a manipulation of the election. At the same time it would seem that the action of the British Government, which certainly appears to have had much to do with the elimination of rival candidates, was such as to give the impression that the recognition of Feisal's claims would be favourably looked on, and the prevalence of this impression would be likely to have considerable effect on the minds of electors. Great offence was taken by the French at this elevation under British auspices of a prince for whom they felt nothing but antipathy.

Since Feisal's accession to the throne of 'Iraq, little has occurred to bring that country into public prominence. Superficially at least, the work of government and administration appears to have followed a normal course. Nevertheless, there have been abundant indications that neither the British nor the 'Iraqis are satisfied with the state of Anglo-Mesopotamian relations.

Situation after
Feisal's acces-
sion.

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In Great Britain the policy of the Government has been subjected to continual criticism. It has been urged that the military and civil expenditure involved is more than the British Treasury can afford, and that, subject to maintaining the security of British interests in the Persian Gulf, no adequate justification exists for the continuance of British control on the present scale.¹

In 'Iraq the Mandatory system has fallen into disrepute and has come to be regarded as synonymous with foreign domination.

Even before Feisal's accession the possibility of supplementing the Mandate or replacing it by some other form or agreement had been mooted. Mr. Churchill, when Colonial Secretary, declared in the House of Commons on

The Treaty between Britain and 'Iraq.

June 14, 1921:—

We are prepared, when the Arab Government has been set up and a ruler chosen, to enter into negotiations with that ruler, to enable us to adjust our relations with Mesopotamia upon a treaty basis, that is, recognizing in a much more direct form the independence, and thus still further to disengage ourselves from the problems, burdens and responsibilities of those embarrassing regions.

A few months later, on November 16, 1921, Mr. Fisher made the following pronouncement on behalf of the

¹ In articles contributed by Sir Percival Phillips to the *Daily Mail* in November 1922, the total estimated expenditure of Government in 'Iraq for 1922-3 is given as rather over £11,000,000. Of this sum nearly £8,000,000, comprising £7,000,000 for military and £200,000 for civil expenditure, is borne by the British Treasury. The 'Iraq Government has civil expenditure of over £3,000,000 and military expenditure of about £600,000. A deficit between £200,000 and £300,000 is expected, and the Minister of Finance is said to have expressed the desire for a subvention of about £1,000,000 per annum for the next few years until the State can organize its resources.

British Government at the Meeting of the Council of the League of Nations in Paris :—

Statements made publicly by King Feisal from the Throne at the moment of his accession show clearly that he is ready and willing to include in his treaty with His Majesty's Government all proper provisions to insure that the Government of 'Iraq shall be carried on in strict conformity with the spirit of the Covenant of the League.

It is therefore the opinion of His Majesty's Government that, provided that the treaty secures, first, the control of His Majesty's Government over the foreign relations of 'Iraq ; secondly, due fulfilment of the international obligations incurred by His Majesty's Government by treaty, mandate or agreement ; thirdly, such measure of financial control as may be necessary ; and fourthly, provided that it contravenes in no respect either the spirit or the letter of the Covenant of the League of Nations, it would provide a more satisfactory definition of the relations between the Mandatory Power and the mandated State than other form of instrument.

It will be understood that the proposed treaty will serve merely to regulate the relations between His Majesty's Government, as Mandatory Power, and the Arab Government of 'Iraq. It is not intended as a substitute for the Mandate, which will remain the operative document defining the obligations undertaken by His Majesty's Government on behalf of the League of Nations.

Negotiations for an Agreement on this basis were accordingly begun and a treaty,¹ to last for twenty years,² was signed on October 10, 1922. The following are its principal provisions :—

Great Britain is to provide 'Iraq with advice and assistance "without prejudice to her national sovereignty," and 'Iraq undertakes to follow the advice tendered through the British High Commissioner

¹ Cmd. 1757, 1922. For full text see Appendix III., p. 174.

² A subsequent Protocol signed in May 1923 reduces this period. The Treaty is now to terminate either on the entry of 'Iraq into the League of Nations or four years after the ratification of peace with Turkey, whichever is the earlier date.

in matters concerning international engagements, and, having regard to the obligations under which 'Iraq stands to Great Britain, in matters of financial policy. No part of the territory of 'Iraq is to be alienated in any way, and Great Britain undertakes to provide military support under conditions to be subsequently determined. The main provisions of the Mandate are safeguarded by a number of clauses dealing with such questions as liberty of conscience, community rights, equality of commercial opportunity, and the status of foreigners. Great Britain agrees to use its good offices to secure the admission of 'Iraq to the League of Nations as soon as possible.

The following official announcement was made on the occasion of the signing of the treaty, in which it is implied that this is a step towards the abrogation of the Mandate :—

His Britannic Majesty's Government, conscious of the deep obligations into which they entered towards 'Iraq, are convinced that these obligations will be completely fulfilled by means of the Treaty of Alliance which has been signed on behalf of His Britannic Majesty and of His Majesty the King of 'Iraq. They will do everything in their power to secure the speedy delimitation of the frontiers of 'Iraq, in order that 'Iraq may be in a position when the treaty and the subsidiary agreements therein provided for have been duly ratified and the Organic Law has been brought into effect, to apply for admission to membership of the League of Nations.

They confidently look forward to this application being made as soon as the frontiers are settled and a stable Government set up in accordance with the Organic Law, when they will use their good offices, provided that effect is being given to the provisions of the treaty, to secure the admission of 'Iraq to membership of the League, as provided for in Article VI thereof, which affords, in their opinion, the sole means by which the mandatory relation can legally be terminated.

CHAPTER VI

BRITISH, ARABS AND JEWS IN PALESTINE

Situation, 1918 to 1920—Civil administration—Transjordan—Relations between Arabs and Jews—Riots of May 1921—Causes of Arab hostility to the Jews—The Constitution—The Arab Delegation to England and British policy.

HITHERTO only passing reference has been made to the problems of Palestine, where the population, while reacting to the echo of events in Syria and watching them with keen interest, was primarily absorbed in the peculiar difficulties of its relations with the Jews.

The text of the Balfour Declaration has already been given, and some allusion made to the military administration set up as a result of the British occupation. A vivid account of the state of the country at this time is contained in the opening passages of the first official report¹ of the administration to be published and is worth quoting.

When General Allenby's army swept over Palestine, in a campaign as brilliant and decisive as any recorded in history, it occupied a country exhausted by war. The population had been depleted; the people of the towns were in severe distress; much cultivated land was left untilled; the stocks of cattle and horses had fallen to a low ebb; the wood-

¹ "An Interim Report on the Civil Administration of Palestine during the period July 1, 1920—June 30, 1921" (Cmd. 1499, 1921).

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lands, always scanty, had almost disappeared ; orange groves had been ruined by lack of irrigation ; commerce had long been at a standstill. A Military Administration was established to govern the country. For nearly two years it laboured, with great devotion, at its restoration. An administrative system, as efficient as the conditions allowed, was set up. The revenue authorized by the Turkish law was collected, and was spent on the needs of the country. A considerable sum, advanced by the Anglo-Egyptian Bank was lent by the Government in small amounts to the agriculturists, and enabled them to purchase stock and seed, and partly to restore their cultivation. Philanthropic agencies in other countries came to the relief of the most necessitous. Commerce began to revive. It was encouraged by the new railway connection with Egypt, established during the campaign for purposes of military transport. It was assisted also by the construction, with the same object, of a network of good roads. The country showed all the signs of gradually returning life.

But the prospects of Palestine are not limited, on the economic side, merely to a return to the standard attained before the war. It has the possibilities of a far more prosperous future. Small in area—comparable in size to Belgium or Wales—its geographical position rendered it in ancient times, and may render it again, a centre of no small importance to the commercial traffic of the larger territories that surround it. Within the limits of a province, it offers the varieties of soil and climate of a continent. It is a country of mountain and plain, of desert and pleasant valleys, of lake and seaboard, of barren hills, desolate to the last degree of desolation, and of broad stretches of deep, fruitful soil. The rainfall of Jerusalem equals that of London. The water problem, over most of the country, is not a question of quantity, but of storage, of pumping and of distribution.

It is obvious to every passing traveller, and well known to every European resident, that the country was before the war, and is now, undeveloped and under-populated. The methods of agriculture are, for the most part, primitive ; the area of land now cultivated could yield a far greater product. There are, in addition, large cultivable areas that are left untilled. The summits and slopes of the hills are

admirably suited to the growth of trees, but there are no forests. Miles of sand dunes that could be redeemed are untouched, a danger, by their encroachment, to the neighbouring tillage. The Jordan and the Yarmuk offer an abundance of water-power; but it is unused. Some industries—fishing, and the culture and manufacture of tobacco are examples—have been killed by Turkish laws; none have been encouraged; the markets of Palestine and of the neighbouring countries are supplied almost wholly from Europe. The sea-borne commerce, such as it is, is loaded and discharged in the open roadsteads of Jaffa and Haifa; there are no harbours. The religious and historical associations that offer most powerful attractions to the whole of the Western, and to a large part of the Eastern world, have hitherto brought to Palestine but a fraction of the pilgrims and travellers who, under better conditions, would flock to her sacred shrines and famous sites.

The country is under-populated because of this lack of development. There are now in the whole of Palestine hardly 700,000 people,¹ a population much less than that of the province of Galilee alone in the time of Christ.² Of these 235,000 live in the larger towns, 465,000 in the smaller towns and villages. Four-fifths of the whole population are Moslems. A small proportion of these are Bedouin Arabs; the remainder, although they speak Arabic and are termed Arabs, are largely of mixed race. Some 77,000 of the population are Christians, in large majority belonging to the Orthodox Church, and speaking Arabic. The minority are members of the Latin or of the Uniate Greek Catholic Church, or—a small number—are Protestants.

The Jewish element of the population numbers 76,000. Almost all have entered Palestine during the last forty years. Prior to 1850 there were in the country only a handful of Jews. In the following thirty years a few hundreds came to Palestine.³ Most of them were animated by religious

¹ According to the official census taken in 1922 the total population of Palestine is 755,858, composed as follows: Moslems, 589,564; Jews, 83,794; Christians, 73,026; Druses, 7,028; Other Religions, 1,446.

² See Sir George Adam Smith, *Historical Geography of the Holy Land*, ch. xx.

³ According to observers who visited Palestine in 1839 on behalf

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motives; they came to pray and to die in the Holy Land and to be buried in its soil. After the persecutions in Russia forty years ago, the movement of the Jews to Palestine assumed larger proportions. Jewish agricultural colonies were founded. They developed the culture of oranges and gave importance to the Jaffa orange trade. They cultivated the vine, and manufactured and exported wine. They drained swamps. They planted eucalyptus trees. They practised, with modern methods, all the processes of agriculture. There are, at the present time, 64 of these settlements, large and small, with a population of some 15,000. Every traveller in Palestine who visits them is impressed by the contrast between these pleasant villages, with the beautiful stretches of prosperous cultivation about them, and the primitive conditions of life and work by which they are surrounded.

The success of these agricultural colonies attracted the eager interest of the masses of the Jewish people scattered throughout the world. In many countries they were living under the pressure of laws or customs which cramped their capacities and thwarted their energies; they saw in Palestine the prospect of a home in which they might live at ease. Profoundly discontented, as numbers of them were, with a life of petty trade in crowded cities, they listened with ready ears to the call of a healthier and finer life as producers on the land. Some among them, agriculturists already, saw in Palestine the prospect of a soil not less fertile, and an environment far more free, than those to which they were accustomed. Everywhere great numbers of Jews, whose religion causes them to live, spiritually, largely in the past, began to take an active interest in those passages of their ritual that dwelt, with constant emphasis, upon the connection of their race with Palestine; passages which they had hitherto read day by day and week by week, with the lax attention that is given to contingency that is possible but remote. Among a great proportion, at least, of the fourteen millions of Jews, who are dispersed in all the countries

of the Church of Scotland the Jewish population was then about 12,000. Mr. Stein, of the London Zionist Organization, states that the number of Jews had increased by 1880 to 25,000 and by 1914 to between 90,000 and 100,000. This total was much reduced during the war by deportations, emigration and deaths from famine.

of the globe, the Zionist idea took hold. They found in it that larger and higher interest, outside and beyond the cares and concerns of daily life, which every man, who is not wholly materialist, must seek somewhere.

Societies were formed which purchased areas of land in Palestine for further Jewish colonization. The Hebrew language which, except for purposes of ritual, had been dead for many centuries, was revived as a vernacular. A new vocabulary, to meet the needs of modern life, was welded into it. Hebrew is now the language spoken by almost all the younger generation of the Jews of Palestine and by a large proportion of their elders. The Jewish newspapers are published in it. It is the language of instruction in the schools and colleges, the language used for sermons in the synagogues, for political speeches and for scientific lectures.

Large sums of money were collected in Europe and America, and spent in Palestine, for forwarding the movement. Many looked forward to a steady process of Jewish immigration, of Jewish land colonization and industrial development, until at last the Jews throughout the world would be able to see one country in which their race had a political and a spiritual home, in which, perhaps, the Jewish genius might repeat the services it had rendered to mankind from the same soil long ago.

Such were the conditions under which Great Britain was called upon to administer the country in accordance with the pledges given both to the Arabs and the Jews, and variously interpreted by them.

On July 1920, following on the San Remo Conference and the acceptance by Great Britain of the Palestine Civil Adminis-
tration. Mandate, the military administration was replaced by a civil régime under a High Commissioner, to which post Sir Herbert Samuel, a former member of the British Cabinet, was appointed. Tributes to the capacity and impartiality of this gentleman have been given by all parties, but it is questionable whether the appointment of a Jew has

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had all the beneficial results anticipated.¹ British officials were provisionally retained at the head of the central departments and of the provincial divisions. In October 1920 an Advisory Council was established consisting of twenty members, half chosen from the officials of the Administration and half, comprising four Moslems, three Christians and three Jews, nominated by the High Commissioner. The functions of this Council were only consultative, but it is stated in the report to which reference has previously been made that "no case has yet arisen in which the Government has been unable to accept the opinion of a majority of the unofficial members." The proceedings of the Council are published in the Press.

Much needed attention has been paid to local government. There are twenty-two municipalities in Palestine and fourteen local Councils (a number which may be expected to increase) in the larger villages. These bodies have certain powers of local taxation.

The Turkish system of Government education has been reorganized and extended. The children of the Jewish and Christian communities nearly all go to schools maintained by non-Government organizations. The Jewish schools are mostly run by the Zionist Organization; the Christian Schools by ecclesiastical and charitable bodies. The Government education system deals, therefore, chiefly at present with Moslems, who have few non-Government Institutions to depend on. It was stated by the High Commissioner in 1920.

¹ I cannot refrain from quoting a pithy comment of the *Daily Mail* correspondent in that paper's issue of January 20, 1923: "He (Sir H. Samuel) was sent to show the Syrian an example of Zionism: he has succeeded in being thought a favourable exception."

that, out of 134,000 children in the country of school age, 100,000 were receiving no education at all. The great majority of these would be Christian and Moslem Arabs, and most of them probably Moslems. The superior organization of the Jewish community secures the attendance of most Jewish children at school. Illiteracy prevails among a very large proportion of the Arab population. The Government scheme aims at starting sufficient village schools within the next two or three years to provide opportunities for a minimum of elementary education throughout the country. Before the war Arabic was taught in the Turkish Government schools as a foreign language. It is now the principal medium of instruction, little occasion having arisen yet to introduce English or Hebrew.

Some of the most valuable work done by the administration has been in the direction of Public Health. Apart from the valuable activities of private charitable institutions, practically no attempt was made to cope with the medical and sanitary needs of the country under the Turkish régime. The war intensified the evils of this state of affairs. The presence of the Turkish armies encouraged the spread of disease, and economic stringencies lowered the vitality of the population. Considerable progress has now been made towards the establishment of suitable Government Institutions to fight such endemic diseases as malaria and ophthalmia, for medical research, for the sanitation of towns and villages, besides the provision of hospitals and the appointment of competent medical officers in the various districts.

With regard to the administration of Justice, it is

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to be noted that the abolition of the Capitulations decreed by the Turks on the outbreak of war has been maintained. An exception has been made in the case of the United States, apparently because that country was never at war with Turkey, but it is not altogether clear why this should have been allowed, especially as other neutral States do not seem to have been accorded this privilege. Foreigners can at present claim to be tried by a British magistrate or by a court with a majority of British judges. The law administered is substantially that of the Ottoman Code, with such modifications as were necessary to meet new circumstances and to simplify its most cumbersome features. Arabic is the language most generally used, but English and Hebrew are, as official languages, also allowed. In districts of mixed speech this inevitably tends to produce some confusion and to lengthen the proceedings, but such conditions only prevail over limited areas and in the big towns.

For internal security a police force and gendarmerie, drawn from all sections of the population, has been recruited. The British garrison towards the end of 1922 numbered 2,800 men, maintained at an estimated cost to the British Treasury for the financial year 1922-3 of £1,724.¹ There is in addition a force of British gendarmerie,² about 700 strong, towards the upkeep of which the British Treasury has made a grant of £300,000 for the same period. These are stated to be the only substantial charges incurred by

¹ See statement in the House of Commons on December 7, 1922. In the previous year a garrison of 5,000 men was being maintained at a cost of £2,500,000.

² This force is largely composed of men transferred from the Special Irish Constabulary ("Black and Tans"). It was started in the latter part of 1921.

Great Britain, as it has been possible to meet all civil expenditure out of local resources.¹

The area thus administered only includes that part of the country lying west of the Jordan Valley and of the depression running southwards from Trans-jordania, the Dead Sea to the Gulf of Aqaba. The region to the east, known as Transjordania,² was up to the overthrow of the Emir Feisal by the French in July 1920, administered by the Arab Government at Damascus. Since this date it has been under the authority of the British High Commissioner for Palestine, but has enjoyed a special status. No British garrison is maintained there, and it is excluded from the area within which the Jewish National Home is to be established.

In November 1920 the Emir Abdulla, a brother of the Emir Feisal, made his way to Amman from the Hejaz with the intention, it was said, of attempting to restore a Sherifian Government at Damascus. At the time the country was in a state bordering on chaos. Local Councils had been instituted to carry on the administration, but they had completely failed in their task, and the five British officers placed at their disposal to assist them and organize a gendarmerie had been able to make little headway. It was accordingly decided to ask Abdulla to accept the responsibilities of government, on condition that he refrained from any hostile proceedings towards Syria. An arrangement in this sense was concluded in March 1921,

¹ Full details of the work of the various administrative departments are to be found in the "Report of the Palestine Administration, July 1920-December 1921," published by the Stationery Office in December 1922.

² For definition of boundaries see Appendix VIII, p. 212

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and in July a grant of £180,000 was made by the British Exchequer towards the initial expenses of organization. It does not appear that the Emir has yet been able to establish any great measure of stability. In the autumn of 1922 he came to England to confer with the British as to the region's future, but it is not yet clear what result these deliberations will have. It was announced in the Press on May 17, 1923, that the British Government had decided to recognize the independence of Transjordan subject to an agreement being concluded providing for constitutional government and the fulfilment of international obligations and subject to the approval of the Council of the League of Nations.

Meanwhile the strained relations between the Arabs and the Jews in Palestine proper had been growing in intensity. Close co-operation had been established between the Moslem and Christian sections of the Arab community in order to resist Jewish pretensions. Already in April 1920 riots had broken out in Jerusalem involving loss of life and the pillaging of Jewish shops. In February 1921 an Arab Palestinian Congress had been held at Haifa, at which protests had been made against the Balfour Declaration and demands formulated for the institution of a national Government, with a Legislative Assembly to be elected only by the Arab-speaking population which existed in the country before the war. The suspension of further legislation and the repeal of past legislation,¹ was

¹ Particular emphasis was laid on legislation dealing with transactions in land. Just after the Armistice a proclamation was issued annulling all transactions in immovable property effected

demanding until the status of the country had been finally settled and a national Government formed. A permanent Committee was set up to carry on the work of the Congress, and an appeal was made for the co-operation and solidarity of all Arabs in Palestine.

May 1, 1921, provided an occasion for serious disturbances, which brought to light the extreme danger of the bitter feeling existing between the hostile parties. On this and succeeding days the town of Jaffa was the scene of violent conflicts resulting in heavy casualties,¹ while the Jewish colonies in the neighbourhood were

since the occupation and prohibiting further transactions. This was done (1) because of the confusion existing in the Turkish land registration offices owing to the inefficiency of the system generally and the removal of the registers by the departing Turks. (2) To protect landowners and especially to prevent advantage being taken of their distressful condition for the foreclosure of mortgages. This measure was considered by Zionists to be contrary to their interests, as it prevented the acquisition of land by Jews under what would, as a matter of fact, have been very unfair conditions. A reorganization of the land registration system was effected and the "Transfer of Land Ordinance" of September 1920 restored freedom to execute transactions in land under certain conditions. The High Commissioner has stated in his comments on the Jaffa Riots Report (Cmd. 1540, 1921, p. 62) that "the purpose of the restrictions . . . is to prevent speculative companies purchasing large areas of land in Palestine and holding them back from use or development in expectation of a considerable increase in price as the prosperity of the country increases." This measure was regarded with suspicion by the Arabs as an attempt by the Government to facilitate the acquisition of land by Jews. It is difficult to see anything but reasonable regard for the interest of landowners, whether Jews or Arabs, in either of these enactments, and it is only another illustration of the atmosphere of distrust that any unusual amount of comment should have arisen about them. See also the extract from the Jaffa report on p. 119.

¹ See Cmd. 1540, 1921, p. 60. The Arab casualties were 48 killed and 73 wounded. The Jewish casualties were 47 killed and 146 wounded. The total was thus 95 killed and 219 wounded, or 314 casualties all told. It is asserted by the Zionists that most of the Arab casualties were caused by the troops in suppressing the riots.

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subjected to attacks by Arab tribes. The civil administration proved powerless to maintain order, since a number of the police and gendarmerie, carried away by the force of personal feeling, either refused to intervene or actually joined in on the side which held their sympathies. Troops had to be called in to restore the peace.

An exhaustive inquiry was made into these events, the causes of which lie so deep in the nature of affairs in Palestine, and are so admirably set forth in the report of the Commission set up that, in spite of their length, certain portions are well worth quoting. The following extracts deal with the conclusions reached after two and a half months' research¹ :—

Causes of Arab hostility to the Jews.

When we come to consider the causes of these disturbances we find an immediate cause, which of itself could not have been sufficient to give rise to more than a street riot of the ordinary kind, confined to a comparatively small body of persons, restricted to a limited area, and within the power of the Jaffa police to control. That cause was the M.P.S.² demonstration, and its clash with the procession of the Jewish Labour Party.

But this was no ordinary riot. The disturbance raged for several days with intensity wherever Arabs came into contact with Jews, and spread into the surrounding country, where Jewish colonies having nothing whatever to do with Bolshevism, were attacked with ferocity. The Bolshevik demonstration was the spark that set alight the explosive discontent of the Arabs and precipitated an outbreak which developed into an Arab-Jewish feud.

It has been said to us by Jewish witnesses that there was no essentially anti-Jewish question at that time, but that a

¹ Cmd. 1540, 1921, pp. 43-5, and pp. 50-8.

² M.P.S. stands for "Miflagat Poalim Sozialistim," meaning Socialist Labour Party. It is a Jewish Communist organization.

movement against the Jews was engineered by persons who, anxious to discredit the British Government, promoted discontent and disturbance of the peace by stirring up the common people against the Jews. It is argued by them that all the trouble is due to the propaganda of a small class whose members regret the departure of the old régime, because British administration has put an end to privileges and opportunities of profit formerly enjoyed by them; that in co-operation with them are certain foreigners, principally French agents, who are ready to make mischief for political reasons, and to encourage any sort of disturbance calculated to embarrass the British Government. These witnesses asseverate that Zionism has nothing to do with the anti-Jewish feeling manifested in the Jaffa disturbances. They declare that the Arabs are only anti-Zionist or anti-Jewish because they are primarily anti-British, and that they are merely making use of the anti-Zionist cry in order to wreck the British Mandate.

We are satisfied that this is not the case. Although an inclination to take advantage of any trouble in the country may have been present in the minds of a very few for this and that reason, yet the feeling against the Jews was too genuine, too widespread and too intense to be accounted for in the above superficial manner. That there is discontent with the Government has appeared during this inquiry, but we are persuaded that it is due partly to the Government policy with regard to a Jewish National Home in Palestine, partly to Arab misunderstandings of that policy, and partly to the manner in which that policy is interpreted and sought to be applied by some of its advocates outside the Government. It culminates in a suspicion that the Government is under Zionist influence, and is therefore led to favour a minority to the prejudice of the vast majority of the population. We have been assured, and we believe, that had there been no Jewish question, the Government would have had no political difficulty of any importance to deal with so far as its domestic affairs are concerned. We consider that any anti-British feeling on the part of the Arabs that may have arisen in the country originates in their association of the Government with the furtherance of the policy of Zionism. . . .

Had there been nothing more than some rough handling

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of the demonstrators by the Arabs, there would be little for us to say. It would have been the usual row to which we are accustomed from time to time in all countries. But we have no doubt that the Arabs were the first to turn this quarrel into a race conflict, and when once this issue had been joined they behaved with a savagery which cannot be condoned. . . . The killing was accompanied and followed by an orgy of pillage which was a disgrace to a civilized community.

That the Jews retaliated with equal savagery is not to be denied, but they had much to revenge. . . .

So long as the Jews remained an unobtrusive minority, as they did under the Ottoman Government, they were not molested or disliked. It was only when it came to be believed by the Arabs that the Jews were exercising a preponderating influence over the Government that a state of feeling arose which required but a minor provocation on the part of a small number of undesirable Jews to ignite an explosion of popular anger against the Jews in general. This manifested itself in serious outrages, of which some of the best sort of Jews have been the victims.

It is not within our province to discuss Zionism, but only such questions as are popularly supposed to be involved in Zionism, and have been put before us as causes of discontent culminating in the riots. Whether the construction put by the Arabs or their leaders in opinion on certain statements of fact are reasonable, and whether the statements themselves are true or capable of explanation, are questions not altogether relevant to this inquiry. What are relevant are the statements themselves, and the constructions put upon them. . . .

The grievances put before us by Arabs and others as having contributed materially to the state of exasperation which found its outlet in the disturbances are already known to the readers of the newspapers, but their repetition cannot be avoided in this report. We are satisfied that these grievances had the effect thus alleged, but this conclusion involves no pronouncement on our part upon their individual merits or demerits. The principal ones are contained in the following allegations :

(a) That Great Britain, when she took over the administration of Palestine, was led by the Zionists to

adopt a policy mainly directed towards the establishment of a National Home for the Jews, and not to the equal benefit of all Palestinians.

(b) That in pursuance of this policy the Government of Palestine has, as its official advisory body, a Zionist Commission, bound by its ideals and its conception of its rôle to regard Jewish interests before all others, and constituted by its singular prerogatives into an *imperium in imperio*.

(c) That there is an undue proportion of Jews in the Government service.

(d) That a part of the programme of the Zionists is the flooding of Palestine with a people which possesses greater commercial and organizing ability than the Arabs, and will eventually obtain the upper hand over the rest of the population.

(e) That the immigrants are an economic danger to the population because of their competition, and because they are favoured in this competition.

(f) That immigrant Jews offend by their arrogance and by their contempt of Arab social prejudices.

(g) That owing to insufficient precautions immigrants of Bolshevik tendencies have been allowed to enter the country, and that these persons have endeavoured to introduce social strife and economic unrest into Palestine and to propagate Bolshevik doctrines.

Labouring under these grievances the Arabs have regarded with suspicion measures taken by the Government with the best intentions. The Transfer of Land Ordinance, 1920, which requires that the consent of the Government must be obtained to all dispossessions of immovable property and forbids transfers to others than residents in Palestine, they regard as having been introduced to keep down the price of land, and to throw land which is in the market into the hands of the Jews at a low price.¹ The temporary measure, now inoperative, which prohibited the export of cereals, was enacted, as they contend, to oppress the native landowners so as to compel them to sell their land, and at the same time to provide cheap food for the Jewish immigrants.²

¹ See note on p. 115.

² The measure referred to was imposed in the autumn of 1920

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In connection with their grievance against the disproportionate number of Jews in the Government, the Arabs urge that the Legal Secretary is a Jew well known as an ardent exponent of Zionism, and while making no personal attack upon him, say that the control which he is able to exercise over the Courts of Law lessens their confidence in the administration of justice. They also point to the personnel of the Public Works Department. They assert that Jews are exclusive in business, that a Jewish tradesman will not buy from an Arab if the goods he wants can be obtained from a Jew, and they argue that a Jewish official who has the power to influence the granting of a Government contract will not let it go to anyone but a Jew if he can help it.¹

with the object of assuring supplies of essential food-stuffs during the winter. It was withdrawn in the spring of 1921.

¹ The following is a summary of figures given in the "Interim Report on the Civil Administration of Palestine" of Government Officials employed in June 1921 :—

		Senior Service.	Junior Service.	Totals.
Christians	{ British ..	165	76	241
	{ Palestinian ..	82	967	1,049
		247	1,043	1,290
Jews	{ British ..	14	13	27
	{ Palestinian ..	59	553	589
		73	566	616
Moslems	63	521	584

There were, according to these figures, 268 British officials (including 27 British Jews), 589 Palestinian Jewish officials, and 1,033 Palestinian non-Jewish officials i.e. the Palestinian Jewish officials were to the Palestinian non-Jewish officials as about 1 to 2 $\frac{1}{4}$, whereas the Jews are to the total population as about 1 to 7. The Jews therefore hold more than double the posts they would be entitled to on a population basis. On the other hand, this proportion would probably not seem unjust if an educational standard were to be taken. It is really impossible to settle this question by statistics.

The High Commissioner gives the following figures for the personnel of the Public Works Department in August 1921 :—

With regard to the workmen and labourers employed by the Public Works Department and on the railways, they complain that the employment of a large number of Jews out of all proportion to the Jewish population of the country has displaced Arab labour, and is a means of using public money for the support of the very immigrants whose introduction is viewed with alarm and hostility. They say that they are made to pay for the Jewish National Home.

This brings us to the question of Jewish immigration. The objections on the part of the artisans and labourers are mostly economic. If the new arrivals could have been taken at once into agricultural colonies, their coming would have had little effect on the working people of Jaffa; but their employment on public works and railways, and their entry into competition with the town people as artisans, labourers and porters, particularly since they have come in relatively large numbers, has aroused the same feeling of hostility and alarm that alien immigration has excited in other communities with which we are familiar. It would be useless to argue with the Arab that they are not aliens because they are returning to their ancient home, since this is to him the aspect of the Zionist question with which he will have nothing to do. He tells you that they are Russians and Poles, and sometimes adds that they are Bolsheviks. In any case he complains

			Senior Service.	Junior Service.	Totals.
Christian	{ British	12	2	14
		{ Palestinian	15	15
			—	—	—
			12	17	29
Jews	{ British	1	3	4
		{ Palestinian ..	3	41	44
			—	—	—
			4	44	48
Moslems	—	—	—
		..	1	1	2

Such justification as there may be in the Arab contentions lies in the manifestation of personal bias by individual officials and in traits of the Jewish character, neither of which factors are demonstrable except through personal experience.

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that they take the bread out of his mouth. The immigration policy has been likened to the bounty-fed commerce of the Germans, because the immigrant is subsidized in one way or another, and because, whereas the Arab has to starve when he is out of work, the newcomer is believed to be provided for by the Government or subsidized by his own organization.

Arabs who are not artisans or labourers repeat the above objections and add that immigrants compete in clerical occupations, especially now that Hebrew has been made an official language. Their main objection to immigration has, however, been political, and this objection, although originating with the more educated Arabs, has filtered through the khans and coffee-shops into the streets and villages. It can be summed up in the fear that, through extensive Jewish immigration, Palestine will become a Jewish dominion. This fear is not lessened when they read in Zionist literature such passages as the following, taken from the *Keren Ha-Yesod Book*, which will be referred to again later: "The object of the modern Jewish pioneer in Palestine is to prepare room and work for the thousands and millions that wait outside. . . ."

There is also a limited social objection to Jewish immigrants so far as Jaffa is concerned. Among the causes of the anti-Jewish irritation felt by the Arabs of Jaffa was a certain attitude of arrogance displayed in the streets and open places of the town by younger "Haluzim" of both sexes. Several witnesses have referred to the manner in which strings of these young men and women, in free-and-easy attire, would perambulate the streets arm in arm, singing songs, holding up

¹ The number of Jewish immigrants admitted to Palestine up till the end of 1922 was just under 28,000. Of these, a small but appreciable proportion were people returning to their homes. It has been repeatedly stated by the Government that the number of Jewish immigrants has not been in excess of the economic capacity for absorption of the country and will not be allowed to become so. The Zionists deny that any Arab labour has been displaced. It is probably true that a Jewish employer would engage a Jew in preference to an Arab, all things being equal, but it must also be remembered that were it not for Jewish enterprise opportunities for employment would be fewer. Moreover, the solidarity of the Jews as a community gives them an advantage in labour organization. The Arab grievance is intelligible, but the facts adduced in its support are not always relevant. The same may be said of the alleged partiality in the allocation of contracts.

traffic and generally conducting themselves in a manner at variance with Arab ideas of decorum. It is not difficult to understand the feelings inspiring these young people on their arrival in Palestine. It is natural that the transition from the cramping conditions under which they had been living in the countries whence they came to the freedom of their "National Home," the land of their dreams and hopes, should have stimulated an exuberance of spirit, probably combined with an exaggerated appreciation of what is implied by the term "National Home." On the other hand, it is natural that Arabs should be irritated by the self-assertion and aggressiveness of these new arrivals, and that this pouring of new wine into old bottles should not proceed altogether easily. Our task in this inquiry is to establish facts rather than to impute blame; but the circumstance to which we refer shows how necessary it is that those responsible for the oversight of the immigrants should impress upon the latter the importance of directing their natural and legitimate enthusiasms into channels where they cannot offend others, and how necessary it is that they should warn them of the need to study the susceptibilities of their Arab fellow citizens. . . .

But for the considerations set forth above we feel convinced that there would be no animosity towards the Jews as such; that there is no inherent anti-Semitism in the country, racial or religious. We are credibly assured by educated Arabs that they would welcome the arrival of well-to-do and able Jews who could help to develop the country to the advantage of all sections of the community. Zionists, for their part, dwell freely on the theme that the realization of the policy of the "National Home" will benefit Arabs as well as Jews; but we feel bound to express the opinion, arrived at in the course of the inquiry, that the Zionist Commission, which is the representative of the Zionist Organization in Palestine, has failed to carry conviction to the Arabs on this point. So far as we can judge, the only sentiment it has inspired in them is one of profound distrust.

This distrust is not of recent growth, but appears first to have taken root in the early days of the Military Administration. At this time, according to evidence brought before us, Jews enjoyed greater facilities than Arabs in the matter

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of obtaining permits to travel on and to import merchandise by military railways, owing to the fact that the Zionist Commission was accepted by the Administration as sponsor for the Jews, whereas the Arabs had no corresponding body to whom they could apply for guarantees for this purpose. Consequently the Jews were able to obtain their permits promptly, while the Arabs had to follow a cumbersome and lengthy procedure. This inequality of treatment was clearly not the fault of the Zionist Commission, and was probably inevitable at the time, but it created ill-will on the part of the Arabs towards the Commission. The subsequent activities and pretensions of the Commission do not seem to have dispelled or mitigated this ill-will, and if we refer to the topic here it is because the distrust inspired in the Arabs by the Zionist Commission has been, in our opinion, an appreciable factor in creating the feeling, but for which the Jaffa outrages would probably not have taken place. It seems to us that the Zionist Commission was in a better position than any other unofficial body or organization to fulfil the important function of conciliating the Arabs, and of rendering, or attempting to render, the policy embodied in the Balfour Declaration acceptable to them. Such a function would require tact and powers of conciliation of a high order, and we feel that a part of the energies of the Zionist Commission could have been devoted to no more appropriate, more valuable, and more vital purpose. We find, however, a belief among the Arabs that the Commission has either desired to ignore them as a factor to be taken into serious consideration, or else has combated their interests to the advantage of the Jews. An unfortunate impression was created in the country by the practice of the Zionist Commission, abandoned since April 1920, of paying subsidies to Jewish policemen and Jewish Government clerks of junior grades in aid of their official salaries. Again, we have had evidence to the effect that the Zionist Commission put strong pressure on a large Jewish landowner of Richon-le-Zion to employ Jewish labour in place of the Arabs who had been employed on his farm since he was a boy. The farmer, we were told, yielded to this pressure with reluctance, firstly, because the substitution of Jewish for Arab labour would alienate the Arabs, secondly, because the pay demanded by the Jewish labourers, and the

short hours during which they would consent to work, would make it impossible for him to run his farm at a profit.

Furthermore, the influence exercised, or believed to be exercised, by the Commission over the framing of legislation, and in the selection of Government officials (also, occasionally, in the reinstatement of officials dismissed by the Government), has done nothing to lessen the distrust with which it is regarded by the Arabs, who have no similar body to exercise corresponding influence on their behalf. It is not for us to say that the activities, real or alleged, of the Zionist Commission were or are illegitimate; we can, however, say that in our opinion the Commission's conception of its duties and functions has exercised an exacerbating rather than a conciliatory influence on the Arab population of Palestine, and has thus been a contributory cause of the disturbances which are the subject of our inquiry.

It is important that it should be realized that what is written on the subject of Zionism by Zionists and their sympathizers in Europe is read and discussed by Palestinian Arabs, not only in the towns but in country districts. Thus a witness from Tulkeram, who appeared before us in the course of the Khedera inquiry, quoted as an instance of provocative writing, the following passage from a book entitled *England and Palestine*, by H. Sidebotham (p. 235)¹:—

It is desired to encourage Jewish immigration by every means, and at the same time to discourage the immigration of Arabs. . . .

The book from which this quotation was taken was published as far back as 1918; but our attention has been called to other not less provocative statements appearing in Zionist publications since the disturbances, whilst we were sitting. Thus the *Jewish Chronicle*, No. 2,720, of May 20, 1921, makes the following statement in the course of its leading article:—

¹ This quotation perhaps reads less provocatively in its context. The question under discussion is how to secure Jewish predominance, but it is hoped to achieve this object "without unfair racial discrimination." The idea seems to be (to misquote Macbeth): "If it were done, when 'tis done, then 'twere well it were done gently."

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Hence the real key to the Palestine situation is to be found in giving to Jews as such, those rights and privileges in Palestine which shall enable Jews to make it as Jewish as England is English, or as Canada is Canadian. That is the only reasonable or, indeed, feasible meaning of a Jewish National Home, and it is impossible for Jews to construct it without being accorded a National status for Jews.

Until the Commission came to examine Dr. Eder, acting Chairman of the Zionist Commission, they were unaware to what extent such expressions of opinion as those we have quoted above were authorized by responsible Zionists. Dr. Eder was a most enlightening witness. He was quite unaggressive in manner and free from any desire to push forward opinions which might be offensive to the Arabs. But when questioned on certain vital matters he was perfectly frank in expressing his views of the Zionist ideal. He gave no quarter to the view of the National Home as put forward by the Secretary of State and the High Commissioner. In his opinion there can only be one National Home in Palestine, and that a Jewish one, and no equality in the partnership between Jews and Arabs, but a Jewish predominance as soon as the numbers of that race are sufficiently increased. He declined to admit the word "dominion," but chose "predominance." As acting Chairman of the Zionist Commission, Dr. Eder presumably expresses in all points the official Zionist creed, if such there be, and his statements are, therefore, most important. There is no sophistry about Dr. Eder; he was quite clear that the Jews should, and the Arabs should not, have the right to bear arms, and he stated his belief that this discrimination would tend to improve Arab-Jewish relations. He considered that, with regard to the appointment of the High Commissioner for Palestine, the Zionist organization should be allowed either to formulate objections to the selection of the British Government, or to submit a list of its own nominees for consideration. We do not comment upon his opinions, because the discussion of the questions raised is not our concern, but it is relevant to our report to show that the acting Chairman of the Zionist Commission asserts on behalf of the Jews those

claims which are at the root of the present unrest, and differ materially from the declared policy of the Secretary of State and the High Commissioner for Palestine. It is perhaps worth noting as an instance of the diversity of manner in which Jews and Arabs look upon the same questions, that, whereas Arab witnesses denounce the Government of Palestine as a Zionist Government, Dr. Eder stigmatizes it as an Arab administration.¹ . . .

Much, we feel, might be done to allay the existing hostility between the races if responsible persons on both sides could agree to discuss the questions arising between them in a

¹ The Zionists have objected to this summary of Dr. Eder's evidence as being misleading. It will, therefore, not be superfluous to quote one or two passages from the verbatim report of his actual statements regarding the meaning of the National Home. He said: "The Balfour Declaration provides for a National Home for the Jewish people in Palestine. The interpretation we have put upon this is that Jews should be free to enter Palestine to build up their own civilization and culture, and eventually when the Palestinians are fit for it by their experience and political judgment, representative Government shall be conferred upon Palestine by His Majesty's Government. We look eventually to Palestine being in the position of one of the free dominions, inhabited by Arabs and Jews, and that both will play their part, the only difference being that the League of Nations has a certain control over the Government."

Later, a member of the Commission said: "You have given us a very reasonable definition of the Balfour Declaration, but that is not the definition always given in responsible Zionist papers." To this Dr. Eder replied: "This country has to be built up by the Jews and the Arab. Jews do not come here for domination. I claim predominance. My own view is this, in the remote future there could be a Federate State of the Near East. Syria, Mesopotamia, Hedjaz, Palestine, Transjordan, could all be independent. Palestine would be predominantly Jewish."

Again, when asked whether he considered the Arabs in Palestine as foreigners or not entitled to a National Home, Dr. Eder replied: "I do not say they are foreigners. Every respect would be paid to their civil and religious rights in this country. We do not think there is room for an Arab National Home in Palestine. Their National Home is in Syria, Transjordan, Mesopotamia and Hedjaz." And further on: "There is no room for an Arab National Home (in Palestine). We can have them both united in one home."

The reader must judge for himself whether these statements confirm or otherwise the statements made in the report, but it should be remembered that the Commission seem quite clear as to the impression made on their minds at the time.

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reasonable spirit, on the basis that the Arabs should accept implicitly the declared policy of the Government on the subject of the Jewish National Home, and that the Zionist leaders should abandon and repudiate all pretensions that go beyond it. The immigrants should be made to understand that, whatever their historical and religious claim, they are, after all, seeking a home in a country at present overwhelmingly Arab, and that it behoves them to adopt a considerate attitude towards the people among whom they must wish to live in peace and friendship. The Arab notables, on the other hand, should make it clear to the Arabs that in no case can they expect murder, violence and pillage to be condoned.

The Commission's Report leaves unanswered the important question of how far the specific grievances of the Arabs are founded on fact. The footnotes I have inserted show that the charges of unfair partiality to the Jews brought against the administration seem capable of satisfactory answer, but they are not really the main points at issue. Distrust of the Government's disinterestedness has taken deep hold of the Arab mind. It is not unnatural that the Arabs should regard the fulfilment of Zionist ideals with suspicion. Certain Zionist pronouncements have given them reasonable grounds for apprehension. The assurances of the British Government that their position in the country will not be menaced by the special position accorded to the Jews have not carried conviction. It is, indeed, the very fact of the Jews being given a special position at all, which excites their fear of ultimately becoming subservient to them. They have been quick to lay hold of any indications tending to confirm their suspicions, and apprehension has increased their credulity. A distinction should be

drawn between the exaggerations and misunderstandings to which apprehension has given rise and the cause of the apprehension itself. This distinction is important to a correct appreciation of the problem.

It was thought that the best way of meeting the difficulties to which the conditions just described gave rise, was to proceed as soon as possible to the elaboration of a system settling once and for all the constitutional relations of the various communities in the country. The Draft Constitution. Draft Orders in Council were accordingly prepared by the British Government with this end in view, and an official summary of the Constitution, which it was proposed in this way to put into operation appeared in the Press in February 1922.¹ The Orders in Council giving the Constitution in its final form were published on August 10, 1922. The provisions of the drafts were expressly stated to be open to discussion, and certain modifications were introduced in the definitive texts.

Supreme executive authority is to be vested in the High Commissioner (who is also to be titular Commander-in-Chief), "for giving effect to the provisions of the Mandate accepted by Great Britain, at the request of the Principal Allied Powers, for the general administration of the country and the establishment of a National Home for the Jewish people." He is to be assisted by an Executive Council whose composition is to be determined later. A Legislative Council is to be established, consisting of twenty-two

¹ For full text together with subsequent modifications see Appendix IV, p. 179.

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members, of whom ten are to be official and twelve unofficial. The unofficial members are to be elected under a system of primary and secondary elections, details of which are given.

The Ordinances passed by the Legislative Council are only to take effect after receiving the assent of the High Commissioner, or in certain cases, as, for instance, if anything affecting the provisions of the Mandate should be involved, that of the British Government. The form of the Judicial organization is outlined including the establishment of separate Moslem, Christian and Jewish religious courts. English, Arabic and Hebrew are to be placed on an equal footing as official languages. Any complaints concerning the non-fulfilment of the terms of the Mandate are to be dealt with by the British Government in accordance with the procedure to be recommended by the League of Nations. For settling questions of immigration the High Commissioner is to be assisted by a committee composed of members of the Legislative Council.

At about the time when these proposals were issued a delegation appointed by the Christian-Moslem Society and claiming to represent the general opinion of the whole Arab population of Palestine, arrived in England. It at once protested against the terms of the draft Constitution, and an interesting correspondence, which has been officially published,¹ took place between it and the Colonial Office, supplementary to interviews which it had with the Colonial Secretary and his representatives. In this correspondence the objections

¹ Cmd. 1700, 1922.

of the Arabs and the reasons for the British Government's persistence in the policy inaugurated by the Balfour Declaration are very clearly brought out. In addition to a general repudiation of Zionism and all that it implies, the Arab case, briefly stated, consists of a series of complaints against the restricted powers of self-government to be granted to Palestine. It is urged that contrary to Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, in which independence is promised, and in contradistinction to the policy followed in Mesopotamia and Syria, Palestine is in effect reduced to the status of a British colony. Detailed arguments are adduced to support this view, involving criticism of the powers of the High Commissioner and the British Government over legislation, of the subordination of the Legislature to the Executive, and of the composition of the Legislature, in which it is alleged that the Executive would too easily be able to command a majority. Some of these arguments carry more weight than others, and the same may be said of the replies furnished by the Colonial Office. One conclusion, however, which emerges from the controversy is that no national Government in any true sense of the term would endorse a Zionist policy, and that therefore, while the British Government are bound by the Balfour Declaration, it is impossible for them to consider the establishment of a national Government. As the Colonial Office state in a letter of March 1, 1922 : " If your delegation really represents the present attitude of the majority of the Arab population of Palestine, and Mr. Churchill has no grounds for suggesting that this is not the case, it is

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quite clear that the creation of this stage of a national Government would preclude the fulfilment of the pledge made by the British Government to the Jewish people."

This declaration is at once a justification of British and Zionist arguments on the one side and of Arab arguments on the other. It begs the whole question of whether the political development of Palestine is to follow a normal course or whether it is to depend on an abnormal factor, namely, the establishment of a Jewish National Home. Another question of almost equal importance raised by the correspondence is whether, Zionism apart, there would not still remain a certain conflict of ideas about what normal political development would connote, since the British Government claim that Palestine, west of the Jordan, is not within the area in which independence was ever promised.

In July 1922, a lengthy declaration of British policy was issued, recapitulating the arguments already adduced in the correspondence with the Arab delegation. After referring to Arab apprehensions as being "partly based upon exaggerated interpretations of the meaning . . . of a Jewish National Home in Palestine," the declaration points out that only part of Palestine is affected by pledges to the Jews and that in this part the Zionist Organization "has not desired to possess and does not possess, any share in the general administration of the country. Nor does the special position assigned to the Zionist Organization in Article IV of the Draft Mandate for Palestine imply any such functions." In order to allay any fears that the Jews might have of the promises made to them not being

fulfilled, it is affirmed that the Balfour Declaration "is not susceptible of change." The following paragraph gives the interpretation which the British Government put upon this declaration :—

During the last two or three generations, the Jews have recreated in Palestine a community, now numbering 80,000, of whom about one-fourth are farmers or workers upon the land. This community has its own political organs; an elected assembly for the direction of its domestic concerns; elected councils in the towns; and an organization for the control of its schools. It has its elected Chief Rabbinate and Rabbinical Council for the direction of its religious affairs. Its business is conducted in Hebrew as a vernacular language, and a Hebrew Press serves its needs. It has its distinctive intellectual life and displays considerable economic activity. This community, then, with its town and country population, its political, religious and social organizations, its own language, its own customs and its own life, has in fact "national" characteristics. When it is asked what is meant by the development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, it may be answered that it is not the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole, but the further development of the existing Jewish community, with the assistance of Jews in other parts of the world, in order that it may become a centre in which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion and race, an interest and a pride. But in order that this community should have the best prospect of free development and provide a full opportunity for the Jewish people to display its capacities, it is essential that it should know that it is in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance. That is the reason why it is necessary that the existence of a Jewish National Home in Palestine should be internationally guaranteed and that it should be recognized to rest upon ancient historical connection.

Thus understood, the British Government considers there is nothing which need cause either alarm to the Arab population of Palestine or disappointment

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to the Jews. The encouragement of Jewish immigration within the economic capacity of the country is taken to be a natural corollary of this point of view.

It is argued that Palestine does not lie within the area where pledges of Arab independence were given in 1915 to the Emir of Mecca, on the grounds that Palestine, west of the Jordan, was included in the reserved territory "lying to the west of the district of Damascus."¹ Finally, it is stated, that the development of self-government is contemplated by gradual stages.

Upon consideration of this declaration, the Zionist Organization expressed itself satisfied and bound itself to mould its policy in accordance with its provisions. The Arab delegation, on the other hand, refused to accept it as in any way compatible with Arab aspirations. The delegation left England in the autumn of 1922, after making a statement to this effect.

Arab opposition to Zionism involved, as we have already seen, opposition to the proposed Constitution. The Arabs, therefore, decided to boycott the elections for the Legislative Council which were held early in 1923. As the wholesale abstention of a large majority of voters made the formation of a representative body impossible, the British Government decided to suspend that part of the Constitution which refers to the Legislative Council and temporarily to restore the old Advisory Council which was to have been superseded.

¹ See Sir Henry MacMahon's letter to the Sherif, of October 24, 1915, quoted on p. 21.

CHAPTER VII

MANDATES, TREATIES AND CONCLUSIONS

The nature of the problem to be solved—The Mandatory system—Self-determination—The allocation of Mandates at San Remo—The San Remo Oil Agreement—The Treaty of Sèvres—The Anglo-French agreement regarding boundaries, etc.—Draft Mandates and League action—The Lausanne Conference—Conclusions—The situation in relation to (i) European politics, (ii) The local populations, (iii) Wider issues.

IN the first of the preceding chapters were discussed the attempts made during the war to secure agreement among the various interested parties as to the future of the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire, should victory place its disposal in the hands of the Allies. Succeeding chapters have been devoted to a narrative of events for the occurrence of which the failure to make such agreement sufficiently definite and complete has been largely responsible. It would be useless to recriminate. The question which has to be faced and upon the satisfactory solution of which the peace and prosperity of this part of the Middle East depends, still remains—what is to be the status of those predominantly Arab-speaking regions whose separation from the political unit to which they formerly belonged is contemplated?

The populations on whose behalf, and because

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of whose general wish this separation is primarily considered desirable, are not homogeneous in the sense implied by the word "nation." There are wide differences among them of race, of religion, of degree, of civilization and of mode of life. They have, indeed, a considerable sense of unity, but it is yet undeveloped, and therefore, however much the creation of a great Arab State may appeal to the imagination, it cannot be said that natural conditions favour the adoption of this course. When other factors are taken into consideration, the impossibility of its present realization is manifest. For there are British "interests," and French "interests" and in places Italian "interests," political, economic, strategic, religious and cultural, to be considered, and, whatever may be thought of them, they cannot be ignored. Neither can the promises made to the Jews be rudely brushed aside.

Aspirations of every kind jostle each other everywhere. Envy, hatred and malice seem more prevalent than loving-kindness and mercy. What has been done up to now to compose the differences between the rival claimants?

It was anticipated that everything would be settled by the Peace Conference. The reconciliation of Arab **The Mandatory system** aspirations and European "interests" was to be effected by the invention of the Mandate system. In place of the procedure involving or implying varying degrees of direct control, by which the political influence of a colonial Power was accustomed to be imposed on partially developed communities, the tutelage of such com-

munities was to be regarded henceforward as a trust for which the trustee was to be responsible to a tribunal of the world.

The matter was accordingly thus dealt with in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations which came into operation on the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles in January 1920 :—

To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.

The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League.

The character of the Mandate must differ according to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances.

Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.

The Mandates of this class are known as “A” Mandates. There follow two paragraphs dealing with less advanced communities in Africa and the Pacific

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where Mandates of classes " B " and " C " involving greater degrees of direct administrative control are to be set up. The Article concludes :—

In every case of Mandate the Mandatory shall render to the Council (of the League of Nations) an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge.

The degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory shall, if not previously agreed upon by the members of the League, be explicitly defined in each case by the Council.

A permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive and examine the annual reports of the Mandatories and to advise the Council on all matters relating to the observance of the Mandates.

As the detachment of territories from enemy States as a result of the war was necessarily effected by the victorious Powers, it fell to them to decide how the Mandates should be divided. The League's part was only considered to begin with the submission of the terms of the Mandates to the League for approval.

The recognition of the Mandatory principle was undoubtedly a great advance in the theory of international relations. It is to be deeply regretted that the rivalries of the Great Powers and their apparent difficulty in realizing a change of method as well as form has greatly hindered the advance in practice. Perhaps it is unfortunate that people were led to expect so much ; it is little short of a calamity that the benefits (at least in so far as the Turkish or " A " Mandates are concerned) have been so few. It is, however, something that the duties and obligations of Powers responsible for the guidance of undeveloped communities should be definitely laid down, and that

an appeal against treatment not in conformity with the Mandate should be possible.

Attenuating circumstances can, it is true, be pleaded. The failure to conclude peace with Turkey, in itself and apart from the question of whether the failure was avoidable or not, complicated and prolonged the difficulties inevitable during a transitional period of this nature. Moreover, no legal basis for a change of status exists until a peace treaty with Turkey is ratified and the League of Nations has strictly speaking no competence as yet to deal with the regions under discussion. All the Powers occupying these regions could do was to administer them according to the spirit of the Mandatory system. It can be said that they tried, but, whether in truth they could not or would not do more than they did, the success achieved was limited.

We have seen what attempts were made in Syria and Mesopotamia to ascertain the wishes of the Self-determinations. With all the goodwill in the world it may be doubted whether conclusive verdicts were possible. Too many considerations, some of which have been mentioned in the narrative, were present to confuse the issues, and it was too much to expect that people inexperienced in the complicated forms of Western political thought should not be influenced by them. Certain general opinions do, however, seem to have been established with reasonable certainty. In the first place, there was a wide feeling in favour of the establishment of maximum internal independence with a minimum of foreign control. Then, in Syria,

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there were clear indications that Great Britain was more likely to act in this sense than France. Finally, in Palestine there was no doubt about the condemnation of the Jewish policy laid down in the Balfour Declaration. Greater efforts might well have been made by the two Great Powers principally concerned to play up to these indications. Their interests need not have suffered, and their prestige, upon which co-operation with Arabs must ultimately be based, would have gained immeasurably instead of depreciating.

The allocation of the Mandates was performed by the Council of the Principal Allied Powers at San Remo in April 1920 on the basis of the division of the Arab regions diplomatically settled between them during the war. The League of Nations had no competence in the choice. Great Britain accepted the Mandates for Mesopotamia and Palestine, France that for Syria and the Lebanon. The substitution of Civil for Military Administration was carried out subsequent to, and as a consequence of, the arrangements made at this time.

An important agreement, which must be mentioned, was also come to at San Remo between Great Britain and France with regard to Mesopotamian oil.

Shortly before the war the then existing oil concessions in the vilayets of Mosul and Baghdad were sold by the Turkish Government to the Turkish Petroleum Company, the capital of which was 75 per cent. British and 25 per cent. German.

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This British interest was safeguarded by the Sykes-Picot Agreement, but the French were anxious to obtain the German interest. During 1919 an arrangement in this sense was discussed as compensation for the inclusion of Mosul in the British zone of political control. Agreement was not reached until the San Remo Conference, where a document¹ was signed securing to French capital 25 per cent. of whatever sums might be invested in the oilfields of Mesopotamia as a whole, or alternatively 25 per cent. of the output of crude oil in the event of the oilfields being developed by British Government action. Arrangements were made regarding pipe lines, transport facilities and similar matters.²

The Treaty of Sèvres, signed on August 20, 1920, contained provisions regarding the Arab provinces to be detached from the Ottoman Empire

Treaty of Sèvres, August 1920. which, in spite of its non-ratification, deserve mention as representing the intentions of the Allies at this time and as forming the basis upon which the final settlement will be built.

Syria and Mesopotamia were "provisionally recognized as independent States subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone" (Art. 94).

As regards Palestine :—

¹ Cmd. 675, 1920. See Appendix V, p. 184.

² The bad bargain alleged to have been made by France was one of the reasons for M. Clemenceau's fall. A bird in the hand in the shape of political rights in Mosul was said to be better than the indefinite advantages for which this was exchanged.

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The High Contracting Parties agree to entrust, by application of the provisions of Article 22 (of the Covenant of the League of Nations), the administration of Palestine, within such boundaries as may be determined by the Principal Allied Powers to a Mandatory to be selected by the said Powers. The Mandatory will be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 2, 1917, by the British Government, and adopted by the other Allied Powers, in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

The Mandatory undertakes to appoint as soon as possible a special Commission to study and regulate all questions and claims relating to the different religious communities. In the composition of this Commission the religious interests concerned will be taken into account. The Chairman of the Commission will be appointed by the Council of the League of Nations (Art. 95).

It was provided (Arts. 96 and 97) that the terms of the Mandates should be drawn up by the principal Allied Powers and submitted to the Council of the League of Nations for approval, and Turkey undertook to accept any decisions regarding the questions dealt with in this section of the treaty.

In Article 98, Turkey was made to recognize the Hejaz as a "free and independent State."

It will be noticed that while the independence of Syria and Mesopotamia is explicitly alluded to, nothing is said about the independence of Palestine. This inconsistency, which also appears to involve a breach of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, needs explanation. The reason given for the course pursued, and stated by the British Government in

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a letter addressed by the Colonial Office to the Palestine Arab Delegation on March 1, 1922, is the obligation to carry out the pledges to the Jews.

There is no question (the letter continues), of treating the people of Palestine as less advanced than their neighbours in 'Iraq and Syria ; the position is that His Majesty's Government are bound by a pledge which is antecedent to the Covenant of the League of Nations, and they cannot allow a constitutional position to develop in a country for which they have accepted responsibility to the Principal Allied Powers, which may make it impracticable to carry into effect a solemn undertaking given by themselves and their Allies.¹

The answer of the Arab Delegation to this argument,² is to the effect that the maintenance of the Balfour Declaration policy, besides being contrary to antecedent and subsequent pledges to the Arabs, namely, those made to King Hussein and in the Anglo-French Declaration of November 1918, is inconsistent with Article 22 of the Covenant, and that according to Article 20 of the Covenant,³ any such inconsistent agreement ought to be annulled. It was indeed a contradiction to talk of entrusting the administration of Palestine to a Mandatory with the express object of carrying out the Balfour Declaration as an application of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The system proposed bore more reference to a " B " than to an " A " Mandate, and was a very different

¹ Cmd. 1700, 1922, p. 6.

² Cmd. 1700, 1922, pp. 11, 12.

³ The second paragraph of Article 20 of the Covenant reads : " In case any member of the League shall, before becoming a member of the League, have undertaken any obligations inconsistent with the terms of this Covenant, it shall be the duty of such member to take immediate steps to procure its release from such obligations."

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thing to the mere rendering of administrative advice and assistance to a provisionally independent country.

In December 1920, an agreement was signed between Great Britain and France,¹ settling the boundary between their respective mandated areas and sundry other matters, mostly pertaining to railway construction and irrigation works, and involving the modification of the agreements made during the war. A new delimitation of the northern frontier of Palestine was made, securing for this country, at the expense of Syria, territory containing the headwaters of the Jordan and the Litani. Official recognition was also given by France to the inclusion of the Mosul vilayet in the British area. The concessions made by France were expressly stated "to imply the maintenance to the profit of France of the stipulations of the Franco-British San Remo Oil Agreement."

Meanwhile the terms of the proposed Mandates had been drafted, and, in December 1920, the Commission mentioned in the last paragraph of Article 22 of the Covenant was brought into being. It consists of nine members, a majority of whom represent States which are not Mandatory Powers. The discussion and approval of the draft Mandates for Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia was, however, delayed by the intervention of the United States, who claimed a moral, if not a technical, right to benefit by provisions giving "most favoured nation" treatment to all members of the League. Protracted negotiations resulted, and

Draft Man-
dates and
League action

¹ For full text see Appendix VI, p. 186.

the Council of the League did not feel justified in discussing the draft Mandates until their conclusion. Consequently, it was not till July 1922 that approval was given to the terms of the Mandates for Syria and Palestine.¹ These two Mandates are to come into force simultaneously, but have not yet done so. Certain differences which existed at the time between the Allies regarding the control of the Holy Places in Palestine have now been settled, but there are still certain matters in dispute between the French and Italian Governments regarding Syria. The draft Mandate for Mesopotamia has not yet been submitted to the League of Nations for approval, because of the negotiations with King Feisal, which culminated in the signature of the treaty of October 1922, to which reference has already been made.

At the Conference held at Lausanne between November 1922 and February 1923, to conclude the long-delayed peace with Turkey, the only questions discussed which come within the scope of these pages referred to the delimitation of the southern frontier of Turkey bordering on Syria and 'Iraq. Although the Conference failed in its object, the draft treaty presented to the Turks is still the subject of negotiation, and it will therefore be useful to detail what occurred, especially with regard to the dispute over the 'Iraq frontier, the decision regarding which is not likely to be altered.

The Turks have been asked to forgo all claims to the territories formerly belonging to them and lying

¹ For full texts of Mandates see Appendix VII, p. 192.

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beyond the southern frontier as it may eventually be definitely fixed.

Important modifications of the Turco-Syrian frontier as laid down in the Treaty of Sèvres (Art. 27), were agreed to by France in the Convention concluded by that country with the Angora Government in October 1921. This new frontier has been allowed to stand.

A claim was put forward by the Turks for the return of the Mosul vilayet, which is at present an integral part of the kingdom of 'Iraq. This claim was based on the assertion that the area concerned should form part of Turkey as defined in the clause of the National Pact, which runs as follows :—

Inasmuch as it is necessary that the destinies of the portions of the Turkish Empire which are populated exclusively by an Arab majority, and which on the conclusion of the Armistice of October 30, 1918, were in the occupation of enemy forces, should be determined in accordance with the votes which shall be freely given by the inhabitants, the whole of those parts, whether within or outside the said armistice line, which are inhabited by an Ottoman Moslem majority united in religion, in race and in aim . . . form a whole which does not admit of division for any reason in truth or in ordinance.

The arguments used to establish the assertion that the Mosul vilayet is more Turkish than Arab, and the contrary arguments adduced by the Allies, can be most clearly shown by placing them in parallel columns.¹ It is quite clear from the discussions which took place that the only region about which any legitimate doubt could exist was the Kurdish

¹ See Appendix IX, p. 214.

area in the north-west of the vilayet. Strategic considerations and the presence of Christian communities in the northern portion of this area were strong reasons against conceding anything to the Turks even here. The only Turkish argument of any force was that all the Kurds should be united under Turkish rule, but as against this it was pointed out that these Kurds wanted autonomy rather than union with Turkey, and that southern Kurdistan was economically dependent on Baghdad.

The Allies eventually offered to submit the matter to the Council of the League of Nations for a final decision as to the frontier to be drawn. As the Turks still demurred, it was finally agreed that this procedure should only be followed if within a year of the coming into force of the treaty no settlement had been reached, by negotiations between Great Britain and Turkey.

We have now taken the history of recent events in Mesopotamia, Palestine and Syria as far as our information allows. We will conclude **Conclusions.** with a brief survey of the situation as it appears, firstly, from the point of view of European politics; secondly, from the point of view of the local populations; thirdly, from the point of view of those larger forces which govern the affairs of the world.

The interests of European Powers have three derivations—economic, political and strategic. Under the first heading it is sufficient to say that present conditions impel industrialized countries to seek foreign markets

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and sources of raw materials. These economic considerations strengthen the incentive to secure exclusive control of overseas territories by the exercise of political influence, but the primary factor determining political action has hitherto been and is still, to a great extent, the action and reaction of national forces which is implied in the term "balance of power." Strategic interests depend on the political.

One of the outstanding features of the relations of European Powers in the Near and Middle East has for many years been Anglo-French rivalry in the Levant. To these Powers a third has been added, namely, Italy, within the last generation.

Since the construction of the Suez Canal, the isthmus through which it passes, and the territories adjoining it, have been a focus of British interest. Great Britain achieved a dominant position here with the occupation of Egypt. France failed to prevent this by her own fault. She realized her mistake, and for twenty years her policy was to make things as uncomfortable as possible for Great Britain. The conclusion of the 1904 Agreements, which laid the foundations of the *Entente*, resulted in so far as Eastern policy was concerned in confirming the British position in Egypt in return for the recognition of a similar French position in Morocco. But while Great Britain, with the Straits of Gibraltar in her mind, still obstructed French ambitions in the western Mediterranean by the use of the Spanish position in northern Morocco, France did not wholly abandon her opposition to Great Britain in the eastern Mediterranean. French naval policy worked on a

double axis—from north to south through Toulon and Bizerta ; from west to east through Morocco (making the acquisition of Tangier desirable) and (failing Egypt) Syria. The traditional French interest in Syria, derived from many centuries of close commercial, religious and cultural contact, was therefore reinforced after the beginning of the present century by a present political interest.

The participation of Turkey in the war provided the opportunity for the realization of many political aspirations. Syria was earmarked by France to be her own exclusive sphere of interest. Great Britain was anxious to consolidate her position in the Persian Gulf—important in relation to India. She was able to strengthen her hold on the Suez Canal, but she did not want to see France her neighbour in Palestine. Hence the creation of a British preserve to include the Bay of Acre, having regard to the passing of Alexandretta into French hands and the possibility of losing Cyprus to Greece. Hence also the proposal to internationalize Palestine.

Zionism, however, provided an opportunity for an even more advantageous arrangement. Apart from the question of abstract justice and its bearing on a solution of the Jewish problem as a whole, which we shall discuss later, Zionism offered certain definite advantages to Great Britain. There was the chance of an alliance with the international force of Jewry which the circumstances of the war made specially attractive and which might survive as of permanent value, and there was the chance of introducing a Jewish element into Palestine, bound by ties of

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gratitude to Great Britain, which would turn Palestine into an advanced bastion for the defence of the Suez Canal. The Balfour Declaration must have been influenced by such considerations, though they were certainly not its ultimate motive. The abandonment of the proposal to internationalize Palestine and its transfer to British control marked the attainment of these objects.

Mention has been made of the British interest in the Persian Gulf. Apart from this, 'Iraq is of importance owing to its position as part of the area across which the air routes of the future between Europe and Asia must pass, but neither this consideration nor the prospect of economic advantages could in themselves justify Great Britain in assuming any form of direct control of the country for her own ends. From a military point of view 'Iraq can be nothing but an incubus. It has no natural frontiers, vulnerable communications and a trying climate. Short of direct administrative control amounting to annexation, there is really no alternative for Great Britain save eventual evacuation. There are very good reasons, however, why evacuation should not take place suddenly and immediately. Stability is the one important consideration for Great Britain in relation to the Arab countries. While the consequences of the war remain unliquidated, that is to say, until a treaty with Turkey has been concluded, we cannot evacuate 'Iraq. Considerations of honour apart, it is not in the British interest to allow the disintegration of the Arab Government which would undoubtedly follow the withdrawal of British support, and thus to

let in the Turks again with the inevitable conflict and confusion which would ensue. The strategic key to 'Iraq as against Turkey is Mosul, since the only line of advance for an invasion in force is down the Tigris Valley. We must therefore hold Mosul until such time as the restoration of peace removes the immediate possibility of a Turkish attack, and until Arab forces have been trained to meet what may then be hoped to be an improbable contingency. It is to be remembered that, once Turkey has concluded a treaty, and, still more, once she is a member of the League of Nations, she will have to think twice before indulging in unprovoked aggression.

If we now turn to the consideration of the local populations, we have as the governing factor the pledges given by the Allies to the Arabs during the war. Great Britain and France have a moral obligation to assist in the establishment of local governments in the Arab countries. The process must necessarily be slow and accompanied by some degree of what may appear at first sight mere pretence. Thus national Governments in the sense in which the term applies in Europe are sheer impossibilities in the Arab countries at present. Nevertheless, there must be a framework or "façade" within or behind which national consciousness, at present in its infancy almost everywhere, and in some places practically non-existent, may build a lasting national structure or structures. The recognition of local differences animating the French administrative system in Syria is sound, though in this particular instance it is questionable how far success is not being invalidated because the motive

is the *divide et impera* principle rather than real regard for the populations concerned. It is admitted that foreign assistance will be required for many years to come if stability is to be preserved not only in Syria, but elsewhere in the Arab countries. At present the necessary spirit of co-operation is largely absent, and the reason is that Western methods have given rise to deep suspicion of Western motives. The expansion of Western Powers has hitherto been closely identified with territorial aggrandizement as a means of attaining political supremacy. Foreign assistance has come to be interpreted as synonymous with foreign domination, and the development of the resources of a country thus assisted has become indistinguishably connected with the idea of economic exploitation. There are real grounds for these suspicions and beliefs though not enough to justify them in their extreme forms. The growth of national consciousness, however, makes a people particularly anxious to be taken at its own valuation and very susceptible to the fear of being "put upon." The Mandate system was devised in order to get over this difficulty, but has not so far been able to do much towards achieving its objects. The selfish motives which enter so largely into the calculations of Governments have been emphasized above, because they have been primarily responsible for the failure to settle the upheaval in international affairs caused by the war. It is only fair, however, to say that Governments, and, to an even greater extent, peoples, do not lack disinterested aims, which they would like to see realized if they could only get away from the disastrous effects of

a competitive system based on narrow divisions of interest. The League of Nations and the Mandate system which springs from it are an expression of the feeling of world solidarity, which the war, paradoxical though it may seem, has done so much to develop.

It is essential that the basis of the relations between the Arabs and the Mandatory Powers should be one of mutual confidence. The way to achieve this lies in the application of the spirit of Article 22 of the Covenant, together with the personality of the officials who are sent to supervise the administration in accordance with its terms. Governments should let it be seen that they do not forget that they are administering a trust, and the officials they put beside those of the local Governments should be few, carefully chosen and directed to identify themselves primarily with the interests of the State they are engaged to assist. The official representative of the Mandatory Powers should merely be *primus inter pares* in relation to other foreign representatives, and foreign officials should not have to serve two masters by having to take direct instructions from official British sources. This is the system which formerly prevailed with marked success in Egypt.

It may be that the objects aimed at could be better attained by some other means than that hitherto attempted, and now seriously discredited. For this reason the establishment of national Governments and the placing of their relations with the Mandatory on a treaty basis, as has been done in Mesopotamia, is to be welcomed. The important thing is the spirit

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of Article 22, and if it is possible to embody this in forms other than those hitherto considered, and more acceptable to those concerned, there seems no objection. If necessary the League of Nations should consider the amendment of Article 22 as it now stands, with a view to removing the blatant anomalies which exist.

The Zionist complication in Palestine intrudes upon the consideration of this part of the Arab countries in relation to the whole. We have already indicated why the Balfour Declaration may have been considered advantageous from the point of view of British policy, but its justification is not usually claimed on these grounds. It is rather to be gathered from official utterances that the recognition of Zionism was a piece of abstract justice restoring to the Jews something taken from them and based on a belief in their *right* to a National Home. The idea of a Jewish State is repudiated, though it is difficult to see how the success of Zionism could be prevented from ultimately bringing this solution into prominence, and make it a demand difficult to resist.

Zionism has certain *prima facie* claims on our sympathy. It is an expression of the desire to give tangible form to the aspirations of Jews who are anxious to preserve and develop the characteristics of a corporate consciousness which can only be qualified by the adjective "national." The part played by the Jews among the early Empires of the Middle East in developing the monotheistic idea and preparing the way for Christianity establishes a claim to respect which few will deny. Islam, too, owes much to the Jews, and it must be admitted has acknowledged its

debt by a tolerance scarcely paralleled in Christendom. Because their uncompromising devotion to a formalized theocratic ideal clashed with the pagan political theory of Rome, they were dispersed, and because the narrow Ecclesiasticism of the Middle Ages burdened them with the responsibility of the crucifixion, and thus provided a moral justification for the ruthless exploitation of their economic genius, they were robbed, persecuted and denied the privileges of citizenship in Europe. To this day the Jewish communities of eastern Europe labour under immense disadvantages. Yet the Jews have preserved their individuality. They have clung together in adversity and have cherished the characteristics and institutions which distinguish them from those among whom they live. It might perhaps be said that they have done this because of persecution rather than in spite of it, for emancipation seems to have brought assimilation appreciably nearer. It may be partly for this reason that such strenuous efforts have been made to find a concrete and permanent home for the expression of what is essentially Jewish. That this home should be sought for in Palestine is readily comprehensible, and on the face of it there seems a very good case for helping its realization. The appeal has special force to Protestant nations whose religious education is based very much more on the Old Testament than that of other denominations. The sympathy founded on these grounds may be real, but to my mind does not bear a true relation to the real situation.

The central idea of a National Home for the Jews in Palestine is the *right* of Jews to settle there without

restriction of immigration other than may be imposed by the capacity of the country to absorb them, and the *right* to be treated there on the same footing as the existing inhabitants. Since the existing inhabitants object and claim the *right* to admit or exclude Jews as their own national prerogative, it is necessary for the Mandatory Power, namely, Great Britain, to adopt a policy of what is tantamount to coercion. The only justification for such a policy would seem to lie in the assertion that the conscience of the world demands that this experiment should be made as an attempt to solve the Jewish problem as a whole and as an act of abstract justice to the Jews. I am far from satisfied that this is the case, especially when I see such countries as Canada, the United States and Australia most emphatically claiming the right to admit or exclude from their territories whomsoever they please.

These considerations lead us to the contemplation of wider problems of world-wide interest in which the future of the Arab countries is involved.' We must, for instance, appreciate the importance of the Jewish problem in the world. We must, in discussing the Mandatory system, envisage the broad principles of nationalism and of the relations of more advanced to relatively backward peoples. We must decide to what extent the existing degree of Arab national consciousness can be utilized for the creation of Arab States and, if as has been repeatedly stated, the creation of Arab States or a Confederation of Arab States is desirable, how this national consciousness can best be guided and increased. It is generally admitted that European assistance is essential, and we must

therefore further decide what claim European States have to demand a return for their efforts either as a matter of right or expediency, and how these claims can best be reconciled with the aspirations of the peoples they hold in tutelage. It is a matter of universal interest that the resources of the world should be exploited to the best advantage and that conditions should prevail in backward places which will encourage the entry of capital. On the other hand, there is no justification for the crude exploitation of defenceless peoples for selfish interests such as marred the colonial policies of the Great Powers in the last century. Political tutelage and the development of natural resources in new countries should be conducted for the benefit of the people of those countries and for humanity at large and a strong League of Nations can alone secure this. There is no alternative save a continuation of the present friction and unrest with the eventual prospect of lawlessness and bloodshed.

It would be beyond the competence of the present writer, as it would be outside the scope of these pages, to attempt an investigation of the large questions to which the problems of Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine lead and of which they form part. But if there is one lesson more than any other which the course of the chapter of contemporary history here related appears to convey, it is the necessity of synthesizing the political events of the world and of realizing that under different forms each conceals a reference to similar principles, the discovery of which in the purest possible truth is the only hope of lasting solution.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

TEXT OF LETTERS, CONFIRMING THE SYKES-PICOT AGREEMENT, EXCHANGED BETWEEN THE BRITISH AND FRENCH GOVERNMENTS (SIR EDWARD GREY AND M. CAMBON) IN MAY 1916.¹

A. *M. Cambon to Sir E. Grey, May 9, 1916.*

1. France and Great Britain are disposed to recognize and protect an independent Arab State or a Confederation of Arab States in the (A) and (B) zones indicated on the enclosed map, under the suzerainty of an Arab chief. In the (A) zone, France, and in the (B) zone, Great Britain, shall have a priority right on local enterprises and loans. In the (A) zone, France, and in the (B) zone, Great Britain, shall alone supply advisors or foreign officials at the request of the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States.

2. In the blue zone, France, and in the red zone, Great Britain, shall be authorized to establish such direct or indirect administration or such control as they desire and shall judge it expedient to establish after reaching an understanding with the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States.

3. In the brown zone shall be established an international administration whose form shall be decided after consultation with Russia, and subsequently in accord with the other Allies and the representatives of the Sherif of Mecca.

4. There shall be accorded to Great Britain :—

Firstly, the ports of Haifa and Acre ; secondly, the guarantee of a definite quantity of water from the Tigris and the Euphrates in the (A) zone for the (B) zone. His Majesty's Government, on its side, undertakes at no time to enter into negotiations for the cession of Cyprus to a third Power without the previous consent of the French Government.

¹ Translated from the French texts reproduced in *L'Asie Française* and in *La Syrie*, by G. Sammé.

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5. Alexandretta shall be a free port in so far as the commerce of the British Empire is concerned, and there shall not be established any difference of treatment in port dues, nor particular advantages refused to British goods or shipping ; there shall be free transit for British goods through Alexandretta and over railways across the blue zone, whether these goods be destined for or come from the red zone, the (A) zone and the (B) zone ; and no difference of treatment shall be established (directly or indirectly) at the expense of British goods on any railway whatever, nor likewise at the expense of British goods or ships in all ports serving the zones mentioned.

Haifa shall be a free port in so far as the commerce of France, its colonies and protectorates, are concerned, and there shall be neither difference of treatment nor advantage in the port dues which might be refused to French goods and shipping. There shall be free transit for French goods through Haifa and over the British railway across the brown zone, whether these goods are destined for or come from the blue zone, the (A) zone or the (B) zone, and there shall be no difference of treatment (direct or indirect) at the expense of French goods and ships in any port whatever serving the zones mentioned.

6. In the (A) zone, the Baghdad Railway shall not be prolonged southwards beyond Mosul, and in the (B) zone northwards beyond Samarra, until a railway has been completed joining Baghdad to Aleppo by the Euphrates Valley, and this only with the agreement of the two Governments.

7. Great Britain shall have the right to construct, administer and be sole proprietor of a railway joining Haifa to the (B) zone. She shall have, moreover, a perpetual right to transport troops, at any time, along this line. It should be understood by the two Governments that this railway is to facilitate the junction of Baghdad with Haifa, and it is further understood that if technical difficulties and the expense incurred for the maintenance of this junction line in the brown zone make its execution impracticable, the French Government shall be disposed to consider the passage of the said line through the polygon Barreis-Keis-Maril-Silbrad-Tel-Hotsada-Mesuire before reaching the (B) zone.

8. For a period of twenty years the Turkish customs tariffs

shall remain in force throughout the blue and red zones as well as in the (A) and (B) zones, and no increase in the scale of dues nor change in *ad valorem* dues in specific dues shall be made except with the consent of the two Powers.

There shall be no internal customs between any of the above-mentioned zones. The customs dues leviable on goods destined for the interior shall be exacted at the port of entry and transmitted to the administration of the zone of destination.

9. It shall be understood that the French Government shall not undertake, at any time, any negotiations for the cession of its rights and shall not cede the rights it will possess in the blue zone to any third Power except the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States, without the previous consent of His Majesty's Government, which, on its side, shall give a similar assurance to the French Government in regard to the red zone.

10. The French and British Governments, as protectors of the Arab State, shall agree not to acquire and will not consent to the acquisition by any third Power of territorial possessions in the Arabian peninsula, nor the construction of a naval base in the islands off the east coast of the Red Sea. This shall not, however, prevent such rectification of the frontier of Aden as may be judged necessary as a consequence of the recent Turkish aggression.

11. The negotiations with the Arabs concerning the frontiers of the Arab State or Federation of Arab States shall continue through the same channels as heretofore in the name of the two Powers.

12. It is further understood that measures of control for the importation of arms in Arab territory shall be considered by the two Governments.

B. *M. Cambon to Sir E. Grey, May 15, 1916.*

(In reply to a letter of the same date from Sir E. Grey asking for certain guarantees not mentioned in M. Cambon's letter of May 9th.)

In your communication of even date your Excellency has expressed the desire, before answering my letter of May 9th regarding the creation of an Arab State, to receive an assur-

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ance that, in the regions which would become French or in those where French interests would be predominant, the concessions and rights of navigation, together with the rights and privileges of all British religious, scholastic and medical establishments should be maintained. It would be understood, on the other hand, that the same rights would be recognized to France by the King's Government in the sphere devolving to Great Britain.

I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the French Government is ready to sanction the various British concessions, dating with certainty from before the war, in the regions which may be attributed to it or which may depend on its action. As to the religious, scholastic and medical institutions, they would continue to function as in the past, it being at the same time understood that such a reservation does not imply the maintenance of rights of jurisdiction and the capitulations in these territories.

C. *Sir E. Grey to M. Cambon, May 16, 1916.*

(Accepts the text of the agreement contained in M. Cambon's letter of May 9th.)

APPENDIX II

(I) NOTE ON THE HISTORY AND AIMS OF ZIONISM.

(By *Mr. Leonard Stein.*)

The Zionist Movement is, in one sense, as old as the Dispersion. When the last vestiges of the Jewish State were blotted out by Hadrian in the second century, Palestine did not cease to be, in Jewish eyes, the Land of Israel. The ties between Palestine and the Jews were unbroken. The Jews conceived of themselves as a people in exile. But the exile was only an episode. Sooner or later, in God's good time, the exiles would be gathered in and the people restored to its land.

These were the ideas which continued to dominate the Jewish mind until well into the eighteenth century. Hence the repeated, though abortive, attempts at mass immigration into Palestine which were characteristic of the Middle Ages. Hence, too, the steady stream of Jewish pilgrims, and the pious offerings which regularly flowed from the Diaspora into the "Holy Cities." Hence, again, the instant response to the pseudo-Messiahs who appeared at intervals in various parts of the Jewish world. Nor should it be forgotten that the collapse of the Jewish State in Palestine by no means involved the disappearance of the Jews. For four hundred years and more, Palestine continued to be the foremost centre of Jewish thought and learning. Even after the centre of gravity had begun to shift to Babylonia, Palestine became the birthplace of Jewish mysticism, and produced the first of the Jewish liturgical poets. In the fifteenth century Palestine again became the scene of a renaissance which has left an enduring impression on Jewish thought. At the end of the eighteenth century, Jewish life in Palestine was,

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it is true, at a low ebb, but it had behind it a long and an august tradition.

Thus Palestine never ceased to be a magic name, and the hopes and memories which centred round it came to be woven into the very texture of Jewish life. This background is indispensable, if the Jewish connection with Palestine is to be understood. What the Jews have felt and still feel for Palestine is not merely a sentimental attachment to the cradle of their race and religion ; it is a living emotion which is of the essence of their corporate being.

In the new world which emerged from the convulsions of the French Revolution the Jews began to see themselves in a different light. In the West they acquired the ordinary rights of citizenship, and began to be absorbed into the structure of the societies in which they lived. In Eastern Europe they continued to be subject to grave disabilities ; but here, too, though the old world tradition was much more powerful, the ideas on which Jewry had fed in the Middle Ages were no longer adequate. Thus the conceptions of the Exile and the Redemption could no longer be taken literally, and had to be modified or re-stated.

But this did not mean that the Jews lost interest in Palestine. On the contrary, in the changed circumstances of the nineteenth century, they gradually passed from passive expectancy to active endeavour. To this change of attitude a variety of causes contributed. Anti-Semitism in the West threw the Jews back upon themselves and challenged their self-respect. In Eastern and South-Eastern Europe the Jews were actively persecuted. They were still living in compact masses, they were keenly conscious of their corporate identity, and they listened attentively to the echoes of the nationalist movements which were then in the ascendant. Finally, there was a growing feeling that, anti-Semitism or no anti-Semitism, it was incumbent upon the Jews to express themselves as a genuine constructive force and thus to make their corporate contribution to the common stock of spiritual values.

The turning-point was reached when the anti-Jewish excesses which began in Russia in 1880 caused the tide of Jewish emigration to swell of a sudden into a torrent. A certain number of emigrants from Russia and Rumania now made their way to Palestine, and began, together with a

small band of idealists from other parts of the world, to redeem the soil of Palestine with the sweat of their brows. They left their homes mainly because they were persecuted, but they made their new homes in Palestine because it was there that they saw a vision of a healthier and loftier Jewish life. These were the original Jewish "colonists." Between 1878 and 1914 the Jewish population of Palestine grew from about 34,000 to about 100,000, including some 13,000 settlers in the agricultural colonies. Inspired by contact with soil impregnated with sacred memories, the Jews not only built up a number of flourishing rural and urban settlements, but developed a many-sided corporate life, in which their fellow Jews elsewhere saw, with hope and pride, the promise of a Jewish renaissance. The Jewish imagination was kindled, and the pioneers had behind them the self-sacrificing enthusiasm of the Russian "Lovers of Zion," the munificent philanthropy of Baron Edmond de Rothschild, and—at a somewhat later stage—the systematic activities of the Zionist Organization.

The Zionist Organization came into existence in 1897. Its object was formally defined as "the creation in Palestine of a home for the Jewish people secured by public law." In this formula two lines of thought converged. On the one hand, Zionism was to solve what was called "the problem of the Jews" by providing a recognized outlet for the surplus Jewish population of Europe, and especially of Eastern Europe. On the other hand, it was also to solve what was called "the problem of Judaism" by creating in Palestine a society in which the Jewish genius could freely expand, and which would thus become a rallying-point and an inspiration for Jews throughout the world.

The original programme was to acquire a charter from the Porte, to secure the express approval of the Powers, and then, but not till then, to proceed on a large scale with organized immigration. The charter proved to be unobtainable, and the Movement had either to come to a standstill or to throw itself forthwith into practical work in Palestine. Accordingly, a variety of constructive activities were now undertaken. Those activities were at first almost exclusively economic. As time went on, however, what were known as the "cultural" aspects of Zionism began to attract increasing

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attention. It began to be realized that even under the most favourable conditions, mass immigration on the scale originally contemplated must remain outside the sphere of practical politics. Palestine could undoubtedly absorb by gradual stages a large additional population, but it could not find room within a measurable period for more than a fraction of the twelve million Jews of the world, or even of the seven or eight million Jews of Eastern Europe. Thus the problem of the Jews tended to give place to the problem of Judaism. While Zionism would play its part in providing a sanctuary for homeless individuals, its essential purpose was to create what could be created nowhere but in Palestine—a home for the Jewish spirit. These were the ideas which now began to gain ground. While it was realized that the spiritual home must be built on material foundations, Zionists concerned themselves more and more with spiritual values—with the revival of the Hebrew language, with education, and with the project of a Hebrew University, by which the educational system was to be crowned.

A new situation was created by the Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917. The significance of the Declaration is often misunderstood. It is hardly necessary to explain that it does not envisage the handing over of Palestine to a body vaguely known as "the Jews" for the purpose of creating what is described, not less vaguely, as a "Jewish State." It does not imply that Palestine is to have the smallest claim to the political allegiance of Jews in other parts of the world. Again, it does not imply that those Jews who settle in Palestine are to have any political privileges as compared with their fellow-citizens of other creeds or races. The political aspect of the matter, as Zionists conceive it, is perfectly simple. Those Jews who actually reside in Palestine are to be on a footing of perfect equality with other sections of the population. Those Jews—and they will, of necessity be the vast majority—who continue to live elsewhere, will, if they are true to themselves, regard the building up of the Jewish National Home as their common obligation, and will rejoice in the new flowering of the Jewish spirit, but they will be wholly unaffected in their political allegiance. On the contrary, by deepening their spiritual life and raising their moral stature, their Zionism will make them not worse, but better, citizens of the countries to which they belong.

If this be the case, why—it may be asked—was the Balfour Declaration necessary? Why should Zionist aspirations be provided for in the Palestine Mandate? The answer is not far to seek. It is true that a Jewish National Home was being slowly built up in Palestine before the war. But it existed merely on sufferance. The Jews had no assurance that their labours would not be in vain, and that all that they had laboriously constructed would not be swept away at the caprice of their Arab neighbours or their Turkish overlords. What the Declaration and the Mandate really give them is primarily a moral advantage--the assurance that their legitimate aspirations have the sanction of international approval and the security of an international guarantee. That assurance has, in fact, had an electrifying effect on the morale of Jews throughout the world. It has helped to regularize their status in their own eyes. It has raised their work in Palestine to a higher and more dignified plane. It has given them confidence to go forward with heads erect, in the knowledge that the world at large acknowledges them as a constructive force.

The Jews have received no privileged status in Palestine. Their responsible spokesmen have sought none. What the Declaration and the Mandate do guarantee them is the right to enter Palestine within the limits of its capacity to absorb them, to develop their own characteristic civilization, and to succeed on their merits. There is no question of any attempt to crowd out or subordinate the Arab population. "Palestine," says the Official Interim Report on the Civil Administration, "was before the war, and is now, undeveloped and underpopulated." There is ample room for Jews and Arabs to live and develop peaceably side by side, on terms of mutual goodwill. If the Jews succeed, their success will show itself, not in the dispossession of the Arabs, but in the emergence of a many-sided and self-reliant Jewish society, in which the Hebrew genius will renew its youth.

(2) STATEMENT OF MAY 1917, EXPRESSING THE VIEWS
OF NON-ZIONIST JEWS.

In view of the statements and discussions lately published in the newspapers relative to a projected Jewish resettlement in Palestine on a national basis, the Conjoint Foreign

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Committee of the Board of Deputies of British Jews and the Anglo-Jewish Association deem it necessary to place on record the views they hold on this important question.

The Holy Land has necessarily a profound and undying interest for all Jews as the cradle of their religion, the main theatre of Bible History, and the site of its sacred memorials. It is not, however, as a mere shrine or place of pilgrimage that they regard the country. Since the dawn of their political emancipation in Europe, the Jews have made the rehabilitation of the Jewish community in the Holy Land one of their chief cares; and they have always cherished the hope that the result of their labours would be the regeneration on Palestinian soil of a Jewish community worthy of the great memories of their environment, and a source of spiritual inspiration to the whole of Jewry. Accordingly, the Conjoint Committee have welcomed with deep satisfaction the prospect of a rich fruition of this work, opened to them by the victorious progress of the British Army in Palestine.

The "Cultural" Policy.—Anxious that on this question all sections and parties in Jewry should be united in a common effort, the Committee intimated to the Zionist Organizations as far back as the winter of 1914 their readiness to co-operate with them on the basis of the so-called "cultural" policy which had been adopted at the last two Zionist Congresses in 1911 and 1913. This policy aimed primarily at making Palestine a Jewish spiritual centre by securing for the local Jews, and the colonists who might join them, such conditions of life as would best enable them to develop the Jewish genius on lines of its own. Larger political questions, not directly affecting this main purpose, were left to be solved as need and opportunity might render possible. Unfortunately, an agreement on these lines has not proved practicable; and the Conjoint Committee are consequently compelled to pursue their work alone. They are doing so on the basis of a formula adopted by them in March 1916, in which they proposed to recommend to His Majesty's Government the formal recognition of the high historic interest Palestine possesses for the Jewish community, and a public declaration that at the close of the war "the Jewish population will be secured in the enjoyment of civil and religious liberty, equal political rights with the rest of the population, reasonable facilities

for immigration and colonization, and such municipal privileges in the towns and colonies inhabited by them as may be shown to be necessary."

That is still the policy of the Conjoint Committee.

Meanwhile the Committee have learnt from the published statements of the Zionist leaders in this country that they now favour a much larger scheme of an essentially political character. Two points in this scheme appear to the Committee to be open to grave objections on public grounds.

Nationality and Religion.—The first is a claim that the Jewish settlements in Palestine shall be recognized as possessing a national character in a political sense. Were this claim of purely local import, it might well be left to settle itself in accordance with the general political exigencies of the reorganization of the country under a new sovereign power. The Conjoint Committee, indeed, would have no objections to urge against a local Jewish nationality establishing itself in such conditions. But the present claim is not of this limited scope. It is part and parcel of a wider Zionist theory which regards all the Jewish communities of the world as constituting one homeless nationality, incapable of complete social and political identification with the nations among whom they dwell; and it is argued that for this homeless nationality a political centre and an always available homeland in Palestine are necessary.

Against this theory the Conjoint Committee strongly and earnestly protest. Emancipated Jews in this country regard themselves primarily as a religious community, and they have always based their claims to political equality with their fellow-citizens of other creeds on this assumption, and on its corollary—that they have no separate national aspirations in a political sense. They hold Judaism to be a religious system with which their political status has no concern; and they maintain that, as citizens of the countries in which they live, they are fully and sincerely identified with the national spirit and interests of those countries. It follows that the establishment of a Jewish nationality in Palestine founded on this theory of Jewish homelessness must have the effect throughout the world of stamping the Jews as strangers in their native lands, and of undermining their hard-won position as citizens and nationals of those lands. Moreover, a Jewish

political nationality carried to its logical conclusion must in the present circumstances of the world be an anachronism. The Jewish religion being the only certain test of the Jew, a Jewish nationality must be founded on, and limited by, the religion. It cannot be supposed for a moment that any section of Jews would aim at a commonwealth governed by religious tests and limited in the matter of freedom of conscience; but can a religious nationality express itself politically in any other way? The only alternative would be a secular Jewish nationality recruited on some loose and obscure principle of race and ethnographic peculiarity; but this would not be Jewish in any spiritual sense, and its establishment in Palestine would be a denial of all the ideals and hopes by which the revival of Jewish life in that country commends itself to the Jewish consciousness and Jewish sympathy. On these grounds the Conjoint Committee deprecate most earnestly the national proposals of the Zionists.

Undesirable Privileges.—The second point in the Zionist programme which has aroused the misgivings of the Conjoint Committee is the proposal to invest the Jewish settlers in Palestine with certain special rights in excess of those enjoyed by the rest of the population, these rights to be embodied in a Charter and administered by a Jewish Chartered Company. Whether it is desirable or not to confide any portion of the administration of Palestine to a Chartered Company need not be discussed; but it is certainly very undesirable that Jews should solicit or accept such a concession on a basis of political privilege and economic preferences. Any such action would prove a veritable calamity for the whole Jewish people. In all the countries in which they live the principle of equal rights for all religious denominations is vital for them. Were they to set an example in Palestine of disregarding this principle, they would convict themselves of having appealed to it for purely selfish motives. In the countries in which they are still struggling for equal rights they would find themselves hopelessly compromised, while in other countries where those rights have been secured they would have great difficulty in defending them.

The proposal is the more inadmissible because the Jews are, and will probably long remain, a minority of the population in Palestine, and because it might involve them in the bitterest

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feuds with their neighbours of other races and religions, which would seriously retard their progress, and would find deplorable echoes throughout the Orient. Nor is the scheme necessary for the Zionists themselves. If the Jews prevail in a competition based on perfect equality of rights and opportunity, they will establish their eventual preponderance in the land on a far sounder foundation than any that can be secured by privileges and monopolies.

If the Conjoint Committee can be satisfied with regard to these points they will be prepared to co-operate for securing for the Zionist Organization the united support of Jewry.

(Signed) DAVID L. ALEXANDER,
President, Board of Deputies of British Jews.

CLAUDE G. MONTEFIORE,
President, Anglo-Jewish Association.

LONDON, May 17, 1917.

NOTE.—The above statement has been reprinted both because of its historical importance and because it expresses a point of view common among those who are apprehensive of the political aspects of Zionism. The bodies on whose behalf it was issued are representative of British Jewry. The Conjoint Committee is now known as the Joint Foreign Committee. Recent declarations of British policy seem to have reconciled them to the moderate interpretation of Zionism expressed therein. A resolution was passed in October 1922 expressing satisfaction with the Palestine Mandate.

APPENDIX III

TEXT OF TREATY SIGNED ON OCTOBER 10, 1922, BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND 'IRAQ.'¹

His Britannic Majesty of the one part: and His Majesty the King of 'Iraq of the other part:

Whereas His Britannic Majesty has recognized Feisal Ibn Hussein as constitutional King of 'Iraq: and

Whereas His Majesty the King of 'Iraq considers that it is to the interests of 'Iraq and will conduce to its rapid advancement that he should conclude a Treaty with His Britannic Majesty on the basis of alliance: and

Whereas His Britannic Majesty is satisfied that the relations between himself and His Majesty the King of 'Iraq can now be better defined by such a Treaty of Alliance than by any other means:

For this purpose the High Contracting Parties have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India:

Sir Percy Zachariah Cox, G.C.M.G., G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I.,
High Commissioner and Consul-General of His Britannic Majesty in 'Iraq:

His Majesty the King of 'Iraq:

His Highness Sir Saiyid 'Abd-ur-Rahman, G.B.E.,
Prime Minister and Naqib-al-Ashraf, Baghdad:

Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due order, have agreed as follows:—

ARTICLE I.—At the request of His Majesty the King of 'Iraq, His Britannic Majesty undertakes subject to the provisions of this Treaty to provide the State of 'Iraq with such advice and assistance as may be required during the period

¹ Cmd. 1757, 1922.

of the present Treaty, without prejudice to her national sovereignty. His Britannic Majesty shall be represented in 'Iraq by a High Commissioner and Consul-General assisted by the necessary staff.

ARTICLE II.—His Majesty the King of 'Iraq undertakes that for the period of the present Treaty no gazetted official of other than 'Iraq nationality shall be appointed in 'Iraq without the concurrence of His Britannic Majesty. A separate agreement shall regulate the numbers and conditions of employment of British officials so appointed in the 'Iraq Government.

ARTICLE III.—His Majesty the King of 'Iraq agrees to frame an Organic Law for presentation to the Constituent Assembly of 'Iraq and to give effect to the said law, which shall contain nothing contrary to the provisions of the present Treaty and shall take account of the rights, wishes and interests of all populations inhabiting 'Iraq. This Organic Law shall ensure to all complete freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals. It shall provide that no discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants of 'Iraq on the ground of race, religion or language, and shall secure that the right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the Government of 'Iraq may impose, shall not be denied or impaired. It shall prescribe the constitutional procedure, whether legislative or executive, by which decisions will be taken on all matters of importance, including those involving questions of fiscal, financial and military policy.

ARTICLE IV.—Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles XVII and XVIII of this Treaty, His Majesty the King of 'Iraq agrees to be guided by the advice of His Britannic Majesty tendered through the High Commissioner on all important matters affecting the international and financial obligations and interests of His Britannic Majesty for the whole period of this Treaty. His Majesty the King of 'Iraq will fully consult the High Commissioner on what is conducive to a sound financial and fiscal policy and will ensure the stability and good organization of the finances of the

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'Iraq Government so long as that Government is under financial obligations to the Government of His Britannic Majesty.

ARTICLE V.—His Majesty the King of 'Iraq shall have the right of representation in London and in such other capitals and places as may be agreed upon by the High Contracting Parties. Where His Majesty the King of 'Iraq is not represented he agrees to entrust the protection of 'Iraq nationals to His Britannic Majesty. His Majesty the King of 'Iraq shall himself issue exequaturs to representatives of Foreign Powers in 'Iraq after His Britannic Majesty has agreed to their appointment.

ARTICLE VI.—His Britannic Majesty undertakes to use his good offices to secure the admission of 'Iraq to membership of the League of Nations as soon as possible.

ARTICLE VII.—His Britannic Majesty undertakes to provide such support and assistance to the armed forces of His Majesty the King of 'Iraq as may from time to time be agreed by the High Contracting Parties. A separate agreement regulating the extent and conditions of such support and assistance shall be concluded between the High Contracting Parties and communicated to the Council of the League of Nations.

ARTICLE VIII.—No territory in 'Iraq shall be ceded or leased or in any way placed under the control of any Foreign Power; this shall not prevent His Majesty the King of 'Iraq from making such arrangements as may be necessary for the accommodation of foreign representatives and for the fulfilment of the provisions of the preceding Article.

ARTICLE IX.—His Majesty the King of 'Iraq undertakes that he will accept and give effect to such reasonable provisions as His Britannic Majesty may consider necessary in judicial matters to safeguard the interests of foreigners in consequence of the non-application of the immunities and privileges enjoyed by them under capitulation or usage. These provisions shall be embodied in a separate agreement, which shall be communicated to the Council of the League of Nations.

ARTICLE X.—The High Contracting Parties agree to conclude separate agreements to secure the execution of any treaties, agreements or undertakings which His Britannic Majesty is under obligation to see carried out in respect of

Iraq. His Majesty the King of 'Iraq undertakes to bring in any legislation necessary to ensure the execution of these agreements. Such agreements shall be communicated to the Council of the League of Nations.

ARTICLE XI.—There shall be no discrimination in 'Iraq against the nationals of any State, member of the League of Nations, or of any State to which His Britannic Majesty has agreed by treaty that the same rights should be ensured as it would enjoy if it were a member of the said League (including companies incorporated under the laws of such State), as compared with British nationals or those of any foreign State in matters concerning taxation, commerce or navigation, the exercise of industries or professions, or in the treatment of merchant vessels or civil aircraft. Nor shall there be any discrimination in 'Iraq against goods originating in or destined for any of the said States. There shall be freedom of transit under equitable conditions across 'Iraq territory.

ARTICLE XII.—No measure shall be taken in 'Iraq to obstruct or interfere with missionary enterprise or to discriminate against any missionary on the ground of his religious belief or nationality, provided that such enterprise is not prejudicial to public order and good government.

ARTICLE XIII.—His Majesty the King of 'Iraq undertakes to co-operate, in so far as social, religious and other conditions may permit, in the execution of any common policy adopted by the League of Nations for preventing and combating disease, including diseases of plants and animals.

ARTICLE XIV.—His Majesty the King of 'Iraq undertakes to secure the enactment, within twelve months of the coming into force of this Treaty, and to ensure the execution of a Law of Antiquities based on the rules annexed to Article 421 of the Treaty of Peace signed at Sèvres on August 10, 1920. This Law shall replace the former Ottoman Law of Antiquities, and shall ensure equality of treatment in the matter of archaeological research to the nationals of all States members of the League of Nations, and of any State to which His Britannic Majesty has agreed by treaty that the same rights should be ensured as it would enjoy if it were a member of the said League.

ARTICLE XV.—A separate agreement shall regulate the financial relations between the High Contracting Parties. It

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shall provide, on the one hand, for the transfer by His Britannic Majesty's Government to the Government of 'Iraq of such works of public utility as may be agreed upon and for the rendering by His Britannic Majesty's Government of such financial assistance as may from time to time be considered necessary for 'Iraq, and, on the other hand, for the progressive liquidation by the Government of 'Iraq of all liabilities thus incurred. Such agreement shall be communicated to the Council of the League of Nations.

ARTICLE XVI.—So far as is consistent with his international obligations His Britannic Majesty undertakes to place no obstacle in the way of the association of the State of 'Iraq for customs or other purposes with such neighbouring Arab States as may desire it.

ARTICLE XVII.—Any difference that may arise between the High Contracting Parties as to the interpretation of the provisions of this Treaty shall be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice provided for by Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. In such case, should there be any discrepancy between the English and Arabic texts of this Treaty, the English shall be taken as the authoritative version.

ARTICLE XVIII.—This Treaty shall come into force as soon as it has been ratified by the High Contracting Parties after its acceptance by the Constituent Assembly, and shall remain in force for twenty years, at the end of which period the situation shall be examined, and if the High Contracting Parties are of opinion that the Treaty is no longer required it shall be terminated. Termination shall be subject to confirmation by the League of Nations unless before that date Article VI of this Treaty has come into effect, in which case notice of termination shall be communicated to the Council of the League of Nations. Nothing shall prevent the High Contracting Parties from reviewing from time to time the provisions of this Treaty, and those of the separate Agreements arising out of Articles VII, X and XV, with a view to any revision which may seem desirable in the circumstances then existing, and any modification which may be agreed upon by the High Contracting Parties shall be communicated to the Council of the League of Nations.

APPENDIX IV

TEXT OF THE OFFICIAL SUMMARY OF THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION FOR PALESTINE.¹

(Published in the Press, February 1922.)

The principal order provides for the appointment of "a fit person to administer the government of Palestine," under the designation of High Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief, and confers upon him the powers necessary for the execution of the duties normally associated with the office of High Commissioner, and for giving effect to the provisions of the Mandate accepted by Great Britain, at the request of the principal Allied Powers, for the general administration of the country and the establishment of a National Home for the Jewish people.

(i) The Official Executive.

The High Commissioner will have authority, with the approval of the Secretary of State, to divide the country into provinces or districts in such manner as may be convenient for the purposes of administration; all rights in or in relation to public lands will vest in him, and also all mines and minerals, subject to the subsisting right of any person to work such mines or minerals by virtue of a valid concession; and he may make grants or leases of public lands, mines, or minerals, or, on certain conditions, permit such lands to be temporarily occupied. Subject to the direction of the Secretary of State, the High Commissioner may appoint such public officers of the Government as he may think fit, and all such officers will hold office during his pleasure.

For the purpose of assisting the High Commissioner there will be an Executive Council constituted in such manner as

¹ The Constitution has been published in its final form in two Orders in Council dated August 10, 1922. Where modifications have been introduced their nature has been indicated in footnotes.

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may be directed from time to time by His Majesty's Government.

From a date to be fixed by the High Commissioner in Executive Council there will be constituted a Legislative Council which shall replace any Advisory Council then existing. This Legislative Council

(ii) **Legislative Council.**

will have full power and authority subject to any conditions and limitations prescribed by any Instructions issued by His Majesty's Government, to establish such ordinances as may be necessary for the peace, order and good government of Palestine, provided :

1. That no Ordinance shall be passed which shall restrict complete freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, save in so far as is required for the maintenance of public order and morals, or which shall tend to discriminate in any way between the inhabitants of Palestine on the ground of race, religion or language.¹

2. That no Ordinance shall take effect until either the High Commissioner shall have assented thereto, or the assent of His Majesty has been given by Order in Council or through a Secretary of State ; and

3. That the High Commissioner may reserve any Ordinance for the signification of His Majesty's pleasure, and shall so reserve any Ordinance which concerns matters dealt with specifically by the provisions of the Mandate. Further, His Majesty reserves to himself the right to disallow any Ordinance to which the High Commissioner may have assented within one year of the date of the High Commissioner's assent, and to signify such disallowance through the Secretary of State.

The Legislative Council will consist of 25 members, in addition to the High Commissioner, of whom 10 shall be official members and 15 unofficial members. The unofficial members will be (1) 12 persons to be elected in accordance with such Order in Council, Ordinance, or other legislative enactment as may from time to time provide for elections to the Council ; (2) one person to be nominated by the Associated Chambers of Commerce in Palestine, and two persons, not holding public office in Palestine, to be nominated

¹ To this has been added a proviso that " No Ordinance shall be passed which shall be in any way repugnant to or inconsistent with the provisions of the Mandate."

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by the High Commissioner who shall exercise his power of nomination having regard to the representation of any community or interest which after the elections are held shall be found to have insufficient representation on the Council, this power to be exercised in such a way that one of the nominated members shall be a Moslem, one a Christian and one a Jew.¹

The elected members of the Legislative Council will be chosen by primary and secondary elections, the primary election consisting of the choice of secondary electors and the secondary election consisting of the choice of members of the Council by colleges of secondary electors. Every male Palestinian citizen over twenty-five years of age will be entitled to vote at the primary elections unless he has lost his civil rights or claims to be a foreign subject or under foreign protection, or is otherwise disqualified.

For the purpose of primary elections every District will be divided into voting areas. The Governor of the District, in consultation with the President of any Municipal Council or Local Council in the District and the Mukhtars of the villages, will define such voting areas, and will determine the number of secondary electors to be elected in each area on the basis that every 200 primary electors will elect one secondary elector; provided that if any village or quarter has between 150 and 200 primary electors it will be entitled to vote for one secondary elector; if it has between 350 and 400 primary electors it will be entitled to vote for two secondary electors, and the same principle will be maintained where the number of primary electors exceeds 400.

Any person may be elected as a secondary elector provided he is on the register of primary electors for the District.

The secondary electors will be formed into 12 electoral colleges according to the religious community to which they belong; the number of colleges to be allotted to each religious community will be proportionate to the number of secondary electors belonging to the several communities²; and each electoral college will elect one member of the Council.

¹ This has been modified by the elimination of the three nominated members. The Council is therefore to consist of 22 members besides the High Commissioner, of whom 10 are to be official and 12 unofficial members.

² It is now further provided that not less than two of the electoral colleges are to be Christian and not less than two Jewish.

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The Judiciary will consist of Magistrates' Courts; District Courts, with jurisdiction in all civil and criminal matters (iii) Civil and Religious Magistrates' Court, and with an appellate Courts. jurisdiction; a Court of Criminal Assize, with exclusive jurisdiction in capital offences; Land Courts; a Supreme Court acting as a Court of Appeal from the District and other Courts; and Tribal Courts for cases involving the application of local customs. There will also be

1. Moslem Religious Courts with exclusive jurisdiction in matters of personal status of Moslems in suits regarding marriage, divorce, alimony, guardianship, legitimation, and adoption of minors, successions, wills and legacies, and inhibition dealing with the property of persons legally incompetent;

2. Jewish Religious Courts with exclusive jurisdiction in suits of personal status of Jewish persons (other than foreigners); and

3. Christian Religious Courts with exclusive jurisdiction in matters of marriage, divorce, etc., of members of their community other than foreigners. In particular, these several Religious Courts will exercise exclusive jurisdiction over any case concerning the constitution or internal administration of a Wakf or religious endowment constituted before the Religious Court according to the law of the community.

The judgments of the Religious Courts will be carried out by the process and offices of the Civil Courts, which Courts will, subject to various conditions, also have jurisdiction in matters of personal status, and may call in any competent jurist to advise them upon such questions.

All Ordinances, official notices and official forms of the Government and all official notices of local authorities and municipalities in areas to be prescribed by order of the High Commissioner, shall be published in English, Arabic and Hebrew. The three languages may be used in debates and discussions in the Legislative Council, and, subject to any regulations to be made from time to time, in the Government offices and the Law Courts.

If any religious community or considerable section of the

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population in Palestine complains that the terms of the Mandate are not being fulfilled by the Government of Palestine, it shall be entitled to present a Memorandum through a member of the Legislative Council to the High Commissioner. Such Memorandum shall be forwarded to the Secretary of State for submission to the Council of the League of Nations, unless the High Commissioner gives a written reason to the petitioners for not forwarding it.¹

Special provision is made for the Government of territories comprised in Palestine to the east of the Jordan and the Dead Sea.²

¹ This procedure has been modified by the following sentence :
" Any Memorandum so submitted shall be dealt with in such manner as may be prescribed by His Majesty in conformity with the procedure recommended by the Council of the League of Nations."

² An additional article has been introduced providing that the High Commissioner shall confer upon all matters relating to the regulation of immigration with a committee consisting of not less than one-half of the unofficial members of the Legislative Council.

APPENDIX V

PART OF SAN REMO OIL AGREEMENT OF APRIL 24, 1920, RELATING TO MESOPOTAMIA.¹

7. *Mesopotamia*.—The British Government undertake to grant to the French Government or its nominee 25 per cent. of the net output of crude oil at current market rates which His Majesty's Government may secure from the Mesopotamian oilfields, in the event of their being developed by Government action ; or in the event of a private petroleum company being used to develop the Mesopotamian oilfields, the British Government will place at the disposal of the French Government a share of 25 per cent. in such company. The price to be paid for such participation to be no more than that paid by any of the other participants to the said petroleum company. It is also understood that the said petroleum company shall be under permanent British control.

8. It is agreed that, should the private petroleum company be constituted as aforesaid, the native Government or other native interests shall be allowed, if they so desire, to participate up to a maximum of 20 per cent. of the share capital of the said company. The French shall contribute one-half of the first 10 per cent. of such native participation and the additional participation shall be provided by each participant in proportion to his holdings.

9. The British Government agree to support arrangements by which the French Government may procure from the Anglo-Persian Company supplies of oil, which may be piped from Persia to the Mediterranean through any pipe-line which may have been constructed within the French mandated territory and in regard to which France has given special facilities, up to the extent of 25 per cent. of the oil so piped, on such terms and conditions as may be mutually agreed

¹ Cmd. 675, 1920.

between the French Government and the Anglo-Persian Company.

10. In consideration of the above-mentioned arrangements, the French Government shall agree, if it is desired and as soon as application is made, to the construction of two separate pipe-lines and railways necessary for their construction and maintenance and for the transport of oil from Mesopotamia and Persia through French spheres of influence to a port or ports on the Eastern Mediterranean. The port or ports shall be chosen in agreement between the two Governments.

11. Should such pipe-line and railways cross territory within a French sphere of influence, France undertakes to give every facility for the rights of crossing without any royalty or wayleaves on the oil transported. Nevertheless, compensation shall be payable to the landowners for the surface occupied.

12. In the same way France will give facilities at the terminal port for the acquisition of the land necessary for the erection of depots, railways, refineries, loading wharfs, etc. Oil thus exported shall be exempt from export and transit dues. The material necessary for the construction of the pipe-lines, railways, refineries and other equipment shall also be free from import duties and wayleaves.

13. Should the said petroleum company desire to lay a pipe-line and a railway to the Persian Gulf, the British Government will use its good offices to secure similar facilities for that purpose.

APPENDIX VI

ANGLO-FRENCH CONVENTION OF DECEMBER 23, 1920, ON CERTAIN POINTS CONNECTED WITH THE MANDATES FOR SYRIA AND THE LEBANON, PALESTINE AND MESOPOTAMIA.¹

The British and French Governments, respectively represented by the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, wishing to settle completely the problems raised by the attribution to Great Britain of the Mandates for Palestine and Mesopotamia and by the attribution to France of the Mandate over Syria and the Lebanon, all three conferred by the Supreme Council at San Remo, have agreed on the following provisions:—

ARTICLE I.—The boundaries between the territories under the French Mandate of Syria and the Lebanon on the one hand and the British Mandates of Mesopotamia and Palestine on the other are determined as follows:—

On the east, the Tigris from Jeziret-ibn-Omar to the boundaries of the former vilayets of Diarbekir and Mosul.

On the south-east and south, the aforesaid boundary of the former vilayets southwards as far as Roumelan Koeui; thence a line leaving in the territory under the French Mandate the entire basin of the western Kabur and passing in a straight line towards the Euphrates, which it crosses at Abu Kemal, thence a straight line to Imtar to the south of Jebul Druse, then a line to the south of Nasib on the Hedjaz Railway, then a line to Semakh on the Lake of Tiberias, traced to the south of the railway, which descends towards the lake and parallel to the railway. Deraa and its environs will remain in the territory under the French Mandate; the frontier will in principle leave the valley of the Yarmuk in the territory under the French Mandate, but will be drawn as close as possible to the railway in such a manner as to allow the construction

¹ Cmd. 1105, 1921.

in the valley of the Yarmuk of a railway entirely situated in the territory under the British Mandate. At Semakh the frontier will be fixed in such a manner as to allow each of the two High Contracting Parties to construct and establish a harbour and railway station giving free access to the Lake of Tiberias.

On the west, the frontier will pass from Semakh across the Lake of Tiberias to the mouth of the Wadi Massadyie. It will then follow the course of this river upstream, and then the Wadi Jeraba to its source. From that point it will reach the track from El Kuneitra to Banias at the point marked Skek, thence it will follow the said track, which will remain in the territory under the French Mandate as far as Banias. Thence the frontier will be drawn westwards as far as Metullah, which will remain in Palestinian territory. This portion of the frontier will be traced in detail in such a manner as to ensure for the territory under the French Mandate easy communication entirely within such territory with the regions of Tyre and Sidon, as well as continuity of road communication to the west and to the east of Banias.

From Metullah the frontier will reach the watershed of the valley of the Jordan and the basin of the Litani. Thence it will follow this watershed southwards. Thereafter it will follow in principle the watershed between the Wadis Farah-Houroun and Kerkera, which will remain in the territory under the British Mandate, and the Wadis El Doubleh, El Aioun and Es Zerka, which will remain in the territory under the French Mandate. The frontier will reach the Mediterranean Sea at the port of Ras-el-Nakura, which will remain in the territory under the French Mandate.

ARTICLE 2.—A commission shall be established within three months from the signature of the present convention to trace on the spot the boundary line laid down in Article 1 between the French and British Mandatory territories. This commission shall be composed of four members. Two of these members shall be nominated by the British and French Governments respectively, the two others shall be nominated, with the consent of the Mandatory Power, by the local Governments concerned in the French and British Mandatory territories respectively.

In case any dispute should arise in connection with the

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work of the commission, the question shall be referred to the Council of the League of Nations, whose decision shall be final.

The final reports by the commission shall give the definite description of the boundary as it has been actually demarcated on the ground ; the necessary maps shall be annexed thereto and signed by the commission. The reports, with their annexes, shall be made in triplicate ; one copy shall be deposited in the archives of the League of Nations, one copy shall be kept by the Mandatory, and one by the other Government concerned.

ARTICLE 3.—The British and French Governments shall come to an agreement regarding the nomination of a commission, whose duty it will be to make a preliminary examination of any plan of irrigation formed by the Government of the French Mandatory territory, the execution of which would be of a nature to diminish in any considerable degree the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates at the point where they enter the area of the British Mandate in Mesopotamia.

ARTICLE 4.—In virtue of the geographic and strategic position of the island of Cyprus, off the Gulf of Alexandretta, the British Government agrees not to open any negotiations for the cession or alienation of the said island of Cyprus without the previous consent of the French Government.

ARTICLE 5.—1. The French Government agrees to facilitate by a liberal arrangement the joint use of the section of the existing railway between the Lake of Tiberias and Nasib. This arrangement shall be concluded between the railway administrations of the areas under the French and British Mandates respectively as soon as possible after the coming into force of the Mandates for Palestine and Syria. In particular the agreement shall allow the administration in the British zone to run their own trains with their own traction and train crews over the above section of the railway in both directions for all purposes other than the local traffic of the territory under the French Mandate. The agreement shall determine at the same time the financial, administrative and technical conditions governing the running of the British trains. In the event of the two administrations being unable to reach an agreement within three months from the coming into force of the two above-mentioned Mandates, an arbitrator shall be appointed by the Council of the League of

Nations to settle the points as to which a difference of opinion exists and immediate effect shall be given as far as possible to those parts of the agreement on which an understanding has already been reached.

The said agreement shall be concluded for an indefinite period and shall be subject to periodical revision as need arises.

2. The British Government may carry a pipe-line along the existing railway track and shall have in perpetuity and at any moment the right to transport troops by the railway.

3. The French Government consents to the nomination of a special commission, which, after having examined the ground, may readjust the above-mentioned frontier line in the valley of the Yarmuk as far as Nasib in such a manner as to render possible the construction of the British railway and pipe-line connecting Palestine with the Hedjaz Railway and the valley of the Euphrates, and running entirely within the limits of the areas under the British Mandate. It is agreed, however, that the existing railway in the Yarmuk Valley is to remain entirely in the territory under the French Mandate. The right provided by the present paragraph for the benefit of the British Government must be utilized within a maximum period of ten years.

The above-mentioned commission shall be composed of a representative of the French Government and a representative of the British Government, to whom may be added representatives of the local Governments and experts as technical advisers to the extent considered necessary by the British and French Governments.

4. In the event of the track of the British railway being compelled for technical reasons to enter in certain places the territory under French Mandate, the French Government will recognize the full and complete extra-territoriality of the sections thus lying in the territory under the French Mandate, and will give the British Government or its technical agents full and easy access for all railway purposes.

5. In the event of the British Government making use of the right mentioned in paragraph 3 to construct a railway in the valley of the Yarmuk, the obligations assumed by the French Government in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 of the present Article will determine three months after the completion of the construction of the said railway.

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6. The French Government agrees to arrange that the rights provided for above for the benefit of the British Government shall be recognized by the local Governments in the territory under the French Mandate.

ARTICLE 6.—It is expressly stipulated that the facilities accorded to the British Government by the preceding articles imply the maintenance for the benefit of France of the provisions of the Franco-British Agreement of San Remo regarding oil.

ARTICLE 7.—The French and British Governments will put no obstacle in their respective Mandatory areas in the way of the recruitment of railway staff for any section of the Hedjaz Railway.

Every facility will be given for the passage of employees of the Hedjaz Railway over the British and French Mandatory areas in order that the working of the said railway may be in no way prejudiced.

The French and British Governments agree, where necessary, and in eventual agreement with the local Governments, to conclude an arrangement whereby the stores and railway material passing from one Mandatory area to another and intended for the use of the Hedjaz Railway will not for this reason be submitted to any additional customs dues and will be exempted so far as possible from customs formalities.

ARTICLE 8.—Experts nominated respectively by the Administrations of Syria and Palestine shall examine in common within six months after the signature of the present convention the employment, for the purposes of irrigation and the production of hydro-electric power, of the waters of the Upper Jordan and the Yarmuk and of their tributaries, after satisfaction of the needs of the territories under the French Mandate.

In connection with this examination the French Government will give its representatives the most liberal instructions for the employment of the surplus of these waters for the benefit of Palestine.

In the event of no agreement being reached as a result of this examination, these questions shall be referred to the French and British Governments for decision.

To the extent to which the contemplated works are to benefit Palestine, the Administration of Palestine shall defray

the expenses of the construction of all canals, weirs, dams, tunnels, pipe-lines and reservoirs or other works of a similar nature, or measures taken with the object of reafforestation and the management of forests.

ARTICLE 9.—Subject to the provisions of Articles 15 and 16 of the Mandate for Palestine, of Articles 8 and 10 of the Mandate for Mesopotamia, and of Article 8 of the Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon, and subject also to the general right of control in relation to education and public instruction, of the local Administrations concerned, the British and French Governments agree to allow the schools which French and British nationals possess and direct at the present moment in their respective Mandatory areas to continue their work freely; the teaching of French and English will be freely permitted in these schools.

The present article does not in any way imply the right of nationals of either of the two parties to open new schools in the Mandatory area of the other.

APPENDIX VII

TEXT OF THE MANDATES FOR SYRIA, PALESTINE AND MESOPOTAMIA.

<p>SYRIA (as approved by the League).¹</p>	<p>PALESTINE (as approved by the League).²</p>	<p>MESOPOTAMIA (as drafted by the British Government).³</p>
<p>ARTICLE I.</p> <p>The Mandatory shall frame, within a period of three years from the coming into force of this Mandate, an Organic Law for Syria and the Lebanon.</p> <p>This Organic Law shall be framed in agreement with the native authorities and shall take into account the rights, interests, and wishes of all the population inhabiting the said territory. The Mandatory shall further enact measures to facilitate the progressive development of Syria and the Lebanon as independent States. Pending the coming into effect of the Organic Law, the Government of Syria and</p>	<p>ARTICLE I.</p> <p>The Mandatory shall have full powers of legislation and of administration, save as they may be limited by the terms of this Mandate.</p>	<p>ARTICLE I.</p> <p>Same as for Syria but omitting last sentence, and adding that the Organic Law will be submitted to the League of Nations for approval.</p>

the Lebanon shall be conducted in accordance with the spirit of this Mandate.

The Mandatory shall, as far as circumstances permit, encourage local autonomy.

ARTICLE 2.

The Mandatory may maintain its troops in the said territory for its defence. It shall further be empowered, until the entry into force of the Organic Law and the re-establishment of public security, to organize such local militia as may be necessary for the defence of the territory, and to employ this militia for defence and also for the maintenance of order. These local forces may only be recruited from the inhabitants of the said territory.

The said militia shall thereafter be under the local authorities, subject to the authority and the control which the Mandatory shall retain over these forces. It shall not be used for purposes other than those

ARTICLE 2.

The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish National Home, as laid down in the preamble, and the development of self-governing institutions, and also for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion.

ARTICLE 2.
Same as for Syria.

¹ Cmd. 1785, 1922.

¹ League of Nations Publication C. 528, M. 313, 1922, VI.
³ Cmd. 1170, 1921, with amendments as published in the Press.

TEXTS OF THE MANDATES FOR SYRIA, PALESTINE AND MESOPOTAMIA—*continued.*

SYRIA.	PALESTINE.	MESOPOTAMIA.
<p>specified save with the consent of the Mandatory.</p> <p>Nothing shall preclude Syria and the Lebanon from contributing to the cost of the maintenance of the forces of the Mandatory stationed in the territory.</p> <p>The Mandatory shall at all times possess the right to make use of the ports, railways and means of communication of Syria and the Lebanon for the passage of its troops and of all materials, supplies and fuel.</p> <p>ARTICLE 3.</p> <p>The Mandatory shall be entrusted with the exclusive control of the foreign relations of Syria and the Lebanon and with the right to issue exequaturs to the consuls appointed by foreign Powers. Nationals of Syria and the Lebanon living outside the limits of the territory shall be under the diplomatic and consular protection of the Mandatory.</p>	<p>ARTICLE 3.</p> <p>The Mandatory shall, so far as circumstances permit, encourage local autonomy.</p>	<p>ARTICLE 3.</p> <p>Same as for Syria.</p>

<p>ARTICLE 4.</p> <p>The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that no part of the territory of Syria and the Lebanon is ceded or leased or in any way placed under the control of a foreign Power.</p>	<p>ARTICLE 4.</p> <p>An appropriate Jewish agency shall be recognized as a public body for the purpose of advising and co-operating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish National Home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine, and, subject always to the control of the Administration, to assist and take part in the development of the country.</p> <p>The Zionist organization, so long as its organization and constitution are in the opinion of the Mandatory appropriate, shall be recognized as such agency. It shall take steps in consultation with His Britannic Majesty's Government to secure the co-operation of all Jews who are willing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish National Home.</p>	<p>ARTICLE 4.</p> <p>Same as for Syria.</p>
<p>ARTICLE 5.</p> <p>The privileges and immunities of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection as formerly enjoyed by</p>	<p>ARTICLE 5.</p> <p>The immunities and privileges of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection as formerly enjoyed by</p>	<p>ARTICLE 5.</p> <p>Same as Article 4 for Syria.</p>

TEXTS OF THE MANDATES FOR SYRIA, PALESTINE AND MESOPOTAMIA—*continued.*

SYRIA.	PALESTINE.	MESOPOTAMIA.
<p>Capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, shall not be applicable in Syria and the Lebanon. Foreign consular tribunals shall, however, continue to perform their duties until the coming into force of the new legal organization provided for in Article 6.</p> <p>Unless the Powers whose nationals enjoyed the aforementioned privileges and immunities on August 1, 1914, shall have previously renounced the right to their re-establishment, or shall have agreed to their non-application during a specified period, these privileges and immunities shall at the expiration of the Mandate be immediately re-established in their entirety or with such modification as may have been agreed upon between the Powers concerned.</p> <p>ARTICLE 6.</p> <p>The Mandatory shall establish in Syria and the Lebanon a judicial</p>	<p>ARTICLE 6.</p> <p>The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and</p>	<p>Capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, are definitely abrogated in Mesopotamia.</p> <p>ARTICLE 6.</p> <p>The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that the judicia</p>

system established in Mesopotamia shall safeguard (a) the interests of foreigners; (b) the law, and (to the extent deemed expedient) the jurisdiction now existing in Mesopotamia with regard to questions arising out of the religious beliefs of certain communities (such as the laws of Wakf and personal status). In particular the Mandatory agrees that the control and administration of Wakfs shall be exercised in accordance with religious law and the dispositions of the founders.

ARTICLE 7. Same as for Syria.

ARTICLE 8. Same as for Syria, omitting para. 2.

position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and shall encourage, in co-operation with the Jewish agency referred to in Article 4, close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes.

ARTICLE 7. The Administration of Palestine shall be responsible for enacting a nationality law. There shall be included in this law provisions framed so as to facilitate the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jews who take up their permanent residence in Palestine.

ARTICLE 8. The privileges and immunities of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection as formerly enjoyed by Capitulation

system which shall assure to natives as well as to foreigners a complete guarantee of their rights.
Respect for the personal status of the various peoples and for their religious interests shall be fully guaranteed. In particular, the control and administration of Wakfs shall be exercised in complete accordance with religious law and the dispositions of the founders.

ARTICLE 7. Pending the conclusion of special extradition agreements, the extradition treaties at present in force between foreign Powers and the Mandatory shall apply within the territory of Syria and the Lebanon.

ARTICLE 8. The Mandatory shall ensure to all complete freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship which are consonant

TEXTS OF THE MANDATES FOR SYRIA, PALESTINE AND MESOPOTAMIA—*continued*.

SYRIA.	PALESTINE.	MESOPOTAMIA.
<p>with public order and morality. No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants of Syria and the Lebanon on the ground of differences in race, religion or language.</p> <p>The Mandatory shall encourage public instruction, which shall be given through the medium of the native languages in use in the territory of Syria and the Lebanon.</p> <p>The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the instruction and education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the administration may impose, shall not be denied or impaired.</p>	<p>or usage in the Ottoman Empire, shall not be applicable in Palestine.</p> <p>Unless the Powers whose nationals enjoyed the aforementioned privileges and immunities on August 1, 1914, shall have previously renounced the right to their re-establishment, or shall have agreed to their non-application for a specified period, these privileges and immunities shall, at the expiration of the Mandate, be immediately re-established in their entirety or with such modifications as may have been agreed upon between the Powers concerned.</p>	
<p>ARTICLE 9.</p> <p>The Mandatory shall refrain from all interference in the administration of the Councils of management (Conseils de fabrique) or in</p>	<p>ARTICLE 9.</p> <p>The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that the judicial system established in Palestine shall assure to foreigners, as well</p>	<p>ARTICLE 9.</p> <p>Nothing in this Mandate shall be construed as conferring upon the Mandatory authority to interfere with the fabric or the manage-</p>

ment of the sacred shrines, the immunities of which are guaranteed.

as to natives, a complete guarantee of their rights.

Respect for the personal status of the various peoples and communities and for their religious interests shall be fully guaranteed. In particular, the control and administration of Wakfs shall be exercised in accordance with religious law and the dispositions of the founders.

ARTICLE 10.

The Mandatory shall be responsible for exercising such supervision over missionary enterprise in Mesopotamia as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government. Subject to such supervision, no measures shall be taken in Mesopotamia to obstruct or interfere with such enterprise or to discriminate against any missionary on the ground of his religion or nationality.

ARTICLE 10.

Same as Article 7 for Syria.

the management of religious communities and sacred shrines belonging to the various religions, the immunity of which has been expressly guaranteed.

ARTICLE 10.

The supervision exercised by the Mandatory over the religious missions in Syria and the Lebanon shall be limited to the maintenance of public order and good government; the activities of these religious missions shall in no way be restricted, nor shall their members be subjected to any restrictive measures on the ground of nationality, provided that their activities are confined to the domain of religion.

The religious missions may also concern themselves with education and relief, subject to the general right of regulation and control by

TEXTS OF THE MANDATES FOR SYRIA, PALESTINE AND MESOPOTAMIA—continued.

SYRIA.	PALESTINE.	MESOPOTAMIA.
<p>The Mandatory or of the local Government, in regard to education, public instruction and charitable relief.</p> <p>ARTICLE II.</p> <p>The Mandatory shall see that there is no discrimination in Syria or the Lebanon against the nationals, including societies and associations, of any State member of the League of Nations as compared with its own nationals, including societies and associations, or with the nationals of any other foreign State in matters concerning taxation or commerce, the exercise of professions or industries, or navigation, or in the treatment of ships or aircraft. Similarly, there shall be no discrimination in Syria or the Lebanon against goods originating in or destined for any of the said States; there shall be freedom of transit, under equitable conditions, across the said territory.</p>	<p>ARTICLE II.</p> <p>The Administration of Palestine shall take all necessary measures to safeguard the interests of the community in connection with the development of the country, and, subject to any international obligations accepted by the Mandatory, shall have full power to provide for public ownership or control of any of the natural resources of the country or of the public works, services and utilities established or to be established therein. It shall introduce a land system appropriate to the needs of the country, having regard, among other things, to the desirability of promoting the close settlement and intensive cultivation of the land.</p> <p>The Administration may arrange</p>	<p>ARTICLE II.</p> <p>Para. I same as for Syria.</p> <p>Subject as aforesaid the Mesopotamian Government may on the advice of the Mandatory impose such taxes and customs duties as it may consider necessary and take such steps as it may think best to promote the development of the natural resources of the country and to safeguard the interests of the population.</p> <p>Nothing in this Article shall prevent the Mesopotamian Government on the advice of the Mandatory, from concluding a special customs arrangement with any State, the territory of which in 1914 was wholly included in Asiatic Turkey or Arabia.</p>

with the Jewish agency mentioned in Article 4 to construct or operate, upon fair and equitable terms, any public works, services and utilities, and to develop any of the natural resources of the country, in so far as these matters are not directly undertaken by the Administration. Any such arrangements shall provide that no profits distributed by such agency, directly or indirectly, shall exceed a reasonable rate of interest on the capital, and any further profits shall be utilized by it for the benefit of the country in a manner approved by the Administration.

Subject to the above, the Mandatory may impose or cause to be imposed by the local Governments such taxes and customs duties as it may consider necessary. The Mandatory, or the local Governments acting under its advice, may also conclude on grounds of continuity any special customs arrangements with an adjoining country.

The Mandatory may take or cause to be taken, subject to the provisions of Para. 1 of this Article, such steps as it may think best to ensure the development of the natural resources of the said territory and to safeguard the interests of the local population.

Concessions for the development of these natural resources shall be granted without distinction of nationality between the nationals of all States members of the League of Nations, but on condition that they do not infringe upon the authority of the local Government. Concessions in the nature of a general monopoly shall not be granted. This clause shall in no way limit the right of the Mandatory to create monopolies of a

TEXTS OF THE MANDATES FOR SYRIA, PALESTINE AND MESOPOTAMIA—*continued*.

SYRIA.	PALESTINE.	MESOPOTAMIA.
<p>purely fiscal character in the interest of the territory of Syria and the Lebanon, and with a view to assuring to the territory the fiscal resources which would appear best adapted to the local needs, or, in certain cases, with a view to developing the natural resources either directly by the State or through an organization under its control, provided that this does not involve either directly or indirectly the creation of a monopoly of the natural resources in favour of the Mandatory or its nationals, nor involve any preferential treatment which would be incompatible with the economic, commercial and industrial equality guaranteed above.</p> <p>ARTICLE 12. The Mandatory shall adhere, on behalf of Syria and the Lebanon, to any general international agreements already existing, or which may be concluded hereafter with</p>	<p>ARTICLE 12. Substantially the same as Article 3 for Syria.</p>	<p>ARTICLE 12. Same as for Syria.</p>

the approval of the League of Nations, in respect of the following: the slave trade, the traffic in drugs, the traffic in arms and ammunition, commercial equality, freedom of transit and navigation, aerial navigation, postal, telegraphic or wireless communications, and measures for the protection of literature, art or industries.

ARTICLE 13.

The Mandatory shall secure the adhesion of Syria and the Lebanon, so far as social, religious and other conditions permit, to such measures of common utility as may be adopted by the League of Nations for preventing and combating disease, including diseases of animals and plants.

ARTICLE 13.

All responsibility in connection with the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites in Palestine, including that of preserving existing rights and of securing free access to the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites and the free exercise of worship, while ensuring the requirements of public order and decorum, is assumed by the Mandatory, who shall be responsible solely to the League of Nations in all matters connected herewith, provided that nothing in this article shall prevent the Mandatory from entering into such arrangements as he may deem reasonable with the Administration for the

ARTICLE 13.

Same as for Syria, except opening words "The Mandatory will secure the co-operation of the Mesopotamian Government," etc.

TEXTS OF THE MANDATES FOR SYRIA, PALESTINE AND MESOPOTAMIA—continued.

SYRIA.	PALESTINE.	MESOPOTAMIA.
<p style="text-align: center;">ARTICLE 14.</p> <p>Deals at some length with the enactment of a Law of Antiquities.</p>	<p>purpose of carrying the provisions of this article into effect; and provided also that nothing in this Mandate shall be construed as conferring upon the Mandatory authority to interfere with the fabric of the management of purely Moslem sacred shrines, the immunities of which are guaranteed.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">ARTICLE 14.</p> <p>A special Commission shall be appointed by the Mandatory to study, define and determine the rights and claims in connection with the Holy Places and the rights and claims relating to the different religious communities in Palestine. The method of nomination, the composition and the functions of this Commission shall be submitted to the Council of the League for its approval, and the Commission shall not be appointed or enter upon its functions without the approval of the Council.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">ARTICLE 14.</p> <p>The Mandatory will secure the enactment within twelve months from the coming into force of this Mandate, and will ensure the execution of a Law of Antiquities, based on the contents of Article 421 of Part XIII of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey. This law shall replace the former Ottoman Law of Antiquities, and shall ensure equality of treatment in the matter of archaeological research to the nationals of all States members of the League of Nations.</p>

ARTICLE 15.

Upon the coming into force of the Organic Law referred to in Article 1, an arrangement shall be made between the Mandatory and the local Governments for reimbursement by the latter of all expenses incurred by the Mandatory in organizing the administration, developing local resources, and carrying out permanent public works, of which the country retains the benefit. Such arrangement shall be communicated to the Council of the League of Nations.

ARTICLE 16.

French and Arabic shall be the official languages of Syria and the Lebanon.

ARTICLE 15.

Same as Article 8 for Syria, omitting Para. 2 and adding to Para. 1: "No person shall be excluded from Palestine on the sole ground of his religious belief."

ARTICLE 16.

The Mandatory shall be responsible for exercising such supervision over religious or eleemosynary bodies of all faiths in Palestine as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government. Subject to such supervision, no measures shall be taken in Palestine to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of such bodies or to discriminate against any representative or member of them on the ground of his religion or nationality.

ARTICLE 15.

Same as for Syria.

ARTICLE 16.

Nothing in the clauses of this Mandate shall prevent the Mandatory from establishing a system of local autonomy in the zones of Mesopotamia where Kurds predominate, if the Mandatory sees fit to do so.

TEXTS OF THE MANDATES FOR SYRIA, PALESTINE AND MESOPOTAMIA—*continued*.

SYRIA.	PALESTINE.	MESOPOTAMIA.
<p>ARTICLE 17.</p> <p>The Mandatory shall make to the Council of the League of Nations an annual report to the satisfaction of the Council as to the measures taken during the year to carry out the provisions of this Mandate. Copies of all laws and regulations promulgated during the year shall be attached to the said report.</p>	<p>ARTICLE 17.</p> <p>Corresponding to Article 2 for Syria and Mesopotamia.</p>	<p>ARTICLE 17.</p> <p>Same as for Syria.</p>
<p>ARTICLE 18.</p> <p>The consent of the Council of the League of Nations is required for any modification of the terms of this Mandate.</p>	<p>ARTICLE 18.</p> <p>The Mandatory shall see that there is no discrimination in Palestine against the nationals of any State member of the League of Nations (including companies incorporated under its laws) as compared with those of the Mandatory or of any foreign State in matters concerning taxation, commerce or navigation, the exercise of industries or professions, or in the treatment of merchant vessels or civil aircraft. Similarly, there shall be no discrimination in Palestine</p>	<p>ARTICLE 18.</p> <p>The consent of the Council of the League of Nations is required for any modification of the terms of the present Mandate, provided that in the case of any modification proposed by the Mandatory such consent may be given by a majority of the Council.</p>

against goods originating in or destined for any of the said States, and there shall be freedom of transit under equitable conditions across the mandated area.

Subject as aforesaid and to the other provisions of this Mandate, the Administration of Palestine may, on the advice of the Mandatory, impose such taxes and customs duties as it may consider necessary, and take such steps as it may think best to promote the development of the natural resources of the country and to safeguard the interests of the population. It may also, on the advice of the Mandatory, conclude a special customs agreement with any State the territory of which in 1914 was wholly included in Asiatic Turkey or Arabia.

ARTICLE 19.
Same as Article 20 for Syria.

ARTICLE 19.
Same as Article 12 for Syria.

ARTICLE 19.
On the termination of the Mandate, the Council of the League of Nations shall use its influence to safeguard for the future the fulfilment by the Government of Syria and the Lebanon of the financial

TEXTS OF THE MANDATES FOR SYRIA, PALESTINE AND MESOPOTAMIA—*continued.*

SYRIA.	PALESTINE.	MESOPOTAMIA.
<p>obligations, including pensions and allowances, regularly assumed by the administration of Syria or of the Lebanon during the period of the Mandate.</p>	<p>ARTICLE 20.</p> <p>Same as for Syria, except opening words, "The Mandatory shall co-operate on behalf of the Administration of Palestine," etc.</p>	<p>ARTICLE 20.</p> <p>In case the Mandate conferred on the Mandatory by the present declaration should terminate, the Council of the League of Nations shall make such arrangements as it may judge necessary to assume, under the guarantee of the League, that the Mesopotamian Government shall fully honour the financial obligations legally contracted by the Mandatory during the period of the Mandate, including the rights of public officials to pensions and gratifications.</p>
<p>ARTICLE 20.</p> <p>The Mandatory agrees that if any dispute whatever should arise between the Mandatory and another member of the League of Nations relating to the interpretation or the application of the provisions of the Mandate, such dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice provided for by Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.</p>	<p>ARTICLE 21.</p> <p>Same as Article 14 for Syria.</p>	
	<p>ARTICLE 22.</p> <p>English, Arabic and Hebrew shall be the official languages of Palestine.</p>	

Any statement or inscription in Arabic on stamps or money in Palestine shall be repeated in Hebrew, and any statement or inscription in Hebrew shall be repeated in Arabic.

ARTICLE 23.

The Administration of Palestine shall recognize the holy days of the respective communities in Palestine as legal days of rest for the members of such communities.

ARTICLE 24.

Same as Article 17 for Syria.

ARTICLE 25.

In the territories lying between the Jordan and the eastern boundary of Palestine as ultimately determined, the Mandatory shall be entitled, with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations, to postpone or withhold application of such provisions of this Mandate as he may consider inapplicable to the existing local

TEXTS OF THE MANDATES FOR SYRIA, PALESTINE AND MESOPOTAMIA—*continued.*

SYRIA.	PALESTINE.	MESOPOTAMIA.
	<p>conditions, and to make such provision for the administration of the territories as he may consider suitable to those conditions, provided that no action shall be taken which is inconsistent with the provisions of Articles 15, 16 and 18.</p> <p>ARTICLE 26. Same as Article 20 for Syria.</p> <p>ARTICLE 27. Same as Article 18 for Syria.</p>	

ARTICLE 28.

In the event of the termination of the Mandate hereby conferred upon the Mandatory, the Council of the League of Nations shall make such arrangements as may be deemed necessary for safeguarding in perpetuity, under guarantee of the League, the rights secured by Articles 13 and 14, and shall use its influence for securing under the guarantee of the League, that the Government of Palestine will fully honour the financial obligations legitimately incurred by the Administration of Palestine during the period of the Mandate, including the rights of public servants to pensions or gratuities.

APPENDIX VIII

NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS REGARDING THE APPLICATION OF THE MANDATE FOR PALESTINE TO TRANSJORDANIA, SEPTEMBER 23, 1922.¹

The Secretary-General has the honour to communicate for the information of the Members of the League, a memorandum relating to Article 25 of the Palestine Mandate presented by the British Government to the Council of the League on September 16, 1922.

The memorandum was approved by the Council subject to the decision taken at its meeting in London on July 24, 1922, with regard to the coming into force of the Palestine and Syrian Mandates.

MEMORANDUM BY THE BRITISH REPRESENTATIVE.

1. Article 25 of the Mandate for Palestine provides as follows :—

“ In the territories lying between the Jordan and the eastern boundary of Palestine as ultimately determined, the Mandatory shall be entitled, with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations, to postpone or withhold application of such provisions of this Mandate as he may consider inapplicable to the existing local conditions, and to make such provision for the administration of the territories as he may consider suitable to those conditions, provided no action shall be taken which is inconsistent with the provisions of Articles 15, 16 and 18.”

2. In pursuance of the provisions of this Article, His

¹ Cmd. 1785, 1922.

Majesty's Government invite the Council to pass the following resolution :—

" The following provisions of the Mandate for Palestine are not applicable to the territory known as Trans-Jordan, which comprises all territory lying to the east of a line drawn from a point two miles west of the town of Akaba on the Gulf of that name up the centre of the Wady Araba, Dead Sea and River Jordan to its junction with the River Yarmuk ; thence up the centre of that river to the Syrian Frontier."

Preamble.—Recitals 2 and 3.

Article 2.—The words " placing the country under such political administration and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home, as laid down in the preamble, and "

Articles 4 and 6.

Article 7.—The sentence " There shall be included in this law provisions framed so as to facilitate the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jews who take up their permanent residence in Palestine."

Article 11.—The second sentence of the first paragraph and the second paragraph.

Articles 13, 14, 22 and 23.

In the application of the Mandate to Trans-Jordan, the action which, in Palestine, is taken by the Administration of the latter country, will be taken by the Administration of Trans-Jordan under the general supervision of the Mandatory.

3. His Majesty's Government accept full responsibility as Mandatory for Trans-Jordan, and undertake that such provision as may be made for the administration of that territory in accordance with Article 25 of the Mandate shall be in no way inconsistent with those provisions of the Mandate which are not by this resolution declared inapplicable.

APPENDIX IX

BRITISH AND TURKISH ARGUMENTS REGARDING THE FRONTIER BETWEEN TURKEY AND 'IRAQ.

BRITISH ARGUMENTS.

A. Racial.

1. Population figures for Mosul vilayet :—

District.	Kurds.	Turks.	Arabs.	Christians.	Jews.	Total.
Mosul ..	179,820*	14,895	170,663	57,425	9,665	432,468
Arbil ..	77,000	15,000	5,100	4,100	4,800	106,000
Kirkuk ..	45,000	35,000	10,000	600	1,400	92,000
Suleimania	152,900	1,000	—	100	1,000	155,000
Total ..	454,720	65,895	185,763	62,225	16,865	785,468

Including 30,000 Yezidis.

TURKISH ARGUMENTS.

A. Racial.

1. Population figures for Mosul vilayet :—

District.	Kurds.	Turks.	Arabs.	Non-Moslems.	Total.
Suleimania ..	62,830	32,960	7,210	—	103,000
Kirkuk ..	97,000	79,000	8,000	—	184,000
Mosul ..	122,000†	35,000	28,000	31,000	216,000
Total ..	281,830	146,960	43,210	31,000	503,000

† Including 18,000 Yezidis.

BRITISH AND TURKISH ARGUMENTS 215

BRITISH ARGUMENTS (*contd.*).

A. Racial (*contd.*).

1. Population figures for Mosul vilayet (*continued*).

Only nomads generally admitted to range nearly exclusively in the Mosul vilayet have been included above.

2. The Turkish figures are old and incomplete. They were compiled for obtaining lists for military service, and many thousands of persons were excluded because they were not available for service or managed to get excluded to avoid service. The Turks were never in a position to compile accurate statistics.

3. Although the Arabs are only one-quarter of the whole population they comprise two-thirds of the town of Mosul (60,000 in a population of 90,000). All the country west of the Tigris is purely Arab; that between the Tigris and the Arbil-Kirkuk-Kifri road is in great majority Arab. Only the north-east corner of the vilayet is not Arab, and here in the north there are Christians (Assyrians, Nestorians and Chaldaeans) who fled from the Turks during the war to avoid massacre and cannot be handed back to Turkey.

The Turks number only one-twelfth of the population. They belong to a different branch of the race to the Ottomans.

The origin of the Kurds is obscure, but the best authorities say they are Iranian. In any case, they speak an Iranian language. Their appearance can easily be distinguished from that of the Turks. Their customs regarding women and other matters are different.

TURKISH ARGUMENTS (*contd.*).

A. Racial (*contd.*).

1. Population figures for Mosul vilayet (*continued*).

The nomadic population of about 170,000 should not be included, as it migrates to other regions and cannot be said to belong to the vilayet.

2. The Turks have owned the country for centuries and are in the best position to have accurate figures. Moreover, the fact that the British figures were compiled since the war, when there was interest in supporting Arab claims, throws them open to suspicion.

3. There is a Turco-Kurdish majority of 85 per cent.

Many of the Arabic-speaking inhabitants of Mosul are really Turks who have either lost their language or are bilingual.

These and other Turks who form between one-third and one-fourth of the population are of the same stock and speak substantially the same language as the Anatolian Turks.

Turks and Kurds should be counted together. According to the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, the Kurds are of Turanian, not Iranian origin. Their manners and customs are similar to those of the Turks.

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BRITISH ARGUMENTS (*contd.*).

B. Political.

1. The Kurds have constantly resisted interference from Constantinople. The Turks have never exercised effective control in southern Kurdistan. The Kurds in this area gave more assistance to the British than to the Turks during the war. Except round Kirkuk they voted for King Feisal.

2. There are practically no British troops in the Mosul vilayet. The indications of the population's wish to be united with 'Iraq are overwhelming and were not obtained by unfair pressure. The rising of 1920 was partly the result of Turkish propaganda. It occurred during a difficult transitional period, and it was not unnatural that the population should at first resent a strong administration such as the Turks had never given them. The Arabs did not want the Turks.

3. The Allied pledges to the Arabs included the town of Mosul.

The Mandatory principle had been established in the Covenant of the League of Nations. One Mandate cannot be attacked without attacking them all. Therefore Allied responsibilities to the League of Nations cannot be ignored. The Turks implicitly recognized the Mandatory system when they treated with

TURKISH ARGUMENTS (*contd.*)

B. Political.

1. The Kurds wish to be united to Turkey. They do not desire separation or autonomy, still less inclusion in a country which is virtually the colony of a European Power. The Kurds do not look on the Turkish Government as a foreign Government. They are represented in the Turkish Parliament and happy to have rights of Turkish citizenship. Rebellions against the Turks in Kurdistan were only of local importance and were fomented by foreign Consuls. The Kurds are hostile to the Arabs and the British, neither of whom has been able either to dominate or co-operate with them.

2. There is no evidence that the Arabs of the Mosul vilayet wish to belong to the kingdom of 'Iraq. British attempts to ascertain their wishes have no value, as the country is in British occupation and pressure can be exerted. The rising of 1920 is evidence of British unpopularity. All the Arabs would really prefer to return to Turkish allegiance, but Turkey would not interfere with rights of self-determination.

3. The Allies are under no international obligations which would prevent the return of Mosul to Turkey.

The Allied pledges to the Arabs do not apply to the northern part of the Mosul vilayet.

There is no reason why the arrangement come to between the Allies at San Remo allocating Mosul to the future British Mandatory Area should be any

BRITISH AND TURKISH ARGUMENTS 217

BRITISH ARGUMENTS (*contd.*).

B. Political (*contd.*).

France about the northern frontier of Syria (by the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement of October 1921). France could only act in Syria as a Mandatory. Pending the confirmation of the Mandate for 'Iraq, Great Britain had been asked to administer the country in the spirit of the Mandate. Moreover, Great Britain had concluded a Treaty with King Feisal, one provision of which was that no part of his territory was to be alienated.

4. The Allies were within a few miles of Mosul when the Armistice was signed. One of the Armistice provisions was to allow the occupation by the Allies of any places necessary for their security. The position held by the opposing armies at the conclusion of hostilities has nothing to do with the eventual frontiers to be settled in the Peace Treaty. The Angora Government has always refused to recognize the Armistice of Mudros.

C. Historical.

The Turkish argument applies equally to Baghdad, which is not claimed. Mosul was only made a separate vilayet for administrative convenience.

The Greek associations with the interior of Anatolia have not been considered reasons for giving this country to Greece.

D. Geographical and Economic.

1. Mosul is geographically and economically inseparable from 'Iraq.

TURKISH ARGUMENTS (*contd.*).

B. Political (*contd.*).

more unalterable than the inter-Allied agreements concluded during the war which have since been recognized as inapplicable to existing circumstances.

The Mandate has no legal basis and does not exist. The Allies have therefore no obligations towards the League of Nations.

4. The town of Mosul was occupied by the British aiter and in violation of the Armistice of Mudros. In any case, the right of conquest is not an argument which can be advanced in the present age when it is not considered right to transfer populations without their consent.

C. Historical.

Mosul has been ruled by Turks for eleven hundred years. It was under Turkish and Seljuk sovereigns and governors before the existence of the Ottoman Empire and even in the days of the Arab Empire.

The Turkish association is illustrated by the prevalence of Turkish names.

D. Geographical and Economic.

1. Geographically and climatically the dividing line between Anatolia and 'Iraq is the line Jebel Hamrin-Jebel Fouhoul-Vadi-i-Tatar-Jebel Sinjar. There

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BRITISH ARGUMENTS (*contd.*).

D. *Geographical.* (*contd.*).

2. There is little connection between Mosul and Anatolia. Both exports and imports travel either east and west into Syria or south and north to the Persian Gulf. Southern Kurdistan looks towards Baghdad, not towards Anatolia.

E. *Military.*

1. A Turkish army at Mosul would have Baghdad at its mercy.

2. The Jebel Hamrin is not a great mountain range but merely a series of rolling downs. The Turks could cut off Baghdad's wheat supplies and the important trade route to Persia.

The Turkish frontier in Europe will be 80 miles from Constantinople. The Turks argued that this was not far enough for safety. Yet they consider a frontier 60 miles from Baghdad safe enough. Adrianople is not a capital. The safety of Constantinople is specially guaranteed in the Straits Convention.

TURKISH ARGUMENTS (*contd.*).

D. *Geographical* (*contd.*)

are no date-palms north of this line.

2. Mosul lies at the junction of trade routes between Anatolia and Syria and Persia. It is the outlet of Southern Anatolia. The trade of Mosul is mostly transit trade in Anatolian products. With the establishment of railway communication with the Mediterranean, Mosul will turn towards this short route to Europe which also serves Anatolia.

E. *Military.*

1. Turkey has no aggressive designs.

2. The frontier proposed by the Turks would come no closer to Baghdad than to the Persian frontier. If 70 miles is too close for a capital to be to the frontier, what about the arrangements made regarding Constantinople and the Straits and regarding Adrianople and Thrace?


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